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ABSTRACT 

Deals with the issue of freedom of conscience in two of its principal advocates in 
the modem English and Spanish-speaking worlds, John Henry Newman and Miguel de 
Unamuno. Seemingly strange bedfellows, in their respective linguistic communities 
Newman is considered an intellectual defender of institutional Christianity, while 
Unamuno is oft characterized as its greatest heretic. 
This dissertation is a comparative study of both writersfi^om a historical-critical 
perspective. Our aim is to suggest that the heroic defenses of conscience by both 
NewTnan and Unamuno towards the end of their lives are a logical corollary to a 
succession of actions and writings from their youth onwards in the affirmation of the 
principles offi-ee examination and personal choice against censorship, control and 
coercion. 
In our research on Newman's and Unamuno's thought on tmth and life, religion 
and ideology, conscience and authority, we therefore pursue that living and developing 
intelligence by which they wrote, argued and acted. Hence, we chronologically apply 
their own literary and philosophical thought over a life-time of writings to their own 
actions in freedom of conscience in academic, religious and political settings. Academics 
and activists in defense of conscience, they bear witness to its deeper meaning as related 
in their books, poems and letters. Both were poets, polemicists, and philosophers. Above 
all, both were people, willing to pay the price of expulsion, exile and loneliness, in their 
search for tmth in life and life in tmth. 
IV 
Therefore, our approach is both literary and philosophical. In Newman and 
Unamuno, we respectfully shadow the development of their own autobiographical 
writings. Our focus is to analyze key periods of their lives in chronological order, 
combining principal writings and cmcial decisions. Seeking out their views on 
conscience from childhood memories throughout philosophical classics, the agony of 
personal polemics, analyses of historical Christianity, poems in exile and heroic defense 
of conscience against authority, we find a consistency unto death. 
Conclusively, we wish to deduce a theory of freedom of conscience in Newman 
and Unamuno vis-a-vis, churches, states and universities, as applicable to all human 
beings independent, but inclusive, of their religious, political and academic convictions. 
CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

Vencereis, pero no convencereis.' 
Anyhow the tme judgment about me lies, [.. .] 
with my own acts.^ 
Unamuno's final public words spoken on October 12, 1936, in the Aula Magna of 
the University of Salamanca, cited above by Rudd, face to face with the violent arrogance 
of General Millan Astray, "vencereis, pero no convencereis," may also be duly 
appreciated as the peak of another writer's brave defense of conscience against 
authoritarianism.^ 
Likewise, Mr. Kingsley's pamphlet, "What, Then, Does Dr. Newman Mean?"" 
comes to mind as we seek today the meaning of Newman's oft quoted after-dinner toast 
to conscience. Newman (1801-90) had written in his "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk" 
(1875): "Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts, (which 
indeed does not seem quite the thing) I shall drink—to the Pope, if you please,~still, to 
Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards."^ No doubt Newman's toast can be 
effectively used as a mirror to better see Unamuno. 
The bibliography on Unamuno, and specifically his religious search and beliefs, is 
vastly extensive. However, critics up to now seem to insist on analyzing a variety of 
Unamuno's views, such as that as an existentialist philosopher, an Old Testament 
believer, a poetic Christian or a Catholic Atheist, rather than his belief in freedom of 
conscience as a condition sine qua non of such a search and even contradictory opinions. 
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One classic philosophical view of Unamuno is that of an existentialist in the 
footsteps of Kierkegaard. In the vein of Paul Hie who wrote that "Unamuno's existential 
psychology is in the finest tradition of humanism,"^ Cerezo later added that, "Se diria que 
hay en Unamuno una profiinda dimension esencialista platonic-augustina, filtrada por el 
nuevo clima kantiano-fichteano del mundo modemo."^ Recently Csetjei completed a 
comparison between the Knight of Faith of Kierkegaard and Unamuno's interpretation of 
Don Quixote, concluding that: "The experience of Unamuno's readings of Kierkegaard 
served as a stimulating factor in the writing of a commentary which, beyond any dispute, 
bears the marks of a sovereign author. [...] With the spiritual association of the Danish 
and Spanish-Basque thinkers, the entire European culture has becomes richer." Csetjei 
does go on to note the common feature that "both Knights of Faith are relentless enemies 
of institutional, ecclesiastical religiosity" (720). Nonetheless our purpose is to focus on 
the element of freedom of conscience implicit in such an existentialist philosophy. 
On the specific issue of Unamuno's religiosity and, particularly, Christianity, 
talented writers from Heman Benitez to our days have addressed the topic. Benitez had 
synthesized his Christian religiosity as "Protestant mind" and "Catholic heart." This 
interpretation may be symbolized in Unamuno's rejection of his finished statue. Unamuno 
showed the artist the iron cross under his vest guarding his heart, and insisted that he add 
the silhouette of the cmcifix over his left breast. 
Martin Nozick sees his appearance as a Protestant pastor in a predominantly 
Catholic country as "a protester in a society which had known no serious religious 
cleavages in three centuries," given that "to be the Spanish Luther had once been his 
ambition." However, the protestantismo of Unamuno, according to Nozick, is in lower 
case "a disposition of the spirit, a religious intentionality beyond or above all official 
'shibboleth'": (47). 
Nelson R. Orringer also faces the dilemma of Unamuno being either Catholic or 
Protestant. Again, taking a cue from the old library at the University of Salamanca, 
Orringer sees the Protestant pastor dress in contrast to the signs of Catholic piety present 
in the cmcifixes hanging beside the painting of the Christ of Velasquez on his bedroom 
wall. Orringer meticulously goes through Unamuno's personal notes upon writing the 
Sentimiento tragico de la vida. searching for hidden sources, to propose that Unamuno's 
reUgion was that of a "ritschliano catolico" (17). Unamuno himself refers to the 
Protestant left, the free-thinkers bom of the Reformation, as the thought "que enraiza 
mejor en mi corazon y arregla la constante lucha de este con la cabeza" (Carta de 
Unamuno a Luis de Zulueta, 12 agosto 1903).'^ Unamuno himself never hides the fact of 
the influence of Ritschl and his disciples. Even the phrase "Creo, Senor, ayuda mi 
incredulidad," made his own by Unamuno, comes from Hamack (230). Orringer 
concludes: 
^es luterano Unamuno?; ^es calvinista? Tan luterano como pueden 
serlo los evangelicos Ritschl y Hamack, criticados ambos por la ortodoxia 
alemana; tan calvinista como el nada ortodoxo Sabatier; y menos luterano 
o calvinista por la incertidumbre de su "piedad catolica", a base de la cual 
modificaba, con frecuencia ligeramente, las doctrinas reogidas de los tres. 
(223-2) 
Rodrigo Segarra, however, comes to an opposite conclusion: Unamuno was 
neither Catholic nor Protestant. His faith was that of Job, an Old Testament faith, "Que 
Unamuno fue un hombre veterotestamentario y, por consiguiente, en el sentido pleno de 
la palabra y de modo coherente y constante a lo largo de su vida, no puede ser 
considerado cristiano."'^ Furthermore, Segarra applies certain criteria of authentic 
Christianity to Unamuno and finds him lacking. Instead of the intellectual rejection of 
dogmas which Boerigter considers as creating "tremendous problems for an 
understanding of Christianity,"'" Segarra sees neither a personal relationship with Christ 
nor Christ's mediation nor resurrection in Unamuno (191-92). Besides, Segarra considers 
that, due to Spain's intransigent Catholicism and fanatical hatred for Jews, Unamuno 
used, "utilizo," the external trappings of Christianity to move along with his Old 
Testament faith (194). 
Van Dee entitled his recent book on Unamuno, Spain's Catholic Atheist, finding 
"a philosophical cocktail of Christian, Protestant, Jansenist and Modernist heterodoxy 
splashed all over his [...] works."'^ 
A retum to the characterization of Unamuno as a poet, and to El Cristo de 
Velasquez as his masterpiece, is skillfully achieved by William T. Little. Based on 
Unamuno's own perception of himself as primarily a poet. Little steers another road of 
interpretation beyond the Catholic-Protestant, Christian-Jewish, Secularist-Religious, 
Believer-Atheist paradigms. Unamuno's faith is seen as an eternal search for God. So, 
like all prophetical poets, Unamuno sees his own search for immortality as a model for 
his people. 
Little concludes the first chapter of his Introduction: 
Therefore, at the peak of Unamuno's maturity, [.. .] he chose to 
enter the dark night of his personal soul—which he conceived of and 
experienced as a reflection of his nation's soul—by writing an extended 
poetical fiction in order to discover and raise the core of this creative voice 
to the level of public consciousness. He does this totally in El Cristo de 
Velazquez by reflecting on the supreme mystery of the death and 
resurrection of the Judeo-Christian God in human form as mediated by a 
masterpiece of Spanish painting. (19) 
However, knowing don Miguel, we may possibly imagine how he might reject 
any of the above characterizations. Precisely because conscience is personal, and not 
social, one's beliefs are individual, not sectarian. Hence, Unamuno hated the idea of 
being labeled or pigeon-holed, a member of either an organized creed, a political party or 
an institutional church. Belief is both a free and personal search for tmth and life: 
Y yo no quiero dejarme encasillar, porque yo, Miguel de 
Unamuno, como cualquier otro hombre que aspire a conciencia plena, soy 
especie linica.'^ ("Mi religion" 371) 
De lo que huyo, repito, como de la peste, es de que me clasifiquen, 
y quiero morirme oyendo preguntar de mi a los holgazanes de espiritu que 
se paren alguna vez a oirme: "Y este senor, ^que es?" [...]. (374) 
Y es obra de suprema piedad religiosa buscar la verdad en todo y 
descubrir dondequiera el dolor, la necedad y la inepcia. (375) 
Hence, the thrust of this work will be to avoid the question of what Unamuno 
was, what group he belonged to, or what he believed, respecting his own desire not to be 
"pigeon-holed." What we wish to emphasize is the value of his personal, temporal, 
conscience throughout his life as the essential element in Unamuno's opinions and 
decisions. To further enhance our study, we will use the life, writings and thought of John 
Henry Newman as a constant comparison to Unamuno. The fact that both did not believe 
in rigid schemas of belief and adherence, but followed their consciences consistently in 
often inconsistent fashion only adds to their belief in offering conscience the freedom to 
search and choose. 
So, what exactly did Newman (1801-90) and Unamuno (1864-1936) mean? A 
succession of writings from their early years until their deaths offer us the key both 
writers give as to what they themselves really "meant." Along with their books, we seek 
out the real "men of flesh and blood."'^ The Apologia itself offers us the key Newman 
himself wished to give to what he "means." Rather than go by books, we ought go by 
persons, says Newman (Letters and Diaries 22: 158). Unamuno, on the other hand, begins 
his main philosophical work, Del sentimiento tragico de la vida en los hombres v en los 
pueblos (Sentimiento tragico), insisting that: "Y asi, lo que en un filosofo nos debe mas 
importar es el hombre" (1: 80). 
In our search for Newrman's and Unamuno's thought on conscience vis-a-vis the 
academic, political, and religious authorities of their time, we pursue that "living 
intelligence" by which they wrote, and argued, and acted (Newman, Apologia 11). 
Therefore, we may rightly apply their own literary and philosophical thought over a life­
time of writings to Newman's and Unamuno's own actions in defense of their personal 
conscience. Their multiple experiences in defense of personal conscience are witnessed 
by deep meditation and courageous decisions as related in their books, poems and letters. 
Following the distinction made by John Henry Newman in his Essay on a 
Grammar of Assent we are concemed with that personal "assent" of conscience to 
authority or beliefs, that is, the act of faith rather than the content of that faith.'^ So, the 
argument of intellectual assent is considered from the point of view of personal 
conscience. Hence, the question is not whether either Unamuno or Newman were or were 
either believers, followers or members of specific groups at different stages during their 
lives. So, with Unamuno, we not only inquire whether he was a believer in Christ when 
writing the El Cristo de Velasquez, but also focus on the fact of his reading the poem at 
the anticlerical Ateneo (1914).^° In Newman's case, we analyze the fact of his reception 
into the Catholic Church (1845), but remember his refusing the Pope's invitation to 
attend the First Vatican Council (1870).^' 
That is, we are concemed with how Unamuno and Newman viewed different 
aspects of authority during their lives. We are not focusing on how authorities viewed 
either Unamuno's or Newman's decisions in conscience. Particularly, both authors had to 
deal with Roman Catholicism, with very different reactions. Towards the end of his life, 
Newman received the red hat of the cardinalate (1879), the highest honor in Catholicism, 
whereas Unamuno was considered the "greatest Spanish heretic of modem times" by 
Bishop Pildain of the Canary Islands, at the same time when the University of Salamanca 
was planning to honor Unamuno by dedicating the Casa Museo Unamuno (Rudd 318­
21). 
A similar parallel also exists in the fact that both introductory quotes at the 
beginning of this chapter are part of incidents that took place towards the end of each 
writer's life. Newman considered the "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk," wherein the toast 
is contained, his "last publication" (Letters and Diaries 25: 29) just as Unamuno's words 
to General Millan Astray were in fact his final words in public. Hence, we may rightly 
trace back their own historical and theoretical methods in key works to their own lives to 
better understand their final testimonies. 
This comparative essay aims to be both philosophical and literary, based 
especially on Unamuno's philosophy of religion in Del sentimiento tragico de la vida en 
los hombres y en los pueblos and Newman's in An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. 
linked to the historical analysis of Christianity made by Unamuno in La agonia del 
cristianismo and by Newman in An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. The 
personal, concrete, touches of both authors are read in Unamuno's Recuerdos de ninez y 
mocedad and Newman's Apologia Pro Vita Sua. We conclude with the existential 
realities of San Manuel Bueno, martir, as a practical application of the ideas in "Mi 
religion," and with Newman writing his "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk" as a concrete 
example of his previous ideas and life. 
Our hope is to discover a reflection on conscience and its freedom as they lived 
these convictions throughout their lives, and to which they gave long meditation in their 
moments of exile and solitude. Unamuno's and Newman's final conclusions on 
conscience and authority, respectively in their speech and toast, may thus be duly 
appreciated as the peak of a "living intelligence" on conscience by which they "wrote, 
argued, and acted" (Apologia, pref 11). 
Our approach is humanistic, seeking a view and expression of freedom of 
conscience in both as writers and witnesses, applicable as a human right to all persons. In 
fact, in An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent Newman sought to investigate "natural 
tmths," rather than religious ones (93). Here, likewise, we wish to deal with the natural 
tmth of conscience vis-a-vis authority as applicable to all humans, independent, but not 
exclusive, of their academic, political and religious convictions. 
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Following Newman, we believe that this philosophical basis is the best: "An evil 
time is upon us. Principles are being adopted as starting points, which contradict what we 
know to be axioms. It follows that the only controversy which is likely to do good, is 
philosophical" (Letters and Diaries 24: 74). 
Unamuno likewise rejects a merely religious answer "lafe del carbonero" to his 
search for meaning: (Sentimiento tragico 4: 128) 
Esa sed de vida etema apaganla muchos, los sencillos sobre todo, 
en la fuente de la fe religiosa; pero no a todos es dado beber de ella. (4: 
115) 
A costa, preciso es decirlo, de oprimir las necesidades mentales de 
los creyentes en uso de razon adulta. Exigeseles que crean o todo o nada, 
que acepten la entera totalidad de la dogmatica, o que se pierda todo 
merito si se rechaza la minima parte de ella. (129) 
Newman also believes in the need for freedom of personal inquiry for and against 
historical Christianity: "We are necessarily thrown back on our own judgment 
individually to determine, what the revelation of God is, or rather if in fact there is, or has 
been, any revelation at all. 
Newman and Unamuno therefore accept a philosophy of freedom of conscience, 
with the given that the very character of tmth and life demand that they be subject to free 
examination by the thinking person. Hence, the affirmation and belief in rigid dogmas 
lends itself to the possible proscription of free thought and investigation. In Unamuno's 
words: "Y lo mas opuesto a buscar la vida en la verdad es proscribir el examen y declarar 
que hay principios intangibles. No hay nada que no deba examinarse. jDesgraciada la 
patria donde no se permite analizar el patriotismo!"^^ Whereas Newman argues: "An 
argument is needed, unless Christianity is to abandon the province of argument; and those 
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who find fault with the explanation here offered of its historical phenomena will find it 
their duty to provide one for themselves" (Development 31). 
Our hermeneutic principle is that established in the Essay on the Development of 
Christian Doctrine by Newman: 
Ideas are in the writer and reader of the revelation, not the inspired 
text itself and the question is whether those ideas which the letter conveys 
from writer to reader, reach the reader at once in their completeness and 
accuracy on his first perception of them, or whether they open out in his 
intellect and grow to perfection in the course of time. (Development 56) 
Besides, we may equally apply to Unamuno his own theory on ideas being both in 
the writer and in the reader of his books and life, as he himself did with Cervantes. 
Escribi aquel libro para repensar el Quijote contra cervantistas y 
emditos, para hacer obra de vida de los que era y sigue siendo para los 
mas letra muerta. ^Que me importa lo que Cervantes quiso o no quiso 
poner alii y lo que realmente puso? Lo vivo es lo que yo alii descubro, 
pusieralo o no Cervantes, lo que yo alii pongo y sobrepongo y sotopongo, 
y lo que ponemos alii todos. Quise alii rastrear nuestra filosofia. 
(Sentimiento tragico 12: 274) 
So, not only may we read Unamuno's and Newman's texts as they wrote and 
understood them, there and then. Hence, our ultimate goal is to research whether 
Newman's and Unamuno's ideas in their writings and witness, as conveyed to the reader 
today, can be developed into a coherent theory on freedom of conscience. Hence, as this 
essay advances, we seek to find in Newman and Unamuno a process of reasoning starting 
off from their own consciences as children, and, then, moving on in their lives to accept 
or reject certain authorities, especially religious, with their teaching and commands. This 
acceptance will be then only valid in so far as it is accepted in Newman's and Unamuno's 
conscience. 
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This latter principle implies a liberty of conscience vis-a-vis all kinds of authority 
be they academic, political or religious. Hence, we hope to show that both Unamuno and 
Newman followed consistently a path "such as to secure us against hopeless mistakes and 
emancipate us from the capricious ipse dixit of authority" (Grammar of Assent 211). 
11 
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CHAPTER II 

AN ORDINARY CHILD 

El divino aliento del Creador inspira su alma [del niiio].' 
To a mind thus carefully formed upon the basis of its natural conscience, 

the world, both of nature and of man, 

does but give back a reflection of those tmths about the One Living God, 

which have been familiar to it from childhood.^ 

To prove their point that there is "an instinct of the mind recognizing an extemal 
Master in the dictate of conscience," (Grammar of Assent 102) and "es que acaso no hay 
concepcion mas honda de la vida que la intuicion del nino" (Recuerdos 128), Newman 
and Unamuno both sketch in the Grammar of Assent and Recuerdos de ninez y mocedad, 
respectively, a phenomenology of conscience as supreme in the mind of an ordinary 
child. Newman considers that there is an "impulse of nature," which recognizes a Moral 
Govemor in the consciousness of right and wrong, whereas Unamuno likewise perceives 
a divine origin in our moral sense from childhood: 
jCuantas veces volvemos la vista a la intuicion serena de los 
primeros aflos, la que a fuerza de sencillez alcanzo la mayor profundidad! 
La mayor profundidad, la que sonda el ojo creador de la poesia, cuya 
fecunda edad es la ninez. Asi como al enajenamos en la obra artistica la 
recreamos de nuestra fantasia, nos sentimos autores con su autor que se 
perdio en ella y, por tanto, sin envidia ni recelo la gozamos, asi tambien el 
nino, al enajenarse en el mundo, lo recrea y el divino aliento del Creador 
inspira su alma. (Recuerdos 125-26) 
Without using the word "innate," Newman does see that a child immediately links 
his sense of right and wrong with a feeling of God. His offence is considered a sin against 
God. A child who has offended his parents will "alone and without effort" place himself 
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in the presence of God and beg of Him to set him right with them (Grammar of Assent 
103-07). 
The importance of this phenomenology of religion in a child is to prove the 
"connatural" character of conscience in every person from infancy. Such a phenomenon 
is present in every human being prior both in time and authority to all future authority. 
Newman gives the example of a child offending his parents and placing himself in the 
presence of God. 
Unamuno considers that the ideas we have on birth are the strongest ideas 
throughout our lives: 
Las ideas que en cierto modo traiamos virtualmente al nacer, las 
encamaron como vaga nebulosa en nuestra primera vision, las que fiieron 
viviendo con nuestra vida y de nuestra vida hasta endurecer sus huesos y 
su conciencia con los nuesfros son las ideas madres, las linicas vivas, son 
el tema de la melodia continua que se va desarrollando en la armoniosa 
sinfonia de nuestra conciencia. (Recuerdos 125) 
The application to religious authorities on earth is also drawn by both Newman 
and Unamuno. All divine authorities, such as revealed Religion and institutional 
Churches based thereupon, have their authority in God speaking to conscience. This is 
because conscience relates directly to God as the source of the authority of possible 
religious revelation and authority. Hence, religious authority, written and oral, is accepted 
by the individual precisely as a message and mandate from God only and in so far as it 
has, and is recognized in conscience to have, authority from God in that specific mandate. 
Hence, both writers were to defend from the beginning an absolute independence of mind 
and action from organized religion. At the end of his phenomenology of natural 
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conscience, Newman states how "this vivid apprehension of religious objects [...] is 
independent of the written records of Revelation; it does not require any knowledge of 
Scripture, nor of the history or teaching of the Catholic Church" (Grammar of Assent 
107). 
This independence of mind in the adolescent Unamuno is reflected in his religious 
experiences. On the one hand, he wanted to be a saint, "sonaba en ser santo" (Recuerdos 
113), but, on the other, he soon saw the ignorance of people in religious matters. His 
fervor with the San Luis Gonzaga Congregation was interpreted by a fellow youth as a 
political affiliation with the Carlist cause: 
Todavia recuerdo la profunda indignacion y el hondo desden que 
me produjo el que un chico me dijera que todos los congregantes eramos 
unos carhstones. jCarlistones! Me parecia que en este, como en otros 
casos, atribuia yo a la deplorable ignorancia que respecto a cosas 
rehgiosas leia que aquejaba a los hombres frivolos y mundanos. (114) 
Revelation is a great "addition" of fullness and exactness to our mental image of 
the Divine Personality and Attributes. According to Newman, "the vivid apprehension of 
religious objects, on which I have been enlarging, is independent of the written records of 
Revelation; it does not require any knowledge of Scripture, nor of the history or the 
teaching of the Catholic Church" (Grammar of Assent 107). In Unamuno's case, the 
religious ceremonies common to the Spanish tradition are described in detail in Chapter 
XIII of the Recuerdos de ninez y mocedad. All the "fiestas" seem totally sociological, 
with no mention of the divine, until Unamuno fondly remembers, even years later, the 
impact the Corpus Christi procession had on him: 
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jOh, y que dulce recuerdo intimo, que recuerdo de vida nueva tiene 
para mi esta primaveral procesion de Corpus de mi Bilbao, esta procesion 
que hace tantos afios que no he vuelto a ver! [.. .] Fue en la calle de 
Bidebarrieta, bien lo recuerdo; fue en primavera. De los balcones Uovian 
rosas sobre el Santisimo, y tambien sobre mi alma, que apenas dejaba la 
infancia, Uovian desde el cielo rosas de primavera [. . .]. Despues me han 
dado friitos y espinas. (71-72) 
Conscience is therefore prior to and independent of authority, like that of a child's 
consciousness of God, which is prior to, and independent of, his parents' or church's 
authority and teaching. Later on, for both believers, conscience will follow God prior to 
and independent of any religious authority. Religious authority for the believer, therefore, 
only has force in so far as it is recognized in conscience to have divine authority. Hence, 
conscience is both chronologically and naturally prior to authority, since God is first 
knovm directly by conscience, according to Newman. 
Here we have the force and weight of conscience as Newman and Unamuno will 
later defend it. It is neither the mle of pride against authority, nor blind acceptance of 
human authority, but rather an obedience to a "kindly Light." The poet Newman wrote: 
Lead, Kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom 

Lead Thou me on! 

The night is dark, and I am far from home-

Lead Thou me on ! 

Keep Thou my feet; 1 do not ask to see 

the distant shore-one step enough for me. 

With Unamuno, there is an illusion at the end of his adolescence, to live "en 
renovacion perpetua, empezado a vivir cada dia" (Recuerdos 121). This natural link 
between God and duty, as brought out in An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent and 
Recuerdos de nifiez v mocedad, in each one's conscience from childhood sets the stage 
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for our own reading of Newman's and Unamuno's childhood, considering each one as "an 
ordinary child" (Grammar of Assent 103) 
How does this conscience develop and grow? In those same pages, Newman and 
Unamuno speak of the divine image being strengthened and developed by "information 
extemal to ourselves" (105). With Unamuno, the child: "Se pierde en el mundo, y al 
perderse en el lo hace suyo; en su espiritu virgen se abrazan la vida del mundo y la de su 
alma; enlaza sus fantasias de lo creado, y al dejarse llevar de la corriente de los dias, que 
fluye buUiciosa por su espiritu, alcanza la mayor libertad en el seno de la necesidad mas 
estricta (Recuerdos 126). 
Applying our method of reading Newman and Unamuno through their own lives, 
let us examine key details of their growing conscience as children vis-a-vis authority 
paralleled to their teaching on conscience in a child. 
In John Henry's mind, the world of "nature and of man" are somewhat a mirror 
where the child attains these first tmths on conscience (Grammar of Assent 106). In his 
own case, certain "information extemal" to himself will shed light on his future decisions 
in conscience as they gradually evolved. Hence, the individual circumstances surrounding 
the life of Newman and every child become part of divine providence helping that infant 
discover the meaning of conscience. God and our duty are thus both intertwined in a 
manner "singularly congenial to the mind," due to the fact that the growing human person 
goes beyond the mere shapes and aspects of goodness (103). The child knows good 
things, persons and actions, and immediately goes beyond to a sense of God. 
Unamuno sees that the intuition of a child touches the meaning of life as it 
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presents itself to him: "Y es que acaso no haya concepcion mas honda de la vida que la 
intuicion del nifio, que al fijar su vista en el vestido de las cosas sin intentar desnudarias 
ve todo lo que las cosas encierran, porque las cosas no encierran nada; siente el misterio 
total y etemo, que la mas clara luz; toma a la vida en juego y a la creacion en 
cosmorama" (Recuerdos 128). 
As they looked back at their life and faced surprise after surprise, these tmths 
held. So, for both Newman and Unamuno, no event in a life is indifferent or purposeless. 
Indeed, imforeseen and unusual circumstances can force untold influence on the 
development of each life and conscience. For Newman, the Apologia Pro Vita Sua would 
never have been bom without the attack on his sincerity by Kingsley; the "Letter to the 
Duke of Norfolk" without Gladstone; An Essay on the Development of Christian 
Doctrine without his expulsion from the Anglican Church. With Unamuno, the sickness 
and death of his beloved son would inspire Amor y pedagogia; expulsion from the 
University of Salamanca would steer him towards Del sentimiento tragico de la vida en 
los hombres y en los pueblos; exile to Fuenteventura and Paris would lead him to La 
agom'a del cristianismo. The intolerance of the Second Republic would possibly inspire 
San Manuel Bueno, martir. The arrogance of General Millan Astray motivates the 
prophecy of "Vencereis, pero no convencereis." 
The world of nature and man are the scaffolding on which each person walks their 
path. These ideas are clearly expressed in the whole thmst of Newman's and Unamuno's 
autobiographical works such as the Apologia and the Paz en la guerra. Newman's 
"Secretum meum mihi" made him "rest in the thought of two and two only absolute and 
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luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator."" Unamuno's philosophy rested 
on the 'hombre de came y hueso."^ The meaning both gave to their lives came from the 
central tmth of their teaching on conscience supremacy as knowing the real world in an 
independent ethical fashion from infancy. 
The "world of nature and of man" which reflected a moral sense in Newman's and 
Unamuno's growing consciences as children were their homeland and family. These 
memories of places and people are linked in Newman and Unamuno to their concept of 
life and, hence, to their teaching on the presence of an individual conscience judging life 
as it evolves before them (Grammar of Assent 106). Reminiscing upon the events of their 
childhood meant for Newman and Unamuno remembering their own moral judgments as 
children, echoing their continuous teaching on conscience as being an innate personal 
relationship with a life to be lived. 
Newonan's vivid memory of his childhood involves the image of a huge house in 
the countryside near London, isolated in a field of greenery, illuminated in the evening 
with the fleeting glimmer of candles buming in honor of Admiral Nelson, the victor at 
Trafalgar.^ This was Grey's Court at Ham near Richmond, some miles from the hustle 
and bustle of London. The thought of this immense and quiet home made such an 
impression on Newman that much later in life he affirmed he was able to recall the 
slightest detail although he had seen the house only once or twice since his youth. 
Newman, sensitive to his own history as the dwelling-place of God in his conscience, will 
later search history for the dwelling-place of God in the Church. In the Introduction to the 
An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctiine Newman wishes to use in 
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conti-oversy "the testimony of our most natural informant conceming the doctrine and 
worship of Christianity, viz., the history of eighteen hundred years."^ 
Unamuno's memory of his childhood was, above all, related to his personal 
experience of the Cariist war and siege of his native town, Bilbao, fts bombing in 1874 
was the catalyst of his maturity as a youth. His conscience awakened to the reality of life 
and history brought to his own doorstep: "Pero el suceso verdaderamente nuevo, 
verdaderamente imprevisto, el suceso que dejo mas honda huella en mi memoria fue el 
bombardeo de mi Bilbao, en 1874, el ano mismo en que entre al fristituto. En el termina 
propiamente mi nifiez y empieza mi juventtid con el bachillerato" (Recuerdos 75). 
But not only did this event stand in Unamuno's memory, it also formed the basis 
for all the futtire line of thought for the story of his life. His constant involvement in 
politics can be easily understood as a need to avert his country from the tragedy of war he 
himself witnessed as a child. 
The first authority figure in Newman's and Unamuno's "world of men" were, of 
course, their fathers. Mr. Newman was a banker who wished to give his family the peace 
of the countryside. Nevertheless, hard hit by the financial troubles after Waterloo, Mr. 
Newman acquired the craft of the brewer. This change of fortune brought an end to 
stability and security at home—no doubt a lesson to the child John Henry on the fragility 
of what is human. Towards the end of his life, he found again the "poor book" of violin 
music used in his infancy. This "voice from the grave" had to be auctioned after his 
father went bankmpt. "What a world of history," he sighed, "has any single family in it, 
which perishes like the leaves in Autumn" (Letters and Diaries 25: 352). 
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Unamuno remembers his father at the beginning of Recuerdos de ninez y 
mocedad in what we may consider a prophetical conversation in French with a 
Frenchman. Later, Unamuno was to spend time in Paris and have some works first 
printed in French, not to mention his philological abilities: 
Murio mi padre en 1870, antes de haber yo cumplido los seis afios. 
Apenas me acuerdo de el [...]. Le recuerdo, sin embargo, en un momento 
preciso, aflorando borrosa memoria de las nieblas de mi pasado. [. ..] Un 
dia en que mi padre conversaba en frances con un frances me cole yo a la 
sala, y de no recordarle sino en aquel momento, sentado en su butaca, 
frente a M. Legorgeu, hablando con el un idiomas para mi misterioso, 
deduzco cuan honda debio ser en mi la revelacion del lenguaje. 
(Recuerdos 9-10) 
Another constant frait in Newman's and Unamuno's sense of conscience related to 
their childhood consciousness was their patriotism. In Newman's case, Kingsley had 
accused him of untmthfiilness, but John Henry felt confident of his acquittal by his fellow 
Englishmen. He considered them " the most suspicious and touchy of mankind," but he 
would rather be an Englishman than belong to any other race (Apologia 8). In his 
writings Newman reveals some of his father's traits, attracting esteem rather than 
admiration. As an English gentleman, his culture was that of a liberal member of the 
bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century. 
With Unamuno, the childhood memory of the worthless destmction of his town, 
region and country, was not mere melancholic sentimentality. Rather, the event urged 
him to analyze its causes, with a hope of making his first literary work worthwhile for 
future generations. In the prologue to his Paz en la Guerra, he addresses Spaniards, 
quoting Walt Whitman on one of his collections of poems: "Permitidme, espaiioles, que 
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asi como Walt Whitman dijo en una coleccion de sus poemas: 'jEsto no es un libro; es un 
hombre!', diga yo de este libro que os entrego otra vez: 'Esto no es unanovela; es un 
pueblo.'" Unamuno's patriotism felt enhanced eleven years later with his ending to 
Recuerdos de ninez v mocedad. After identifying himself and his land, "Yo fio en mi 
pueblo porque fio en mi" (Recuerdos 149), he could conclude "jArriba, mi Bilbao, que el 
provenir es tuyo!" (157). 
From an early age, both thinkers were avid lovers of books related to religion. 
However, their childhood religiosity was without doubt more conformist than profound, 
more sincere in its convictions than in its manifestations. Later on, we see both the adult 
Nevraian and Unamuno lament the extravagances in some extemal exaggerations in 
pietistic devotions, from which the "national good sense" has protected English 
Catholics, according to Newman.^ 
While in Recuerdos de ninez y mocedad, Unamuno merely mentions religious 
devotions, in Paz en la guerra religion comes hand in hand with war. Religious affiliation 
is identified with political affiliation. Hence, those who dissent, the "other" is the enemy, 
"El enemigo, jel otro!" (Paz en la guerra 117). Religious leaders are personified in the 
curate Santa Cmz, whose authority signified terror, "su paso era el del terror" (110). 
Leaving a trail of victims of firing squads, Santa Cmz's followers cried both "jViva 
Santa Cmz!" and " jviva la religion!." Unamuno's conclusion was simple and sad: 
Y aquel mismo hombre de terror dirigiales arengas, sacandoles 
lagrimas al hablarles de la guerra. 
-Os hablara de la religion [.. .] 
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-Don Manuel no anda por religion, anda por guerra . . . 
-dijo uno. (103) 
The difficulty of rejecting one aspect of social religion and accepting another was 
foremost in Unamuno's mind as his life advanced. If we are to accept the bombing of 
Bilbao and the blood of the Cariist wars in the name of religion as the foremost memory 
of his childhood and adolescence as well as the topic of his first novel, no wonder that 
Miguel de Unamuno would have serious difficulties with established Catholicism in his 
lifetime. Upon rejecting the authority of the Church in one issue, the slope was slippery 
to reject all. Later, in the Sentimiento tragico, he realized that: 
Exigeseles que crean o todo o nada, que acepten la entera totalidad 
de la dogmatica, o que se pierda todo merito si se rechaza la minima parte 
de ella. Y asi resulta [.. .J y es que en Francia y Espaiia multitudes que 
han pasado de rechazar el papismo al absoluto ateismo [...]. Aqui esta, en 
efecto, el terrible peligro: en creer demasiado. jAunque no! El terrible 
peligro esta en otra parte, y es en querer creer con la razon y no con la 
vida. (Sentimiento tragico 4: 129) 
Instead of violent priests and passive multitudes, John Henry inherited from his 
mother the "Bible Religion" of which he was so proud. Aided by his grandmother and 
Aunt Elizabeth, Newman was introduced to the sacred texts, and the Bible remained the 
manual, par excellence, for all of his religious life. The text spoke as much to his eyes as 
to his mind, and the impressions which he received from it day after day were of an 
aesthetic as well as of a religious order. Bible history revealed some strong and beautifiil 
images to him. His memory then collected them as precious symbols, burying them in the 
deepest recesses of his mind, in order that they might never be lost. Much later, they will 
spring forth from him spontaneously. Every sermon in St. Mary's at Oxford and at 
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Birmingham, every letter to diverse friends, every work of apologetics, are already 
present in germ because of his first biblical initiation. Linked to the text is the revelation 
of a personal God, living at the very heart of history, so rich in personages and heroes, 
that filled the child's subconscious with a richness of images of the divine. The notion 
"God and myself is in the heart of Scripture, at the heart of the Apologia and at the heart 
of his concept of conscience (16). 
It is the best book of meditations which can be, because it is 
divine. This is why we see such multitudes in France and Italy giving up 
religion altogether. They have not impressed upon their hearts the life of 
our Lord and Savior as given in the Evangelists. They believe merely with 
the intellect, not with the heart. Argument may oversee a mere assent of 
the reason, but not a faith founded in a personal love for the Object of 
Faith. They quarrel with their priests, and then they give up the Church. 
We can quarrel with men, we cannot quarrel with a book. (Letters and 
Diaries 26: 87) 
John Henry, therefore, inherited a contented and toleremt Anglican religion, the 
Via Media, always somewhat restrained in its enthusiasm and formal in its rites. His 
sincere efforts in conscience to add depth to its doctrine will later prove his undoing. 
However, his childhood religion enjoyed the King James Bible as an ancient patrimony, 
guarded more with fidelity than with passion. Later on, here too instead of Unamuno 
striking at monarchical papacy, Newman would see the weakness of a "Bible Religion." 
The Religion of England is "the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible-the 
consequence is that to strike a blow at its inspiration, veracity or canonicity, is directly to 
aim at whatever there is of Christianity in the country" (19: 482-83). 
So, we see that Unamuno's and Newman's texts quoted above on individual 
conscience knowing ethical tmths through a reflection of the worid of a child can be aptly 
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applied to Newman and Unamuno themselves. The force of their argument in favor of 
supremacy of conscience is that moral absolutes are present in one's conscience since 
childhood. The events of the world around a child are part of that development of a 
conscience as the person grows. Besides, the supremacy of conscience and its freedom is 
perceived from childhood in its very concept of right and wrong. Newman's childhood 
was his own example to himself of such a natural conscience. His long joumey towards 
"a distant shore" had begun ( "The Pillar of the Cloud," Verses XC: 156) 
In Unamuno's case, his life was seen as a mystery, not a decided fate of the gods. 
Based on his childlike intuition of life, one senses that there is a mystery, a beyond, an 
inner world: "Mas solo conservando una niiiez etema en el lecho del alma, sobre el cual 
se precipita y brama el torrente e las impresiones fugitivas, es como se alcanza la 
verdadera libertad y se puede mirar cara a cara el misterio de la vida" (Recuerdos 129). 
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CHAPTER III 

MYSELF AND MY CREATOR 

Llegue a que todos tienen razon' 
When I was fifteen, [. . .] 
a great change of thought took place in me.^ 
If Newman's and Unamuno's childhood are themselves vivid examples of their 
teaching on human conscience being natural and consisting necessarily in a relationship 
with a personal God, adolescence in Newman's and Unamuno's lives brought them to the 
experience of a religious crisis. What will be interesting in our analysis of this 
phenomenon will be to see how their concepts of conscience reacted to a personal 
experience of religion. The key task will be to see how Newman's and Unamuno's 
changes in thought were not purely subjective as an emotional phenomenon, empty of all 
objective reality, but rather there was a reference to a definite thought system, a 
questioning of authority, and a responsibility towards the fiiture. 
This question should set the stage to answer a deeper concem about conscience 
vis-a-vis authority. If the authority of conscience is supreme as present from the 
beginning of human conscience, as stated in the previous chapter, how can we avoid the 
trap of subjectivism? Can Newman's and Unamuno's thought on natural conscience lead 
to a reduction of conscience to an emotional a priori, due to man's "sense and taste of the 
infinite" in the dependent mode of Schleiermacher?^ Was Newman not answering 
rationalistic criticism of his Bible religion, and Unamuno of his Catholic upbringing by 
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adopting an introspective Kantian a priori approach to God where the roots of religion lie 
in the stmcture of the human mind?" Would Newman's and Unamuno's doctrine of a 
supremacy of conscience over authority, due to the relationship of conscience to the 
individual, not be the death-knell to objective religion and church authority? Later, and 
logically, by putting conscience above the Pope, is Newman not playing into the ancient 
temptation of "being like God" (Gen. 3:5)? And, was not Unamuno succumbing to the 
pride of "praesumptio," excessive confidence in oneself, as charged by his commentator, 
Julian Marias?^ 
Admittedly, their first crisis as teenagers was that of an typical adolescent with 
limited maturity and boundless idealism. Both had a combination of religious fervor and 
philosophical readings. Nevertheless, Newman himself attributed life-long importance to 
this moment of religious conversion. After he became a Cardinal, he confided to Anne 
Mozley, the editor of his correspondence: "Of course I cannot myself be the judge of 
myself; but [. . .] I should say that it is difficult to realize or imagine the identity of the 
boy before and after August 1816 [. . .] I can look back at the end of seventy years as if 
on another person."^ 
Unamuno, likewise, considers his first crisis as a teenager: 
En la epoca de este cuarto curso, a mis catorce afios, cumpliose en 
mi, en lecturas de vela y por la obra de la Congregacion de San Luis 
Gonzaga, la labor de la crisis primera de espiritu, de la enfrada del alma en 
su pubertad. Y voy a ver si consigo hallar palabras apropiadas y sencillas 
para contaros aquella brisa de la mafia de mi espiritu. jFeliz quien logra 
resucitar en su memoria la candorosa expresion de sus afios de 
romanticismo. (Recuerdos 103) 
Unamuno later was certainly not the practicing Catholic nor was Newman the 
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Evangelical of their early youth. Both boys before their changes clung to the upright 
religion and morality learnt at home. However, some taste of superstition still was 
remaining. At the beginning of the Apologia Newman stated how "even though I had 
formed no religious conviction [.. .] I used constantly to cross myself on going into the 
dark" (Apologia 14). 
In Unamuno's case, he remembers his experience of childhood Catholic fervor 
and piety, practicing all Holy Mother Church teaches. 
Verdad es que recuerdo tambien como habiendo leido en un 
devocionario una jaculatoria que proporcionaba cincuenta dias de 
indulgencia a cualquier fiel por cada vez que devotamente la recitare, nos 
estuvimos una tarde una prima mia y yo, sentados sobre la mesa de la 
cocina, recitandola una y ofra vez durante largo espacio de tiempo y 
llevando en un papel con raya de un lapiz la cuenta, no ya de los meses, 
sino de los afios de indulgencia que nos habiamos ganado. (Recuerdos 22) 
His conclusion on indulgences sounds more like a Lutheran critique: "Y tengo por 
indudable que nos los ganamos, vaya si nos los ganamos (22). 
At this stage of their lives, Newman and Unamuno took an inkling towards both 
philosophy and a more emotional and personal Christian faith. Their teenage study was 
based on their first exposure to both the liberal and conservative models characteristic of 
the 18* and 19* century. In the same token, both thinkers were to steer away from 
dogmatism towards a more emotional and personal Christian faith. 
Newman ventured into the literary frontiers of the philosophies of deism where 
the seeds of doubt flourished. Having studied The Age of Reason by Paine, he did not 
appear to have been frightened by the rationalism of Hume any more than by that of 
Voltaire (Apologia 15-16). We notice no anti-clerical bias, the fear of so many people 
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between me and God, but rather a moralistic approach to religion as simply doing one's 
duty. As Newman approached his first conversion, his early ritualistic religious 
upbringing seemed to recede and his critical powers were advancing. 
The change or conversion took place during the summer of 1816. John Henry was 
sent away to the College at Ealing where he had to remain after the close of the school 
term in June, because of the collapse of the bank which Mr. Newman directed. At Ealing, 
he found a discreet and dedicated scholar in the Rev. Walter Mayers, a naturally serious 
man of character. This shy person was above all dedicated to God, preoccupied with the 
Gospel message. Mayers nonetheless always had a yeaming for a more apostolic mission 
and pastoral ministry. He hid the simplicity and depth of his faith under the austere 
appearance of a rigid professor, indifferent to both sympathy or success. Nevertheless, his 
example and the straightforwardness of his words eamed him the esteem of Newman, 
who knew how to look beyond the man's timidity (Apologia 16). 
In religion. Rev. Mayers was a convinced supporter of Evangelicalism. The 
essence of the Evangelical stream within the Anglican Communion was to bring souls to 
the purity and rigorous simplicity of faith. This movement was conceived more as an 
experience of assured salvation than as an adhesion to dogmas. From this came the 
importance attributed to conversion and new birth, giving to each one the certainty of his 
own salvation experienced through the grace of Jesus Christ. Accompanying this 
conversion was an austere morality which added a rigid code of conduct to the piety of 
Evangelicals (17-18). 
Unamuno's change also followed a combination of philosophical and personalized 
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religion: 
En la epoca de este cuarto curso, a mis catorce anos, cumpliose en 
mi, por lecturas en noches de vela y por la obra de la Congregacion de San 
Luis Gonzaga, la labor de la crisis primera del espiritu, de la entrada del 
alma en la pubertad. Y voy a ver si consigo hallar palabras apropiadas y 
sencillas para contaros aquella brisa de la mafiana de mi espiritu. 
(Recuerdos 103) 
Unamuno, in fact, instead of being sent to a college like Newman, found his tutors 
in Balmes and Donoso, with his reading of the only books available to him in the library 
of his father. Nonetheless, this limited library opened his mind to a whole new world: 
Por Balmes me entere de que habia un Kant, un Descartes, un 
Hegel. Apenas entendi yo palabra de su Filosofia fimdamental - esa obra 
tan endeble entre las endebles otras balmesiana —, y, sin embargo, con un 
ahinco grande, el ahinco mismo que aplicado despues a la gimnasia 
regenero mi cuerpo, me empefie en leerla entera y la lei. (Recuerdos 105) 
Those days for Unamuno were a combination of emotional mysticism and 
philosophical searching. Deeply emotional and intellectually curious, the stage was set 
for a philosophy of life linking heart and head, will and imagination: 
Aquellos dias en que me empeiiaba en llorar sin motivo, en que me 
creia presa de un misticismo premature, en que gozaba de rodillas en 
prolongar la molestia de ellos [...]. (103) 
Me dormia a veces con el libro bajo los ojos; otras veces, cansado, 
aburrido, me entretenia en pellizcar los mocos de la vela y en 
amontonarlos junto a la mecha para que volvieran a consumirse, mientras 
se consumia la vitalidad de mi mente a la caza de ideas que se me 
escapaban.(104) 
The results were different for both teenagers, but with amazing similarities. Li 
Newman's case, the new birth of conversion portrayed a conviction of a singular 
predestination from God, acquired by a strong effort of the will and imagination. John 
Henry experienced the certainty of God's pardon in a stirring intuition, thought necessary 
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to reach the certitude that Christ had redeemed him from sin. This proof was as absolute 
and infallible as the fact of one's "own hands and feet" (Apologia 16). So, yielding to a 
flood of emotions, his heart let itself go in a touching avowal of gratitude and love for its 
God who had filled it from his most bountiful mercy. The barrenness of moral formalism 
and the skepticism of rationalism seem to have been answered by a personal call by God 
towards emotional piety. How objective was Newman's conversion to this ardent 
devotion? Was this God neither that of the philosophers nor that of Abraham, Isaac and 
Jacob, but rather the God of Newman's own emotional needs? 
In the Apologia Newman stated the circumstances of his conversion and his debt 
to Rev. Mayers. As to the objective content of his conversion, we notice that it was not a 
mere subjective certainty of conversion. The latter would involve the vicious circle of 
subjectivity, certitude based on certitude. Rather Newman noticed a great change of 
thought, rather than emotion: 
When I was fifteen, (in the autumn of 1816), a great change of 
thought took place in me. I fell under the influence of a definite Creed, and 
received into my intellect impressions of dogma, [. . .] 1 neither recollect 
the title nor the contents, except one doctrine, which I do not include 
among those which I believe to have come from a divine source, viz., the 
doctrine of final perseverance. (Apologia 16) 
In Unamuno's life, the search for the etemal led to changes in his ideas, perhaps a 
seed to his future assertion of his right to contradict himself 
Enamorabame de lo ultimo que leia, estimando hoy verdadero lo 
que ayer absurdo; consumiame un ansia devoradora de esclarecer los 
etemos problemas; sentiame peloteado de unas ideas en otras, y este 
continue vaiven, en vez de engendrar en mi un escepticismo desolador, me 
daba cada vez mas fe en la inteligencia humana y mas esperanza alcanzar 
algima vez un rayo de la Verdad. (Recuerdos 104-05) 
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However, these variations did not lead Unamuno to universal skepticism, but 
rather to a more solid faith in human intelligence. Instead of degrading human efforts due 
to their pluralist conclusions, Unamuno saw that all people are subjectively "right": "En 
vez de llegar, como muchos llegan, a decirme: 'Nada puede saberse de cierto', llegue a 
que todos tienen razon y es lastima grande que no logremos entendemos" (Recuerdos 
105). The words "tienen razon" may be aptly read as both "being right" and "having a 
right." This respect for individual intelligence and, hence, conscience was to continue the 
rest of his life. 
What is important in these texts and their lives is that both Unamuno and 
Newmian feel certain of both aspects of their change or growth: emotional and 
philosophical. With Newman, it is a loving relationship with Jesus as his personal Lord 
and Savior, and also a conversion to God who manifests Himself in a definite creed or 
objective revelation. Moreover, the very doctrine of final perseverance is understood as 
such, that is, a doctrine, an objective teaching to be believed in. In fact, Newman referred 
explicitly to a "divine source" being necessary for the validity of a doctrine. Hence, the 
certitude of belief is not based on the certitude itself, but rather on the "definite creed" 
which itself supposes a divine source. Therefore, the reason behind his conversion was 
not the strength of emotional certitude but rather the fact of divine revelation as 
understood by John Henry. Just as with Unamimo, it was not the personal emotion of 
tears or the will to leam, but rather the conviction of the valor of each person's mind. 
Applying this distinction to conscience, we may deduce that conscience for 
Newman and Unamuno in these changes is not derogatory about their previous 
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superstitious and religious convictions. Rather conscience finds an objective reason for 
conversion, and hence changes. It was the same search for tmth and meaning which 
spurred both on a personal love for tmth, and a better understanding of religion. So we 
see that, for Newman and Unamuno, the same conscience that found tmth was prepared 
to receive further insight. Nature who gives us a conscience as part of our being also 
gives us as part of that conscience the possibility of knowing tmth constantly better in 
conscience through some revelation. In this sense, Newman later would write that 
conscience is a messenger from God both "in nature and in grace."^ 
A second characteristic of this conversion according to the Apologia was 
Newman's understanding of final perseverance and Unamuno's thoughts on "holy tmst." 
On the one hand, Newman asserts the consciousness of his inward conversion and 
certainty that it would last until the next life with his election to etemal glory. In 
Unamimo's case, one of his first writings "jPistis y no gnosis!" (1897) likewise argues in 
favor of an idealistic final Christian hope linked to a moral commitment. Drawing on the 
historical phenomenon of the early Christians, Unamuno draws the conclusion that their 
hope in the second coming of Christ was a hope in the future, where the person and life 
of Jesus was the guide for their lives. 
Jovenes las comunidades cristianas, esperaban la proxima venida 
del reino del Hijo de Dios; la persona y la vida del Divino Maestro eran el 
norte de sus anhelos y sentires. Sentianse henchidas de verdadera fe, de la 
que con la esperanza se confunde, de lo que se Uamo pistis, fe o confianza, 
fe religiosa y no teologal, fe pura y libre todavia de dogmas. Vivian vida 
de fe- Vivian vida de fe; vivian por la esperanza en el porvenir; esperando 
el reino de la vida etema, vivian esta. 
Hence, their sense of Christian ti^th and hope were both directed towards a 
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Person. Their religious faith is neither towards an idea nor an authority nor a virtuous life 
in themselves, but rather towards the Person of Jesus. This God revealed in a tmth, an 
example, and a way of life. This Person, therefore, for a Christian, is above any dogma, 
authority and morality. So, the need to follow conscience towards a philosophy, creed 
and lifestyle was ultimately the need to follow the person of Jesus. 
For both searches, their beliefs involve moral commitment. Newman has no 
consciousness that "this belief would lead me to be careless about pleasing God" 
(Apologia 16). Unamuno finishes his article on faith insisting on the moral basis, that is, 
sincerity, tolerance and mercy: and the necessity of this kind of faith to live accordingly: 
Solo viviendo con la fe en el ideal inasequible y nebuloso cabe 
obrar obras de vida etema en el presente concrecionado y necesario. 
Hay que vivir vida de verdadera fe en el ideal, henchidos de 
sinceridad, de tolerancia y de misericordia. 
jSinceridad, tolerancia y misericordia! ("jPistis y no gnosis!" 
1024) 
Parallel to the Apologia, many confidences in the Journal, written at the time of 
this conversion, are indeed helpful for understanding John Henry's state of mind. A first 
annotation: "I recollect, in 1815 I believe, thinking that I should like to be virtuous but 
not religious. There was something in the latter idea I did not like. Nor did I see the 
meaning of loving God" (Mozley 1: 19). 
So, our view is confirmed that Newman before this religious change at age fifteen 
was seeking a moral perfection, rather than a religious fidelity. The demands of a 
conscience characterized by sincerity and uprightness became a call to love God. His 
former readings had drawn him into the ways of a deism perfectly reconcilable with a 
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certain moral rectitude. However, it is clear that the young Newman realized that virtue 
should be lived to the full in order to be tme. His conversion was to change an 
emotionless moralistic theory into a personal encounter with God. 
Hence, besides the inner consciousness and philosophical certainty which could 
easily be argued as a subjective emotion, and maybe even a passing one at that, there was 
a clear link between that hope and a desire to live accordingly. So, Newman and 
Unamuno do not fall into the quicksand of a subjective conscience based on their 
thoughts, independent and apart from any personal commitment in their lifestyles, but 
rather saw a clear link between their faith, hope and life. 
Newman's and Unamuno's conversions, therefore, were like that of Evangelicals. 
There was the same isolation of conscience free from beings and things, a sense of being 
alone and dependent on God, with the same assurance of being once and always saved. 
We find the same openness of the young Newman and Unamuno to the call of living life 
to the full, the same wish to surpass self in pursuit of the tmth, the same enjoyment of a 
lifelong purpose and the same need of an ideal. In these texts of the Apologia and the 
Recuerdos we note the admiration of the young disciples who find philosophical and 
religious masters, not only through discussion and reasoning, but through reasons that 
only the hearts could know, as Pascal would say. Future years will change off some of 
their ideas and convictions, including the rejection of their teenage mentors, but a durable 
foundation will subsist. Profound values of personal commitment, definite hope, and 
service to humanity will bear abundant fruit in Newman's and Unamuno's future 
endeavor to follow conscience. 
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As to Mayers, as with Balmes and Donoso, we note both their influence and their 
limits on both teenagers. Mayers had influenced the lonely Newman in the course of 
those months of vacation in the empty school. The shy teacher was able to express his 
better self in their conversations. Gaining the confidence of Newman he revealed to him 
thetime meaning of life, the seriousness of the call that God addresses to every soul, and 
the inestimable reward of conversion. The grave wamings of Mayers detached Newman 
from an incipient deism towards the call of the austere life in God. Newman seemed 
captivated, as we see from his letter as a Cardinal and the Apologia, quoted above. 
Exuhed at the encoimter of God's presence, Newman had no doubt of his spiritual 
experience of a second birth. 
But Newman also soon saw Mayers' limits. Beyond the enthusiastic certainty, 
Newman sought the reason why of his conversion and certainty of perseverance. The 
strength of his emotions did not block out the procedure of his mind. Though accepting 
Mayers as his teacher, Newman did not cease seeking after tmth. As will be his 
characteristic in the future, Newman's conscience was above any teacher, because his 
conscience was his personal relationship of duty and friendship with tmth. While 
preserving the essence of his conversion experience as a personal relationship with God 
who loves and saves him, Newman shows his independence of mind not to identify either 
God or tmth with those who claimed to be either his representatives or teachers. 
In December 1816, in fact, Nevmian had gone to Oxford. Mayers gave him a 
work to read, the Private Thoughts of the evangelical Bishop Beveridge. Mayers' letter at 
the end of the month revealed the Master's innermost fears: 
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On pemsing it you will see that the opinions which we have 
discussed, though at present singular, are not novel, nor are they without 
authority, for they are deduced from the only authentic source. To that 
source let me direct your attention. Be more disposed to form your 
sentiments upon religion from that, than to adopt and interpret it to your 
opinions.^ 
The above not only reveals the fears of a master losing his disciple but touches the 
nerve of liberty of conscience. The master based the force of his argument on the fact that 
the matters discussed are neither novel nor without authority, but based on an authority, 
the book of Beveridge. "Not novel" is an appeal to tradition, which begs the question, 
what authority has that tradition got? Whereas, the second appeal to authority as the 
"only authentic source" is equally empty, if not dangerous. The implication is that Bishop 
Beveridge is authoritative in religious matters, and, hence, is the voice of God. Mayers' 
command to be "more disposed" to Beveridge begs the final question of Mayers' own 
authority to command, and the limits thereof His rejection of Newman's opinions in 
favor of Beveridge's without giving reasons why smacks of religious despotism. As we 
wrote in a previous publication on cult-tactics in the Confessions of St. Augustine: 
If Faustus were so sure of his postulates, why was he so afraid of 
questions [.. .]? This implies that either Faustus did not have all the 
answers or the very fact of his not having all the answers did not fit in with 
the cult's credo. His rejection of "the give and take of argument" would 
imply no argument, except the authority of Faustus to allow no 
argument."^ 
Unamuno, in his Recuerdos de nifiez y mocedad, never tired in the hunt for ideas 
initially escaping his grasp. Reading Kant, Fichte and Hegel, causes him vertigo, but the 
critical skills seen later in his life, were also present in the young Unamuno's reading of 
Bahnes and Donoso. The very difficulty of understanding philosophy motivates 
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Unamuno to seek deeper insight, due to its very obscurity: "El mismo vertigo me hacia 
asirme de ella y me entercaba en penetrar el sentido oculto, creyendo que todo lo oscuro 
era profundo por ser lo mas profundo lo inexpresable" (Recuerdos 105-06). 
As with Newman vis-a-vis Mayers, Unamuno began to think critically about his 
masters. Their readings brought him to knowledge of greater philosophers, but also to a 
critical analysis of his initial masters. Soon they who opened his eyes to philosophy also 
enabled him to see their limits, especially in the philosophers they presented. In fact, their 
very reading of Kant, Fichte and Hegel seems inadequate to the searching mind of 
Unamuno. Oversimplification leads to infidelity to the authors: "La desilusion de Balmes 
file lo que empezo a abrirme los ojos. El espiritu del publicista Catalan, una especie de 
escoces de quinta mano, tenia no poco de infantil; simplicificaba todo lo que criticaba, 
ganando la discusion en claridad cuanto perdia en exactitud la exposicion de las doctrinas 
criticadas"(106). 
What was even worse was that Balmes himself did not seem to have direct 
experience with the texts of the philosophers he criticized: "Me he convencido mas tarde 
de que quien no tenga de los grandes filosofos kantianos otra idea que la que de ellos nos 
da Balmes no los conoce. Balmes mismo no los conocia apenas, sino de referencias y por 
extractos y muy mal digeridos" (106). 
Reflecting on the medieval experience of second-hand readings, Unamuno leamt 
then the importance of faithfial translations and direct contact with the texts themselves. 
Possibly his love for languages and his yeaming for reading writers in the original came 
from this negative experience with Balmes: 
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Pero asi como en pesimas traducciones de traducciones, a las veces 
en tercero y cuarto grados, que de Aristoteles corrian en la Edad Media, 
quedo de su genio el suficiente reflejo para promover y agitar escuelas y 
vivificar pensamientos, asi del Hegel, por ejemplo, de Balmes llegaba a mi 
un eco apagado y lejano de la portentosa sinfonia de su gran poema 
metafisico. (106) 
Nonetheless, Unamuno did leam a lesson, studying Balmes' interpretation of 
Hegel. Though Balmes was so superficial, mere by skimping the surface of Hegel, out of 
these readings came pulp, "de ellas broto pulpa" (106). 
At the same time, both writers rejected a blind irrational faith in religious 
authority. NewTnan would write in a work intimately involved in his later "great change" 
to Catholicism: "An argument is needed, unless Christianity is to abandon the province of 
argument."" From Mayers' letter above, we note the pupil did not comply without 
reservation to the principles instilled in him with such great insistence and concem. The 
"absolute obedience" rejected later in the "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk" is unacceptable 
from Newman's first conversion, however emotional and salutary (Difficulties 2: 243). 
Throughout his life Unamuno had a problem with a simplistic faith, a "fe del 
carbonero" ("coal-seller's faith") as he often quotes. In one of his first references to the 
term and its reality, in his Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho, segun Miguel de Cervantes 
Saavedra (1905), Unamuno contrasts the latter with Sancho's faith: 
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La fe de Sancho en Don Quijote no fue una fe muerta, es decir, 
engafiosa, de esas que descansan en ignorancia; no fue una fe de 
carbonero, ni menos fe de barbero, descansadora en ocho reales. Era, por 
el contrario, fe verdadera y viva, fe que se alimenta de dudas.'^ 
Esta la tuya es fe, Sancho, y no la de esos que dicen creer un 
dogma sin entender, ni aun a la letra, siquiera su sentido inmediato, y tal 
vez sin conocerlo; esta es fe y no la del carbonero, que afirma ser verdad 
lo que dice un libro que no ha leido porque no sabe leer ni tampoco sabe lo 
que el libro dice. (Don Quijote 234) 
Obedience, however, though not "absolute," is rendered unto Mayers by 
Nevmian, as Christianity was accepted by Unamuno, though their ideas were later 
adjusted. Newman read the recommended devotional books: Beveridge, Doddridge, Law, 
and Romaine, "all of the school of Calvin." He listened to the sermons which led him 
towards predestination and efficacious grace (Mozley 1: 21). He even scribbled some 
writings, one of them drawn clearly from the Calvinistic inspiration: "These will be 
punished with etemal punishment" (1:21). More and more, the thought of predestination 
took possession of his spirit and an obsession with etemal salvation accompanied it. 
Newman was seeking to persuade himself that the conversion of 1816 really was the 
"second birth" which the books described and which an all too impressive master 
announced to him. He kept this illusion until much later when his inner life grew strong 
and when the realities of the pastoral ministry showed him the inconsistency of this 
"detestable doctrine" of predestination (Apologia 17). 
Besides, his conversion was not exactly according to the book, as is evident from 
his testimonies. He first wrote in 1821: "I speak of conversion with great diffidence, 
being obliged to adopt the language of books. For my own feelings, as far as I remember, 
were so different from any account I have ever read that I dare not go by what may be an 
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individual case." Then adding when he transcribed the above in 1826: "In the matter in 
question, that is conversion, my own feelings were not violent but a retuming to, a 
renewing of principles, under the power of the Holy Spirit, which I already felt, and in a 
measure acted on when young" (Mozley 1: 109). 
Unamuno, likewise kept his Christian faith, but, in the historical Christ and his 
message, as each one understands it, not in Church dogmas and authorities: 
Porque, despues de todo, ^fe cristiana que es? O es la confianza en 
Cristo o no es nada: en la persona historica y en la historica revelacion de 
su vida, tengala cada cual como la tuviere.... fe que no estriba en sus 
ideas, sino en el; no en una doctrina que representara, sino en la persona 
historica, en el espiritu que vivia y vivificaba y amaba. Las ideas no viven 
ni vivifican ni aman.'^ 
Likewise, rejecting both the intellectualism of the irrational and the simplistic 
faith of the coal-worker, Unamuno insists on tmst, not belief, as being the essence of 
faith: "Todo lo que no sea entrega del corazon a esa confianza de vida, no fe, aunque sea 
creencia. Y toda creencia termina, al cabo, en un credo quia absurdum, en el suicidio, por 
desesperacion, del intelectualismo, o en la terrible fe del carbonero" ("La fe" 266). 
Unamuno further explains this simplistic faith as a "vicious" illogical circle, in 
which Church doctrine and the people's faith explain one another: 
jTerrible fe la del carbonero! Porque ^a que viene a reducirse la fe 
del carbonero? 
—^Que crees? 
-Lo que cree y ensefia nuestra Santa Madre la Iglesia. 
-^Y que cree y ensefia nuestra Santa Madre la Iglesia? 
-Lo que yo creo (bis). (266) 
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So, we see a conversion to Christ in Newman and Unamuno that is unique, both 
in their critical acceptance of a specific teacher and a recommended doctrine. 
As to their corresponding life styles, Newman's "not being careless about pleasing 
God" (Apologia 16). led him to copy the models proposed by his masters and books. 
Exerting himself to living his life within the limits of this narrow way, he made 
resolutions and cultivated virtue. The spectacle he offered his family was one of a solitary 
soul, sometimes not well understood. Newman reflected: 
Although it is far from pleasant to give my reasons, inasmuch as I 
shall appear to set myself up, and to be censuring recreations, and those 
who indulge in them: presenting my scmples with humility and a due 
obedience to my parents; open to conviction, and ready to obey in a matter 
so dubious as this is, and to act against my judgment if they command, 
thus satisfying at once my own conscience and them. (Mozley 1:19) 
Unamuno also obviously had difficulties with his family due to his new religious 
convictions. In Paz en la guerra, Pachico, a character in the novel clearly modeled on 
Unamuno himself, gives up his religious practice in Madrid. For a time, he attended 
Church services regularly, then only on feast-days, and finally gave up altogether, seeing 
he no longer found any meaning to the act: "El primer curso iba a misa todos los dias y 
comulgaba mensualmente, [...] Asi es al salir de misa en la mafiana de un domingo- [. . 
.]-se pregunto que significase ya en el tal acto y lo abandono desde entonces, [...] como 
la cosa mas natural del mundo." 
However, on one trip home, his uncle noticed the change. Drawing on the youth's 
memory of his mother, he will leave Pachico emotionally drained and in tears, fri fact, on 
his mother's death anniversary, his uncle convinced Pachico to confess and retum to the 
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religion of his childhood. Pachico fought through a crisis of retrogression with an old 
faith stmggled for rebirth. The irony of the priest's advice against reading the Soliloquies 
of Augustine, as being too strong, still reflected the impact on Pachico and, as we may 
surmise, on Unamuno: 
Y al separarse Pachico del confesionario, desilusionado del ensayo, 
se decia: se creera el pobre que no he leido los Soliloquios, o que soy un 
nifio deteta [...]. 
Paso la crisis y volvio a seguir Pachico el curso de sus ideas, 
evitando toda conversacion con su tio. (Paz en la guerra 53) 
So we see that the first and most tangible outcome of religious change in Newman 
and Unamuno was a withdrawal of these young men into themselves. The search for 
tmth, well in keeping with their temperament, was constantly stimulated. There is no 
doubt that the Evangelical spirituality had a lasting influence on Newman and the 
Lutheran on Unamuno, not only due of the questioning of former doctrinal convictions, 
but also due to the rigors of the moral demands to seek which they subjected themselves. 
A critical judgment on their childhood world, constant personal study, and a moral 
preoccupation with social questions were to be preserved forever in the depths of both 
Newman's and Unamuno's religious sensibility. 
Nevertheless, we notice a new element over and beyond the call to constant 
search for tmth present in Newman and Unamuno. 
That same autumn, the noble and independent spirit Newman praised the "noble 
and independent" Bishop Dupanloup for "daring to do what we think right,"'^ brought 
forth in Newman the desire to live a celibate life. He had no mistake about the fact that it 
would be "the will of God that I should lead a single life." Newman saw celibacy as part 
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of his calling to missionary work among the heathen and his feeling of separation from 
the world (Apologia 19). 
Unamuno moved from wanting to be a saint, "sofiaba ser santo" (Recuerdos 111) 
to the identification of faith with sincerity, tolerance and mercy ("La fe" 273). Leaving 
high-school in love with knowledge, his philosophical readings led him to believe more 
in human intelligence and see the shame that we do not understand each other, "y es 
lastima grande que no logremos entendemos" (Recuerdos 105). 
Thus, what concems us in our understanding of conscience and its liberty in 
Newman and Unamuno is to notice how, first, their tutors were worried about Newman 
and Unamuno following their own opinions rather than received authority. Second, in 
their teenage decisions we see Newman and Unamuno making a break with those 
authorities and with what their books had taught them. The impact of their changes of 
conviction was not only an emotional assurance of tmth, an adherence to a different faith 
due to their understanding of divine revelation, and a way of life in accord with their 
change. 
Their changes were such in so far as their consciences decided that such and such 
was what the God of "religious imperative" wanted of them, there and then ("La fe" 266). 
But when that same God who gave them those tmsts, now was calling them personally to 
a moral choices such as celibacy or tolerance, not mentioned either by their masters or 
books, Newman and Unamuno are ready to walk the extra mile. Their lives were for God 
speaking in their conscience first, and then in books, teachers and family second. 
Conscience is based on "two and two only absolute and luminously self-evident 
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beings, myself and my Creator" (Apologia 16). "Dios en nuestros espiritus es Espiritu y 
no Idea, amor y no dogma, vida y no logica" ("La fe" 266). 
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CHAPTER W 

IMMORTALITY AND RATIONALISM 

Quiero decir, del linico problema vital [. ..] 
de la inmortalidad del alma.' 
The tmth is, [. ..] 
I was drifting in the direction of the Liberalism of the day.^ 
Freedom of conscience implies a realization that tmth is not immediately known 
to everyone in a self-evident fashion. This is above all tme in the case of fimdamental 
questions faced by human beings. One such question faced by both Unamuno and 
Newman is the problem of human immortality. The possibility of death and the mystery 
of life beyond the grave offers both writers, men of "flesh and blood," the opportunity to 
discover a purely rational solution impossible. This intellectual impossibility brings both 
to the conclusion that the human mind is fallible and deficient. Hence, no credence is 
self-evident vis-a-vis the essential mystery of human existence: life after death. 
Consequently, one essential element of religion or its denial thereof is in the realm of the 
unknowm to human reason. Therefore, we may conclude with Unamuno and Newman 
that no kind of coercion may be exercised upon anyone in the realm of knowledge 
relating to human immortality. Moreover, given the imperfect nature of human reason, 
both Newman and Unamuno conclude that all knowledge has an element of subjective 
"certitude" (Apologia 29). 
Newman writes: 
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That it might be quite as much a matter of duty in given cases and 
to given persons to have about a fact an opinion of a definite strength and 
consistency, as in the case of greater or of more numerous probabilities it 
was a duty to have a certitude; that accordingly we were bound to be more 
or less sure, on a sort of (as it were) graduated scale of assent, viz. 
according as the probabilities attaching to a professed fact were brought 
home to us [...]. (30) 
Whereas, Unamuno concludes his Sentimiento tragico with the statement: 
Pero es que mi obra - iba a decir mi mision - es quebrantar la fe de 
unos, y de otros y de los terceros, la fe en la afirmacion, la fe en la 
negacion y la fe en la abstencion, y esto por fe en la fe misma; es combatir 
a todos lo que se resignan, sea el catolicismo, sea el racionalismo, sea el 
agnosticismo; es hacer que vivan todos inquietos y anhelantes. (12: 282) 
The analysis of the limitations of human rationalism brings both writers to see the 
realities of illness and death, teaching us that there are mysteries our human minds simply 
cannot reach. And precisely because our minds are limited in their knowledge of essential 
tmths, both Unamuno and Newman will conclude in their lives and writings that no 
human knowledge may claim to be totally complete. Though their conclusion will go 
towards different definitions - "private judgment" in Newman; "sentimiento tragico" in 
Unamuno, nonetheless their perspective holds. No human mind may insist that their 
personal view or hold on tmth is whole and complete, to the exclusion of all others. 
Consequently, there is a freedom of conscience in beHef for all, based on the incapacity 
of any human to know all tmths by reason alone. Hence an important tenet in Newman's 
and Unamuno's thought on conscience and its liberty is their rejection of Rationalism as 
both found it historically in their lives. 
In the case of Newman, a classic example of his teaching based on his life was his 
life-long resistance to what he called Liberalism, a close relative to the rationalism later 
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denounced by Unamuno. Newman knew and rejected Liberalism at both the beginning 
and the end of his intellectual joumey. The stated purpose of the Apologia is to "simply 
state the facts (13). These words fit into Newman's whole emphasis of going by real 
people, not by books.^ On arrival at Oriel College, Oxford, in 1822, Newman had felt the 
power of the Noetics with their, by Newman's definition, Liberalism. Their ideology had 
excluded faith by relying solely on reason,. Devotion was likewise made superfluous by 
their supposed knowledge ("Note A on LiberaHsm," Apologia 218). 
fri the Apologia, he clearly stated: "The tmth is, [...] I was drifting in the 
direction of die Liberalism of the day. I was mdely awakened from my dream at the end 
of 1827 by two great blows-illness and bereavement." (Apologia 24). 
Later, in life, upon receiving the Cardinal's hat, Newman would be proud to state 
that "to one great mischief [the spirit of Liberalism in religion], I have from the first 
opposed myself"" 
In Unamuno's case, a cenfral point in of his Sentimiento tragico, chap. V, is his 
finding Rationalism inadequate for solving the great human problem: that of immortality. 
Beginning the chapter quoting Hume, Unamuno stresses that human reason cannot prove 
the existence of human immortality. All arguments, he feels, come from the Gospel. 
Reason itself has clear limits. It cannot help us know neither our origin nor our destiny: 
"Y asi como antes de nacer no fiiimos ni tenemos recuerdo alguno personal de entonces, 
asi despues de morir no seremos. Esto es lo racional" (Sentimiento tragico 5: 131). 
Likewise, Unamuno, beginning with the classical Greek conception of soul, based 
on its unity, simplicity and separateness of the soul as a substance, finds the philosophical 
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defenses of the soul's immortality inadequate. Here, the Greek error was to deduce the 
existence of the soul as a substance from the fact that we conceive ourselves with a 
certain identity. From the consciousness of our identity, we falsely deduce the existence 
of the soul: "La verdad irunediata es que pienso, quiero y siento yo. Y yo, el yo que 
piensa, quiere y siente, es inmediatamente mi cuerpo vivo con los estados de conciencia 
que soporta. Es mi cuerpo vivo el que piensa, quiere y siente" (135). According to 
Unamuno, conscience becomes a property of the soul and the soul becomes the 
substantial form of the body, the motor of its organic functions. Hence, we arrive at a 
Greek conception of the soul, with its vegetative, sensitive and rational qualities. But this 
in no way proves the immortality of the soul. 
Unamuno then surveys the history of philosophy conceming the immortality of 
the human soul, concluding: "Por cualquier lado que la cosa se mire, siempre resulta que 
la razon se pone enfrente de ese nuestro anhelo de inmortalidad personal, y nos lo 
confradice. Y es que, en rigor, la razon es enemiga de la vida"(l37-38). Unamuno 
considers that what is rational is only what is relational. The role of reason is merely to 
relate irrational elements: "la razon se limita a relacionar elementos irracionales." Hence, 
reason is skeptical, while real life is absolutely unstable, illogical, individual and 
unintelligible. There is a conflict between life and reason, what is lived and what is 
understood. "^Y la verdad? ^Se vive o se comprende?" (138). 
Miguel de Unamuno does consider the view of those who do think that human 
reason is sufficient. To them, Unamuno replies that such an attitude is like those blind by 
birth. One does not desire what one does not know. However, anyone who has had a 
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belief in immortality at any time in their lives cannot live without its concem. Unamuno 
concludes: "Que aberracion, y no otra cosa, es el hombre mera y exclusivamente 
racional" (145). 
Or is immortality just something to be talked about? But, again answers 
Unamuno, can anyone contemplate life with its universe and not serenely consider that all 
this will end. No, reason is found lacking. Reason does not answer our immortal question. 
"No; para la razon, la verdad es lo que se puede demostrar que es, que existe, 
consuelenos o no. La razon no es ciertamente una facultad consoladora" (140). Later, in 
San Manuel Bueno, martir, Unamuno would insist on the consoling force, though 
mysterious, force of religion. Reason and science are insufficient to calm our sentimental 
and affective needs. In so far as they wish to dethrone belief and religion, they have 
always failed. Science may satisfy our logical and physical needs, our longing to know 
and survive. Modem technology even does so even better, but it no way does it reach the 
heart of the problem, immortality. Outside the limits of the rational, there is a whole new 
world, unattainable by reason. Unamuno concludes: 
Muchas y muy variadas son las invenciones racionalistas-mas 
menos racionales-con que desde los tiempos de epiciireos y estoicos se ha 
tratado de buscar en la verdad racional consuelo y de convencer a los 
hombres, aunque los que de ello trataron no estuviesen en si mismos 
convencidos de que hay motives de obrar y alicientes de vivir, aun estando 
la conciencia humana destinada a desaparecer un dia. (142) 
Besides the fact that human reason can not prove the soul's immortality, it 
likewise postulates that the individual does not live beyond death. Hence, the will to live 
beyond death is a seeking after the irrational, the absurd. "Y ese absurdo no puede 
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apoyarse sino en la mas absoluta incertidumbre" (147). 
However, in regard to liberty of conscience, Unamuno includes in this chapter a 
somber reminder of intolerance. There are some, he states, that not only have the problem 
of the rationalist disbelief Also many, "muchos, muchisimos hombres de ciencia," 
possessed by the anger of not believing, suffer from an "odium antitheologicum" (141). 
The anti-theological hatred against faith in another life is evident, not among serene 
scientific researchers, but rather amidst the fanatics of rationalism, "y ved con que 
grosera bmtalidad hablan de la fe": 
Hay gentes que parece como si no se limitasen a no creer que hay 
ofra vida, o mejor dicho, a creer que no la hay, sino que les molesta y 
duele que otros crean en ella, o hasta que quieran que la haya. Esta 
posicion es despreciable, asi como es digna de respeto la de aquel que, 
empefiandose en creer que la hay, porque la necesitan, no logra creerlo. 
(141) 
This intolerance and intransigence shows Unamuno's point that reason alone may 
tend towards its own destmction. By canonizing one viewpoint to the exclusion of all 
others, the rationalist destroys the human need for ftirther tmth and consolation. By not 
accepting the limits of reason, the rationalist gives an absolute, "infallible," value to his 
own perspective on reality. By denying the validity of knowledge beyond reason, the 
rationalist destroys the human capacity for further inquiry. Unamuno considers tmth as a 
subjective affirmation of the concordance of a concept with the whole system of our 
perceptions. Hence, tmth is coherence. What is unknown is logically not necessarily 
untme. Nor is there a need for all to conform to the rationalist's view. Unamuno sees the 
inner contradiction of the infallible and intolerant rationalist: 
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Cuando hay una lilcera en el estomago, acaba este por digerirse a si 
mismo. Y la razon acaba por destmir la validez inmediata y absoluta del 
concepto de verdad y del concepto de necesidad. Ambos conceptos son 
relatives; ni hay verdad ni hay necesidad absoluta. [...] Y en cuanto al 
sistema todo, al conjunto, como no hay fliera de el nada para nosotros 
conocido, no cabe decir que sea o no verdadero. (147) 
Unamuno concludes that this rationalism leads to absolute relativism and 
skepticism: "El absoluto relativismo, que no es ni mas ni menos que el escepticismo, en 
el sentido mas modemo de esta denominacion, es el triunfo supremos de la razon 
raciocinante" (147). 
Liberalism, as criticized by Newman, was that same immanent philosophy which 
set up the individual as the ultimate judge of reality. But, according to Newman, the very 
fact of setting the individual human as the judge of unknown tmth to reason, such as 
religion, becomes contradictory. The nature of religious belief is precisely to be beyond, 
and independent of, individual reason. The strength of religious doctrines lies in their 
being known from above. Both rationalism and liberalism then went in circles since 
reason must understand something that need not or maybe cannot be understood. All tmth 
must pass through the sieve of one's own mind. And all religious beHef is rejected a 
priori. Religious content and authority must be made to the measure of the individual's 
reason. Hence, Newman concluded that Liberalism was ignorant of the very "constitution 
of the human mind" (Apologia 218). 
Newman's rejection of this rationalism will help us understand the real liberty of 
conscience in Newman's thought and life. What John Henry did not discard was another 
kind of liberalism. The rationalism rejected by Newman was pointedly called a "false 
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liberty of thought." He contrasts his use of the term to that of Montalembert and 
Lacordaire in France. Newman admitted his high admiration of these men, in whose 
ideology he enthusiastically concurred. The "liberty of conscience" invoked publicly by 
Montalembert in 1863, the year before the Apologia was published, is a freedom from 
coercion and respect for the individual conscience.^ Hence, we can logically conclude 
that Newman, by praising Montalembert, accepted this "liberty of thought." On the 
confrary, Newman insisted on his use of the term "LiberaHsm" in the Apologia "as a 
Protestant [. ..] and [. ..] in connection with the circumstances under which that system 
of opinion came before me at Oxford" (216).^ 
Why did Newonan reject this Protestant Oxonian liberalism in a parallel fashion as 
Unamuno? Newman's change of mind did not come by study. Books—"intelligible 
processes of thought"—did play a role in Newman's "history of his opinions," but so also 
did "honest extemal means" (36). In his critique of this rationalist liberalism, in fact, 
books seem to have no part. Rather his own weak body and his dear youngest sister's 
death stopped his moving towards rationalism. "Two great blows" mdely awakened him. 
Let us examine both events with their consequences for his "drift towards LiberaHsm" 
(24). 
The illness was a depression due to intellectual overwork which he brought on 
himself by assuming the burden of tutor in 1826. The temptation to take on too many 
responsibilities remained with him for most of his life. Already in 1820, when he 
competed for honors at Trinity, he experienced a distressing lassitude, symptomatic of a 
state of extreme cerebral fatigue.^ The remedy was simple; go out, take some exercise, 
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and walk in the open air. These prescribed walks had the added advantage of taking him 
away from the excitement of the common room and giving him more time for personal 
reflection. 
To sister Jemima, he wrote; "ft is so great a gain to throw off Oxford for a few 
hours" (Mozley 1: 161). With Harriet, there was an acknowledgment of another reason 
for peace and quiet; a desire to avoid the vanity of success: 
My ride of a morning is generally solitary; but I almost prefer 
being alone. When the spirits are good, everything is delightful in the view 
of the still nature which the country gives [...]. 
How desirable for me to get out of the stir and bustle of the world, 
and not to have the responsibility and weariness of success! Now, if I 
choose to wish a scheme, and in my solitary rides, 1 sometimes do, I 
should say, "Oh, for some small cure of a few hundred a year, and no 
preferment, as the world calls it!" (Mozley 1: 172) 
These thoughts reveal a desire for perfection and silence; no doubt easier to 
achieve in obscurity than in the excitement of the intellectual discussions of the Noetics 
at Oxford University. Beyond that, Newman distmsted the seductions of the academic 
world. Liberalism had little to offer beyond intellectual advance. John Henry had realized 
the magical spell of the intellect was unable to satisfy the flight of the soul towards 
virtuous living. 
Linked to his rejection of mere academic success, John Henry remarked that 
ambition must go, which also included a desire for influence. Being Tutor at Oriel, 
Newman was cautious even about a promising career with considerable influence over 
students. His illness of 1827 cooled the ambitions of his tutorship begun the year before. 
The preference for intellectual over moral excellence was defeated. His illness provoked 
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solitary walks; and solitary walks, a detachment from the vanity of this worid. LiberaHsm 
was found lacking (Apologia 22). 
As a side note, we notice that also Unamuno also received a medical prescription 
for long walks in the country: 
Pocos goces mas serenos y mas hondos que el goce que por 
entonces me procuraba un paseo. Mientras el pecho se hincha de aire 
fresco y libre, adquiere el espiritu libertad [...]. El pensamiento libre yerra 
de una cosa en ofra, se fija en lo que pasa y pasa con ello, se identifica con 
lo fiigitivo y suefia lo que ve. jQue triste tener que pasar de aquellos 
paseos al aula oscura!^ 
Mary's death, on the other hand, on January 4th, 1828, came as a shock to 
Newman. Her memory absorbed him more and more. Besides the vanity of intellectual 
excellence mentioned above, her disappearance opened Newman to the thought of a 
world beyond the senses, the reality of a spiritual communion beyond the grave, the 
mysterious yet powerfiil presence of God in our life, and, finally, the reality of Death as 
the ultimate arbiter of all human life. Liberalism, with its immanent, individualistic, and 
human limitations had no answer to such a mystery. 
To appreciate the impact and consequences of Mary's death on her brother, we 
may envisage the deep and ineffable friendship between the two. Its special nature was 
bom in an intimacy of kindred spirits, quite unknovm even to the family. The few extant 
letters of Mary Newman to her brother John or to her older sister, Harriet, reveal a deeply 
sensitive soul who knew how to hide her impulsive heart. One may guess the immediate 
harmonious agreement of John Henry with such a delicate and intuitive spirit. 
At first, he had guided his young sister in her early studies. Hi spite of all his 
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level. Hi Mary's open and upright soul, John Henry's deep interior life engendered a sort 
of fascination. Long before her brother's future fiiends recognized his talents, Mary 
discemed something of the genius hidden behind his above-mentioned solitude. 
Their communion of souls was kept secret by Mary during her life. There are few 
letters of admiration for her brother, referring to the influence exerted on her: "Well, I 
really think I have found out the secret of my difficulty in writing to you. It is because I 
never told you the difficulty. At least, I find I write much easier since my confession" 
(Mozley 1: 118).^ 
A few weeks before her death, she wrote with the similar sincerity: "How I long 
to see you! . .  . I can fancy your face—there, it is looking at me" (150). 
A close communion of souls in the sharing of a common religious ideal remained 
in Newman after her death. Her memory drew him to the threshold of the invisible world, 
making him even more attentive to the realities inhabiting it. Thus did bereavement 
purify the Oriel tutor's soul, deepening his sense of the world beyond and renewing his 
spiritual life. Their common partaking of the same profound reality of God produced a 
bond that death itself was unable to dissolve but rather strengthened in a renewed fidelity. 
Once again. Liberalism with its a priori rejection of the rationally unacceptable seemed 
inadequate to Newman's life. 
John Henry's first reaction to so bmtal and unexpected a tragedy was one of 
shock (157). Without guilt, anxiety, or meaningless questions, her death resolved for him 
the problem of his own destiny. Quickly, Newman understood that Mary's death was not 
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an end but a beginning, the inauguration of a new order of relations between them. An 
even closer communion began to establish itself Thanks to the mysterious presence of 
his sister, the surviving brother discovered the presence and action of a living God and a 
long list of invisible realities in another world from our concrete worid of appearances. 
The utter suddenness of Mary's death revealed the living God in his terrible 
majesty. "Sister death," to use St. Francis' image, had been so rapid and unexpected that 
she allowed no room for speculation. The visitor came alone "unheralded," coming and 
going with amazing ease. This off-handedness captured Newman's attention. In it, he saw 
the hand of God, seizing for Himself such a young life which really belonged to Him. 
Thus, Mary's departure was a silent witness to the power and mystery of the Lord of life 
and death. 
This theophany showed God as the only Actor; the human being as helpless. The 
revelation of the divine was all the more apparent in its rapidity faced with the inability of 
human medicine to either delay or prolong it. Newman's poetry shortly after her death 
shows how her demise was totally divine, and hence consecrated to the Lord as a pure 
and spontaneous offering: 
Death was fiill urgent with thee, Sister dear 

And startling in his speed;­
Brief pain, then languor till thy end came near ­
Such was the path decreed. 

The hurried road. 

To lead thy soul from earth to thine own God's abode. 
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Death wrought with thee, sweet maid impatiently:­
Yet merciful the haste 
That baffles sickness;-dearest, thou didst die. 
Thou wast not made to taste 
Death's bitterness 
Declines slow-wasting charm, fever's fierce distress.'^ 
So, this "blow" to Liberalism brought home to Newman the living presence of 
God in his life in a manner similar to the day of his earlier conversion. The absolute 
certainty of another world beyond death reinforced what his illness had also taught him; 
the vanity of this world, and, with it, the vanity of intellectual achievement without 
virtue, of reason without faith, of knowledge without devotion, of man without God 
(Apologia 218). 
From then on, Newman's conviction about the invisible world was so real that it 
came close to constituting one of the most basic foundations of his spirituality. Mary's 
death was without doubt the event which contributed the most to the clarity of vision of 
him who wished to "never sin against light" (40). Liberalism's insistence on intellectual 
greatness rejected the notion of moral greatness of virtue over sin, while its refusal to 
accept revelation in religion bore no answer to the mystery of death. 
Besides the incompleteness of the Liberal ideology, Newman saw the 
insufficiency of their claim to life and success only in this world, what he calls "the pride 
of reason" (217). In his letters of 1828, Newman's memories of Mary provoked in him a 
conscious disenchantment with the world caused by his seeing it as so vuHierable. Hi 
May, he wrote to sister Jemima: 
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On Thursday, 1 rode over to Cuddlesdon . .  . The country too, is 
beautiful; the fresh leaves, the scents, the varied landscape. Yet I never felt 
so intensely the transitory nature of this world as when most delighted 
with these county scenes. And in riding out today, 1 have been impressed 
more powerfully than before . . . with the two lines: 
Chanting with a solemn voice 
Minds us of our better choice. 
I wish it were possible for words to put down those indefinite, 
vague, and withal subtle feelings which pierce the soul and make it sick. 
Dear Mary seems embodied in every tree and hid behind every hill. What 
a veil and curtain this world of sense is! beautiful, but a veil. (Mozley 1: 
161) 
Newman's sentiments are far removed from any false affectation and hopeless 
despair. We see his ability to grasp the profound depth of living behind the mask of 
appearances. Liberalism's mistake of judging all human knowledge in rationalistic terms 
blocked out the Hght of mystery (Apologia 223)." Hence, Newman's deep rejection of 
such an ideology till his very end. 
Evoking the memory of Mary, his own destiny of life beyond the grave evoked in 
John Henry more than just a lingering sorrowfiil emotion of his deceased sister. Newman 
saw that a person's past is never totally abolished. A person's history projects itself into 
the present, and the future. This spiritual reality beyond senses, science, time, praise, and 
death is real and meaningful. The past becomes the messenger of the invisible world, the 
life of living persons, close to us always. In June, 1828, five months after his sister's 
death, Newman wrote to his sister Harriet: "Not one half-hour passes but dear Mary's 
face is before my eyes" (Mozley 1: 163). 
Newman began to see a happy, serene, life beyond the grave: "She is not gone; ­
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still in our sight / That dearest maid shall live, / In form as tme, in tints as bright, / As 
youth and health could give" ("A Picture," Verses X: 32). From Mary's happiness in 
etemity, he began to envisage his own destiny on earth as a share in God's etemal bliss: 
"When in due lines her Saviour dear / His scatter'd saints shall range, / And knit in love 
souls parted here, / Where cloud is none, nor change" (Verses X: 32). 
The above poem shows the impact of his sister's death. Newman now considered 
the real world that of God, however invisible and spiritual. In this universe of divine 
knowledge and human happiness, each person has a destiny. John Henry's search for 
tmth encompassed another world unknown to science and the senses, known only 
through faith. The duty of conscience to an "extemal Master" is to a living God, all-
powerful and omniscient. Death, therefore, is the ultimate witness to the tmth of all 
things. All else is secondary. 
Newman ended his note on Liberalism in the Apologia with a sense of total 
liberty from all threats of authority in his search for tmth. Quoting Horace: one's property 
may be taken; cmelty may be his lot; and the great treasure of friends either "dead" or 
"mde. God himself, to whom one wished to be faithful in conscience, would ultimately 
set him free. When? At death. There is the final and just end to the story of his earthly 
endeavor. Mors ultima linea rerum est (222). 
So, Mary's death and the thought of divine judgment at the hour of his own death 
helped Newman achieve the liberty of conscience and life to "launch himself in an ocean 
with currents innumerable" (33). This conviction gave Newman strength when the liberal 
Whately, who taught him how to think for himself, later made himself "dead to me," even 
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when he "felt himself dead as regards my relation with the Anglican Church" (222). Real 
death for Newman would come later. And what would count then was neither the 
judgment of Whately nor that of the Anglican Church, but the viewpoint of tmth. 
Ending this note on Liberalism, Newman stated his frame of mind and strength 
towards those who persecuted his quest for tmth in freedom. Tmsting in God "who the 
moment I choose, will set me free," Newman was faithful to his conscience, and, so, 
ultimately is faithful to tmth in freedom. That same God of tmth, all-seeing and all-
powerful, set him free from all earthly powers and possessions. Newman's love of tmth 
beyond the veil of appearances and authorities found its ultimate vindication at the 
moment of death, moment of tmth and freedom (222). 
Newman says he chooses, because his choice was for tmth in all its reality, both 
here and beyond, both in science and in religion, both in reason and in faith, both in 
freedom and in authority, both in life and in death. The ultimate reason for Newman's 
fearlessness of academic and religious authorities is his own death. People and Churches 
may become dead to him, but the living Lord lives forever. And those who die in the 
Lord are no longer dead, but alive. Like Mary. 
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CHAPTER V 

AGONY IN EXILE 

No hay que obligarse nunca a pensar u opinar de tal o cual manera.' 
My change of opinion arose, not from foreign influences, 
but from the working of my own mind, and the accidents around me.^ 
In an article entitled "No hipotequeis el pensamiento" published for the students 
of Salamanca in 1912, Unamuno links freedom of conscience to change of allegiance. 
Hence, he insists on the need to be always willing to change our views, avoiding 
classifications, and, therefore, being ever ready to change our commitment to any school 
or sect, leaving the door open to such possible change of thought: 
Lo linico que me atrevo a aconsejaros es que no hipotequeis el 
porvenir de vuestra mente, que no os comprometais con doctrina alguna, 
que no senteis plaza en ninguna escuela ni secta, que no os dejeis poner 
mote o etiqueta, que dejeis abierta la puerta a toda posible rectificacion de 
pensamiento. Es el linico modo de vivir una vida interior de libertad y de 
decencia. ("No hipotequeis el pensamiento" 253) 
In Newman's case, his search for tmth in defense of the establishment at both 
Oxford University and the Church of England brought him to question, then doubt, the 
entities he loved. The banishment of Newman from both the University and Church has a 
clear parallel to the treatment Unamuno received with exile from his two loves: the 
University of Salamanca and the land of Spain in 1924. The writer who wanted to believe 
in Christ^ has his books on the Hidex of Prohibited Books," and found himself decried as 
the "hereje mdximo." 
At the heart of both of their adventures, exiles and writings, there persists a 
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conviction to seek tmth in freedom, not relax in a simplistic faith, with a willingness to 
pay the consequences. Both authors reject a "holy ignorance" whereby the believer 
blindly accepts authoritarian doctrine based on a religious authority's decrees. Several 
times throughout his works, Unamuno quoted the Catechism of Fr. Astete on religious 
ignorance whereby the believer is not allowed to question belief In his article of 1907, 
"La feliz ignorancia," he adds his own words to the dictate of the Catechism: 
El catecismo de la doctrina catolica mas usual en Espafia, el del 
Padre Astete, a cierta pregunta responde asi: "eso no me lo pregunteis a mi 
que soy ignorante - y quiero seguir siendolo, debio afiadir  - ; doctores 
tiene la Santa Madre Iglesia que os sabran responder". He aqui la formula 
mas popular y mas precisa de esa horrible fe implicita, o fe por 
delegacion, que nos tiene acorchada el alma.^ 
Neither Unamuno nor Newman have time for such blind obedience and happy 
ignorance. Both preferred to go out "on the open sea"^ in the search for tmth in 
conscience and freedom, including criticizing in "agony" (Agonia 1034) religious beliefs, 
authorities and institutions. Both authors search for tmth in history, despising a 
complacent religiosity based on ignorance. As for the metaphor of "holy ignorance" 
within the metaphor of the "holy donkey," Unamuno states his view: 
^Quien no ha oido alguna vez en su vida hacer el panegirico de la 
ignorancia y del burro santo? Y, sin embargo, he de repetir aqui lo que en 
otra parte tengo dicho y es que el burro no es santo ni el ignorante, en 
cuanto ignorante, puede ser bueno, que yo prefiero ser angel desgraciado a 
no cerdo satisfecho. ("La feliz ignorancia" 869) 
Luckily for us, later readers, both have left us a written account of their search for 
tmth in freedom and linked to freedom in tmth. Hi this chapter, we wish to review 
Unamuno's critique of historical Christianity in his La agonia del cristianismo together 
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with Newman's analysis of the same in his Apologia. Both books were written in the pain 
of exile, harassment and loneliness, but nonetheless reach us with all the fervor of 
spiritual strength. 
In Unamuno's case as well as Newman's, their agony is not some abstract 
philosophical notion open to academic debate, but rather a real-life predicament where 
the writer finds himself needing a justification or, at least, an explanation of both his fate 
and his faith. There is no doubt that Unamuno wishes to approach the issue as a Christian. 
Far removed from being the kind of Christian some contemporary authors characterize, at 
the same time he nevertheless contradicts any possible authors who might doubt his 
Christianity.^ Unamuno's Christianity is a fight and agony for the same within his 
intimate self 
Having attended a religious service in Paris during his exile in 1924, he perceived 
the problem of how Christ could be both tmth and life, how Christianity could be both 
social and personal: "Y aqui estriba la tragedia. Porque la verdad es algo colectivo, 
social, hasta civil; verdadero es aquello en que convenimos y con que nos entendemos. Y 
el cristianismo es algo individual e incomunicable. Y he aqui por que agoniza en cada 
uno de nosotros (Agonia 948). 
Hence, his agony and the reason for this book: 
Agonia, [.. .] quiere decir lucha. Agoniza el que vivir luchando, 
luchando contra la vida misma. Y confra la muerte. [...] Lo que voy a 
exponer aqui, lector, es mi agonia, mi lucha por el cristianismo, la agonia 
del cristianismo en mi, su muerte y su resurreccion en cada momento de 
mi vida intima. (948) 
This agony fits into Unamuno's idea that the goal of life is personal and 
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individual. To be a Christian, for Unamuno, means each one of us setting about the goal 
of our lives to create our own souls, immortal souls. One's own soul is one's own work. 
Todo cristiano, para mostrar su cristianismo, su agonia por el 
cristianismo debe decir de si mismo ecce christianus, como Pilato dijo [. . 
.]. Debe mostrar su alma cristiana, su alma de cristiano, la que en su lucha, 
en su agonia del cristianismo se ha hecho. Y el fin de la vida es hacerse un 
alma, una alma inmortal. Un alma que es la propia obra. (949) 
Unamuno here, as elsewhere, rejects a social Christianity identified with social 
change, seeing history is so easy to forget the individual's effort. History, in fact, is 
defined by Unamuno as the "thought of God": 
Y si esto es la vida fisica o corporal, la vida psiquica o espiritual 
es, a su vez, una lucha contra el etemo olvido. Y contra la Historia. Porque 
la Historia, que es el pensamiento de Dios en la tierra de los hombres, 
carece de ultima finalidad humana, camina al olvido, a la inconciencia. Y 
todo el esfiierzo del hombre es dar finalidad Humana a la Historia, 
finalidad sobrehumana, que diria Nietzsche, que fue el gran sofiador del 
absurdo: el cristianismo social. (950) 
Insisting on a kind of Christianity which is both personal and Historical, Unamuno 
concludes: "Porque al morir se deja un esqueleto a la tierra, un alma, una obra a la 
Historia" (949). 
According to Unamuno, Christ did indeed come into the world precisely to bring 
this agony, an agony of peace in war and war in peace. Quoting the Gospel on Christ 
coming to bring a sword into the world between family and friends, and even inside 
oneself, Unamuno interprets this saying and others on peace as referring to his concept of 
"agony" in Christianity: "^Y la paz?, se nos dira. Porque se pueden producir otros tantos 
pasajes y aiin mas y mas explicitos, en que se nos habla de paz en el Evangelio. Pero es 
que esa paz se da en la guerra y la guerra se en la paz. Y esto es la agonia" (951). 
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What is important here is that Unamuno does consider his hermeneutics as 
authentic and, hence, he does consider himself a Christian, as Newman did some sixty 
years previously. This is brought to clearer light when he notices that the Christ portrayed 
by so many Spanish cmcifixes is precisely the agonizing Christ who prayed on the cross, 
"My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?" (Matt. 27, 46). Hence, the agony felt 
by Unamuno is precisely the same as that felt by Christ. In this way, Unamuno even 
further insists on the authenticity of His Christian religious experience. 
Immediately following this historical and geographical reference to Christianity in 
Spain, Unamimo quotes one of his favorite Gospel phrases: "I believe, help my unbelief!" 
(Mark 9, 23). In Unamuno's paradoxical opinion, this way of belief in doubt and 
searching is, in fact, the only living faith. A faith without doubts is dead. "El modo de 
vivir, de luchar, de lucHar por la vida y de vivir de la lucha, de la fe, es dudar. Ya lo 
hemos dicho en otra nuestra obra, recordando aquel pasaje evangelico que dice: 'iCreo, 
socorre mi incredulidad!' (Marcos ix, 23) Fe que no duda es fe muerta" (952). So a faith 
with doubt, in agony, is indeed the faith of Christ on the Cross, the faith of the faithfiil 
follower and the faith of the Christian Miguel de Unamuno y Jugo. 
So, then, Unamuno asks, what is this doubt which is an essential part of Christian 
faith? 
^Y que es dudar? Dubitare contiene la misma raiz, la del numeral 
duo, dos, que duellum, lucha. La duda, mas la pascaliana, la duda agonica 
o polemica, que no la cartesiana o duda metodica, la duda de vida - vida 
es lucha-, y no de camino-metodo es camino-, supone la dualidad del 
combate. 
[. ..] y dudo, lucho, agonizo como Hombre, como cristiano, 
mirando al porvenir irrealizable, a la etemidad. (952-53) 
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Unamuno follows this statement by analyzing Christianity in its origins with clear 
references to Bultmann's distinction between the Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith. 
Based on its central role in Gospels, the Passion story is the essence of the new religion. 
Jesus insisted that his kingdom was not of this world. His belief was in an early end of 
the world, his second coming and, as a Jew, possibly believing in the resurrection of the 
flesh, rather than a platonic immortality of the soul. However, after Jesus died, Christ was 
rebom in the souls of the faithfiil. Again, we Have a new agony between the Jewish and 
the Hellenic, personified in the Hellenized Jew, Saint Paul the Apostle: 
Pero luego que murio Jesus y renacio el Cristo en las almas de sus 
creyentes, para agonizar en ellas, nacio la fe en la resurreccion de la came 
y con ella la fe en la inmortalidad del alma. Y ese gran dogma de la 
resurreccion de la came a la judaica y de la inmortalidad del alma a la 
helenica nacio a la agonia de San Pablo, un judio helenizado, un fariseo 
que tartamudeaba su poderoso griego polemico. (960-61) 
The first Christians saw that the second coming did not take place, that the end of 
the world did not come about, and, so, envisioned a new individualistic religion based on 
the fact that we all die in our utmost loneliness: "su cristianismo, so pena de perecer tuvo 
que hacerse una religion individual, una religio quae non religat, una paradoja. Porque 
los hombres vivimos juntos, pero cada uno se muere solo y la muerte es la suprema 
soledad"(961). 
Here we notice how Unamuno applies to the Historical Jesus His own theory on 
ideas being both in the writer and in the reader of his books and life, as he Himself did 
with Don Quixote: "^Que me importa lo que Cervantes quiso o no quiso poner alii y lo 
que realmente puso? Lo vivo es lo que yo alii descubro, pusieralo o no Cervantes, lo que 
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yo alii pongo y sobrepongo y sotopongo, y lo que ponemos alii todos."^ 
All of which coincides, according to Unamuno, with the previously-mentioned 
fight or agony between what is social and what is individual in Christianity. In this case, 
the confrast evolves between the resurrection of the flesh, being individual and 
physiological, with the immortality of the soul which is social and spiritual. And here 
again, Unamuno finds doubt and agony in his and our Christian faith. 
La resurreccion de la came, la esperanza judaica, farisaica, 
psiquica-casi carnal—, entro en conflicto con la inmortalidad del alma, la 
esperanza helenica, platoncia, neumatica o espiritual. Y esta es la tragedia, 
la agonia de San Pablo. Y la del cristianismo. Porque la resurreccion de la 
came es algo fisiologico, algo completamente individual [...]. La 
inmortalidad del alma es algo espiritual, algo social [...]. 
De aqui la duda-dubium y la hxcha-duellum-y la agonia. (Agonia 
961-62) 
This constant agony of Christianity is further exasperated in history with the 
conflict between the spirit and the letter. Unamuno considers the oral fradition as life-
giving, but once the word was made letters and books, the Gospel spirit was dead to the 
Gospel texts. This is not a mere anti-legalistic approach in Unamuno, but rather another 
application to his theory of historical personalities being alive and, in this case, possibly 
dead, in their later listeners and followers. Applying the comparison to Socrates, 
Unamuno writes: 
^Cual ftie el Socrates historico, el de Jenofonte, el de Platon, el de 
Aristofanes? El Socrates historico, el inmortal, no fue el Hombre de came 
y hueso y sangre que vivio en tal epoca en Atenas, sino que fue el que 
vivio en cada uno de los que le oyeron, y de todos estos se formo el que 
dejo su alma a la Humanidad. Y el, Socrates, vive en esta. (964) 
This explanation is important in our understanding of Unamuno's confrast of 
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historical Christianity with faith in the Historical person of Christ. Indeed, words became 
dogmas, definitions came about through differences, and dissenters became heretics. All 
of which, according to a previous essay of Unamuno, was a death-knell to real Christian 
beHef which is an adherence to a person, Christ, within a freedom of interpretation: "^Fe 
cristiana que es? 0 es la confianza en Cristo o no es nada: en la persona Historica y en la 
historica revelacion de su vida, tengala cada cual como la tuviere."'^ In this vein, we can 
better understand His letter "Agonismo cristiano" where Unamuno recognizes His thesis 
as Lutheran: 
La fe no es adhesion de la mente a un principle abstracte, sino 
enfrega de la confianza y del corazon a una persona, para el cristiano a la 
persona historica de Cristo. Tal es mi tesis, en el fondo una tesis luterana. 
Creo me ha salido el ensayo con alma, sobre todo cuando combato la ley. 
Aborrezco toda etiqueta; pero si alguna soportase, seria la de ideoclasta, 
rompeideas. ^Que como quiero romperlas? Como las botas, usandolas. 
(Ensayos 2: 60-61) 
But Unamuno lamented at the Reformation. Its aim was to revive Christianity, but 
it too ended up going back to the letter: "La Reforma, que flie la explosion de la letra, 
frato de resucitar en ella la palabra; trato de sacar del Libro el Verbo, de la Historia el 
Evangelio, y resucito la vieja contradiccion latente. jY entonces si que se Hizo la agonia 
vida del cristianismo [.. .]. Quisieron con la letra fijar la palabra, pero la agonia crecio" 
(Agonia 968). 
The result was a social, nationalistic Christianity where citizens would unite for a 
patriotic, national or socioeconomic goal, but never for a religious one. No wonder that 
Here Unamuno remembers his experience as a child seeing religion used as a weapon of 
war against those who disagreed, but may have been, in Unamuno's mind, as Christian if 
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not more than the general who shouted "Long live God!" Beyond this historical reference 
on how religion became partisan, Unamuno concludes the chapter with a phrase 
critiquing Reformation goals and results. It became as an effort to revive Christianity 
with the word of God, but ended dissolving it with the letter. 
Nonetheless, from the point of view of our thesis, Unamuno also points out that 
freedom of thought and conscience, the liberty to examine, is the death of the word: 
"Porque el libre examen es la muerte de la letra" (969). H is noteworthy that Unamuno 
goes beyond a "free examination" of Scripture, as was one of the ideals of the 
Reformation, to "free examination" of Christianity as such. This means that Unamuno 
sees a connection between authentic Christianity as a free following of the person of 
Christ, as each one sees fit, and the word of Christ freely understood. However, as soon 
as rigid and obligatory dogmas are fixed, such freedom ends and followers are branded 
heretics. Therefore, the tme follower of Christ, according to Unamuno, allows others the 
freedom to follow Christ as they view the latter in conscience. Unamuno's reference here 
to the bloody Cariist wars he himself witnessed could also be a reference to the 
possibility that as soon as respect for freedom of conscience ends, the reality of history 
teaches us that violence may follow even in the name of the Prince of Peace. 
In the next chapter, Unamuno makes reference to the story of Abishag the 
Shunammite, the young virgin appointed to warm the body of the dying and aging King 
David. During David's agony and after his death, Abishag was oblivious to all the 
politics, fighting and treachery around the King she loved. Unamuno sees in David the 
fraditional image of Christ and in Abishag an image of the soul who loves in a personal 
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agony, apart from social and political intrigues: 
David ha sido para los cristianos uno de los simbolos, una de las 
prefiguraciones del Dios-Hombre, del Cristo, El alma enamorada trata de 
calentarlo en su agonia, en la agonia de su vejez, con besos y abrazos de 
encendido amor. Y como no puede conocer al amado y, lo que es mas 
terrible, el amado no puede ya conocerla, se desespera de amor. (972) 
So, again, Unamuno is insisting on the personal nature of faith as opposed to a 
social commitment while at the same time stressing its incompleteness, despite the 
mutual love of the soul and Christ, just as Abishag and David: "La pobre alma 
hambrienta y sedienta de inmortalidad y de resurreccion de su came, hambrienta y 
sedienta de Dios, de Dios-Hombre a lo cristiano, o de Hombre-Dios a lo pagano, 
consume su virginidad matemal en besos y abrazos al agonizante etemo" (974). 
This constant emphasis of Unamuno on both these aspects implicitly excludes a 
sociological religion with a concomitant right towards its imposition together with the 
characterization of Christianity as a constant personal search in love and freedom. Hence, 
He would confrast the social reality of Catholicism with the personal faith of Christianity: 
"Todo lo cual tendra que ver con el reino de Salomon y con las disensiones entre este y 
Adonias, tendra que ver con el catolicismo, pero nada tiene que ver con el reino de David 
y menos su agonia, con la agonia, que es la vida del cristianismo" (976-77). 
Drawing on his classical training, Unamuno sees the etymology of the Spanish 
word for "to wish," querer, as derived from the Latin quaerere, to seek. So faith comes 
from searching, from the desire to believe, from the agony of that search. Hi the same 
way, the personal agony of Abishag with David was independent and more important 
than the politics of Salomon's reign. All of which implies freedom of conscience. 
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In Chapter VI, Unamuno refers to two elements, keys to his understanding of 
freedom of conscience: the cmsades and the gift of grace. Unamuno sees the cmsades as 
an effort of the will to believe and to force others to believe. If one is Happy in their 
belief, why does the faith of others bother them? Does the cmsader not remember that 
faith is free and personal, and. Hence, not liable to coercion by the sword of society? The 
reader may surmise that Unamuno draws on his own childhood experience during the 
siege of Bilbao and the spilt blood of Spanish history. Twisting the argument, the exile 
Unamimo concludes that violent believers are really insecure in their faith, and attack 
others, seeking to strengthen their own belief 
Y toda cmzada es uno de los actos mas agonicos del cristianismo. 
El que va a imponer una fe a otro por la espada, lo que busca es 
convencerse a si mismo. Pide sefiales, pide Hacer un milagro para sostener 
su fe. Y toda cmzada por la espada acaba por producir la conquista del 
conquistador por el conquistado, y el conquistador se Hace nadista. (984) 
The reference to grace is quite summary. Unamuno views "grace" in the context 
of masculine and feminine, active and passive, within a Pauline vision of Christians as 
forming the body of Christ: 
La fe es pasiva, femenina, hija de la gracia, y no activa, masculina 
y producida por el libre albedrio. La vision beatifica es buena para la otra 
vida; pero ^es vison o audicion? La fe en este mundo viene de Cristo, que 
es el'que resucita y no de la came (Rom., x, 7), del Cristo que fiie virgen, 
cuerpo de que los cristianos son miembros (1 Cor., vi, 15) segiin la 
polemica pauliniana. (987) 
This contrast of masculine and feminine, free will and grace, is ftirther explained 
by Unamuno in reference to his favorite quote from the Gospel, "I believe, help my 
unbelief with Luther's denomination of free will as "slave will." Following a unique 
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interpretation of the role of the Virgin Mary in Christianity, Unamuno sees real faith is 
feminine, and never forced, a will to know that becomes a desire to love, an 
understanding of the will that is agony and stmggle: 
"Creo, socorre mi incredulidad" (Mar., ix, 23). Creo, quiere decir 
"quiero creer" o mejor, "tengo ganas de creer", y representa el momento 
de la virilidad, el del libre albedrio, que Lutero llamo "siervo albedrio", 
servum arbitrium. "Socorre mi incredulidad", representa el momento de la 
feminidad, que es el de la gracia. Y la fe, [...] proviene de la gracia y no 
del libre albedrio. No cree el que tiene ganas de creer. La virilidad sola es 
esteril. En cambio, la religion cristiana ha concebido la matemidad pura, 
sin concurso de hombre, la fe de gracia pura, de gracia eficaz. (987) 
Though Unamuno draws this contrast between grace which does produce faith 
versus free will which does not, nonetheless He does not bring out the conclusion that 
faith is therefore a gift only granted to some. Hence, as such, coercion to faith is in itself 
confradictory. 
Linking the Shunammite Abishag and the writer Renan, Unamuno concludes that 
real faith is a will to know that becomes a desire to love, an understanding of the will that 
is both agony and stmggle. Force and coercion only lead to nothing: 
^Y la fe? La fe verdaderamente viva, la que vive de dudas y no las 
"sobrepuja", la fe de un Renan, es una voluntad de saber que cambia en 
querer amar, una voluntad de comprender que se hace comprension de 
voluntad, y no unas ganas de creer que acaban por virilidad en la nada. Y 
todo esto en agonia, en lucha. (987) 
Following the historical development of social Christianity, Unamuno draws the 
clear contrast between the Jesuits and Pascal. The Jesuits, the so-called Society of Jesus, 
"la Compafiia Uamada de Jesus"(1001), wished to combat the Reformation with their 
militaristic discipline and passive obedience "like a corpse" (1014). Unamuno sees their 
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military approach linked to the events of 1870 at the Vatican: the proclamation of the 
"Jesuitical" dogma of papal infallibility in July and the violent fall of the Papal States that 
September. A sfrange coincidence is the fact that that very year the Catholic convert 
Nevraian also saw the same historical link: "the definition of July involved the 
dethronement of September."'' 
The problem Unamuno sees with the iron discipline of the Jesuits is that their 
passive obedience implies no active learning, but only reception of defined dogmas. This 
intellectual acquiescence is linked to a practical servitude to religious authorities through 
unquestioning obedience to any command. Who would dare disobey God speaking 
through the Jesuitical powers-that-be? 
Dogma militarista; dogma engendrado en el seno de una milicia, 
de una Compania fiindada por un antiguo soldado, por un militar que, 
despues de herido e inutilizado por la milicia de espada, fiindo la milicia 
del cmcifijo. Y dentro de la Iglesia Romana, la disciplina, discipulina, en 
que el discipulo no aprende—«o« discit—, sino que recibe pasivamente la 
orden, el dogma; no la doctrina, no la enseiianza del maestro, y mejor que 
del maestro, del jefe, conforme al tercer grado de obediencia, que Loyola 
encarecia a los padres hermanos de Portugal, j Y esta si que es agonia! 
(Agonia 995) 
Unamuno again links this aggressive and coercive pseudo-Christianity to the 
recent declaration of the Spanish bishops in favor of a cmsade in Morocco, as if killing 
with a cross made people Christians: 
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^Quiere alguien, pues, que la Iglesia Romana predique la paz? 
Hace poco que los obispos espafioles, en un documento colectivo, la 
llamaban a la guerra por el protectorado civil-jprotectorado y civil!-que 
el reino de Espafia, no la nacion espaiiola, sigue en Marmecos, jla 
llamaban cruzadal Que cmzada tanto puede llamarse asi por llevar los 
guerreros una cmz como emblema, como por machacar cabezas de infieles 
con una cmz esgrimida a modo de maza. [Terrible lucha! [Terrible agonia! 
(995-96) 
Hence, conscience and its freedom are replaced by religious indoctrination and 
social force; another agony and contradictions in terms. Both leaming and morality imply 
the freedom to search for tmth and follow virtue as one sees it. 
Unamuno concludes this chapter with an insight on the root of such intolerance 
and coercion. Those who consider themselves beyond the search for tmth cuid the need 
for respect of conscience consider themselves almost divine in both their teaching and 
authority. Therefore, they never recognize their mistakes, "estos Hombres no reconocen 
jamas Haberse equivocado" (996). 
Consequently the kind of education they promote is slavish, not free; seeks social 
conformity, not conscientious choice; offers simplistic dogma, not a fight for Christian 
faith in freedom. Unamuno deduces that if within the religious Order itself the Jesuits 
promote such passive and blind obedience, opening the door to institutional tyranny, one 
may easily deduce that the kind of education and society they propose follows the same 
lines: 
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Y asi, el cristianismo, el verdadero cristianismo agoniza en manos 
de esos maestros del siglo. La pedagogia jesuitica es una pedagogia 
profundamente anticristiana. El jesuita odia la mistica. Su doctrina de la 
obediencia pasiva, de los tres grados de obediencia, tal como la expuso 
Ifiigo de Loyola en su celebre carta a los padres y Hermanos de Portugal, 
es una doctrina anticristiana y en el fondo anticivil. Con ese genero de 
obediencia, la civilizacion se haria imposible. Y se haria imposible el 
progreso. (1001) 
Unamuno sees other practical consequences in this mode of Jesuitical education. 
Their iron mle comes linked to a love for money. Historically, after the Reformation, 
they were different from monks and friars. So, instead of asking for alms, they became 
school-teachers in private schools, tuming education into a money machine. Unamuno 
obviously considers public education as a community service, and not an occasion for 
financial profit. Nonetheless, He argues that the Society became worse than beggars, since 
they use education for their own monetary profit, "Acabando por tomar el oficio de la 
enseiianza piiblica como una industria; la industria pedagogica. En vez de pedir limosna 
se hacen maestros de escuela" (1001). Of course, a problem Unamuno does not address 
Here, but later, is the religious freedom of students and people to accept such education. 
In contrast to passive and dead faith, Unamuno proposes the example of the 
adversary of the Jesuits, Blaise Pascal. Probabilism was the main issue Pascal fought with 
them, but Unamuno sees that theory as coming from the Jesuitical idea of obedience in 
the famous letter of Saint Ignatius to the Fathers and Brothers of Portugal. Here Ignatius 
speaks of the three degrees of obedience: in action, will and judgment. The last is praised 
as the most virtuous, seeing that the religious submits his judgment to that of the 
Superior: "Porque 'todo obediente verdadero debe inclinarse a sentir lo que su Superior 
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siente'." And Unamuno adds: "Es decir, creer verdadero lo que Superior declara tal" 
(1006). 
This unquestionable submission of one's intellect and will to another in the name 
of Christ is the end of a Christian agony as Pascal understood it. He wrote a book of 
Thoughts, not Ideas, says Unamuno. Here, his thoughts are fluid and free, not solid and 
fixed like dogmas. Pascal fought the fight of reason and faith, kneeling to pray for the 
submission of His reason to faith. Both feared and abhorred by the Pope since He did not 
have a vow of papal obedience, like the Jesuits, in freedom of conscience, he sought for 
Christ and Christianity. But, did he submit? Unamuno concludes: "Quiso someterse. Y no 
enconfro el reposo mas que con la muerte y en la muerte, y hoy vive en aquellos que 
como nosofros han tocado a su alma desnuda con la desnudez de su alma" (1009). 
Likewise, our query continues with Jesuitical obedience: are the concepts of 
freedom of inquiry and dignity of conscience aborted and suppressed? In fact, no inquiry, 
freedom, or even conscience is needed, since the Superior does all the deciding and 
defining, in virtue of his having a presupposed direct communication to Christ. Unamuno 
agrees with Pascal that one may even become like a beast, abdicating the use of reason. 
But, what one can never do is to treat others like beasts, desfroying their intelligence and, 
possibly, their conscience, which is what passive obedience does, treating people as mere 
fools who should submissively pay, pray and obey. 
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Pascal, el hombre de la contradiccion y de la agonia, previo que el 
jesuitismo, con su doctrina de la obediencia mental pasiva, de la fe 
implicita, mataba la lucha, la agonia, y, con ella, la vida misma del 
cristianismo [...]. Pero es que un cristiano puede s 'abetir, puede 
suicidarse racionalmente; lo que no puede es abetir a otro, matar a otro la 
inteligencia. Y es lo que hacen los jesuitas. Solo que tratando de 
entontecer a los demas, se han entontecido ellos. Tratando a todos como a 
nifios, ellos se Han infantilizado en el mas triste sentido [...]. En ellos no 
agoniza, eso es, no lucha, no vive, el cristianismo, sino que esta muerto y 
enterrado. (1012) 
So, with the Jesuits, Christianity no longer lives as a stmggle in freedom. The 
Christian catechism answers all questions and, when the seeker asks what is not clear, he 
is simply told not to ask: "Esto no me lo pregunteis a mi, que soy ignorante; doctores 
tiene la Santa Madre Iglesia que os sabran responder. Asi contesta a una pregunta el 
catecismo mas en curso en Espafia, el del P. Astete, un jesuita. Y los doctores, al no 
ensefiar ciertas cosas al creyente implicito, han acabado por no saberlas y por ser tan 
ignorantes como el" (1013). 
Unamuno finishes this chapter with an apology and a Hermeneutic for freedom of 
conscience. Based on a commentary on Pascal as an "orthodox Heretic," the etymology of 
the words "heteros"-other- and "or?/205"-tme-would seem to contradict each other. 
Nonetheless, Unamuno Holds both complement each other, since the "Heretic" is 
previously the person who freely chooses a doctrine. Holds an opinion and then freely 
picks that which He thinks is the "orthodox" doctrine. Hi fact, Unamuno remembers a 
quote from Paul, wherein the apostle states his opinion as "heretical." The point is that 
the heretic is a free-thinker who breaks with the common creed. And, as Paul shows, the 
heretic of yesterday is often the orthodox of today. Historically, the development of 
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doctrine implies that certain doctrines are rethought, accepted or rejected. Hence, the 
definition of "orthodox" is in constant variation. What Paul and Pascal did was transform 
their new ideas into living ideas and thus recreated orthodoxy. Which proves that 
freedom of conscience can even be useful for doctrinal development in orthodoxy. 
All of this is a far cry from the implicit and infantile faith of the Jesuits: 
Porque Heretico (haereticus) es el que escoge por si mismo una 
doctrina, el que opina libremente—^libremente?—y puede opinar 
libremente la doctrina derecha, puede crearla, puede crear de nuevo el 
dogma que dicen profesar los demas. San Pablo dice en algun pasaje [...] 
que el, respecto a cierta doctrina, es heretico. "En esto soy Heretico", dice 
al pie de la letra, [.. . ] pero quiere decir: "En esto profeso una opinion 
particular, personal, no la corriente." Quiere decir que en aquel punto se 
aparta del sentido comiin para atenerse al sentido propio, al individual, al 
del libre examen. (1013-14) 
Quite the confrary is the above to the Jesuitical concept of perfect obedience just 
like a corpse, "perinde ac cadaver." Unamuno quotes the famous example of the Holy 
and submissive Jesuit going to water a stick placed in the garden just because the Prior 
says so. Unamuno considers both persons as simply acting out a comedy. Even the so-
called moral and religious justification that such is part of mastering our pride is really a 
presupposition that such a stupid act is the will of God. Quite the contrary thinks 
Unamuno. Pride is promoted, not tamed: 
Valor entendido para domar el orguUo humane, sin ver si es que no 
hay mas orguUe en obedecer de esa manera. Porque si esta escrito que el 
que se humilla sera ensalzade, eso no quiere decir que se le ensalce al que 
se humillo en vista del ensalzamiente. Y ese genero de obediencia ha 
engendrado el hinchado orguUo-orguUo luciferino-colectivo de la 
Compafiia de Jesus. (1014) 
Maybe what Unamuno needs to bring out more clearly is the mental confrol 
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exercised by the Prior, seeing that he presents Himself as God's representative. Hence, 
conscience is coerced into obedience, seeing that one's opinion and not only one's acts 
would be, in that perspective, pride mling against divine will. Disobedience would be 
rebellion against our Creator. Unamuno, as we see above, concludes to the contrary. 
Unamuno was well aware of the real sociological pressures applied to conscience. 
Real freedom of conscience implies the liberty to follow one's path in life, but likewise 
involves the possibilities that forces in society may, directly or not, attempt either to keep 
us in their flock or expel us to the four winds. Unamuno, as well as Newman, was willing 
to pay the price of rebellion against the Institutions of Church and State he once loved, 
with exile and loneliness, but equally defended the right of his ideological opponents to 
freedom of conscience, instmction and belief 
Honoring History, we must also mention that a decade later Unamuno would 
apply his own liberal principles to the rights of conscience of the Jesuits themselves. 
Though he would still agree, "Al libre examen reformatorio, al libre examen liberal, 
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respondia aquel famoso tercer grado de la obediencia, la obediencia de juicio," if they 
or other religious orders Had the academic qualifications to teach, they should do so. 
Likewise, the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain because of their vow of obedience to 
the Pope was simply giving them a new vow of obedience to the State: 
El que esto escribe, [. . .] que tiene formado concepto de la 
pedagogia jesuitica, [ . . . ] . Eso si, ha de repetir, pues lo Ha dicho mas de 
una vez, que estima injusta la disolucion de la Compafiia e injusta la 
prohibicion de ensefiar a las Ordenes religiosas si sus miembros poseen los 
titulos que el Estado exige y se someten a la inspeccion y vigilancia de 
este.'^ 
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Unamuno saw that the II Republic was being taken over by new tyrants, 
disrespectful of the civil and Human rights of conscientious belief 
Y como, fuera de las mandangas constitucionales, no saliese nada, 
los delirantes furibundos de la revolucion-revoltosos y no 
revolucionarios-, inquietos ante la espera piiblica y para darse conciencia 
de vencedores-que no la tenian-, se entregaron, desatraillados, a la 
descompostura de quemar iglesias y conventos indefensos. Y empezo a 
antojarseles a los revolucionarios constituyentes el Coco de la reaccion 
monarquica y empezaron a padecer, con la mania persecutoria, la 
perseguidora. Y se decreto aquella desvergonzada Ley de Defensa-mas 
bien de ofensa-de la Republica.'" 
No wonder, then, that in this mood in Paris, Unamuno easily identifies Himself 
with the "soHtary priest," Padre Jacinto, Himself an example of the agony of Christianity. 
Unamuno found a kindred soul likewise denounced by authorities, declared an outcast, 
yet clinging with all the more sfrength to his beliefs in conscience. Padre Jacinto lived a 
muhitude of stmggles in the agony of Christianity in himself Unamuno, above all, sees 
him as a Father, stmggling to survive in the resurrection of His own flesh in his child: 
Es una de las tragedias mas intensas que he leido [...]. 
jEl Padre Jacinto! j Padre! En esto de su patemidad esta el fondo y 
la esencia de su tragedia, de la agonia del cristianismo en el. Se salio de la 
Iglesia para casarse, se caso para tener hijos, para perpetuarse en came, 
para asegurar la resurreccion de la came. (Agonia 1016) 
But, Father Jacinto, like Unamuno, not only goes through an agony in His desire 
to survive death in his son. A variety of religious convictions attracted him; He was drawn 
to mystical solitude and political involvement; stmggled between thoughts and deeds; 
care for the soul and the body; religion and its abuses; church and conscience; loyalties 
and dissent; a mother and a woman; solitude and society; life and death; meaning or 
suicide; a child and His demise; doubts and faith. From the viewpoint of his freedom of 
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conscience, Unamuno insists on his doubts, quoting him at the end of life, as an essential 
part of his free faith: 
La que era mi vida me ha sido arrebatada para siempre, sin 
esperanza, sin consuelo, en la vida presente. A lo que se juntan dudas 
Horribles, dudas involuntarias, dudas irracionales, pero desuelan el 
corazon y a la imaginacion. Una especie de percepcion instintiva de la 
nada del ser, nada de las cosas y nada de las personas [.. .].Y todavia estas 
dudas son involuntarias y no podria ceder a ellas sin renunciar a la fe 
cristiana y Hasta a la naturaleza humana tal como es en mi. Seria un 
suicidio moral seguido sin duda pronto por el suicidio propiamente dicho. 
(1026) 
Besides identifying Himself with such a person, Unamuno is also insisting on the 
right of the mind to examine ideas and ultimately leave one group for another, should 
conscience dictate it. At the heart of dissent, there is a lack of ultimate faith in a specific 
group or, rather, doubts about the divine presence in such an institution. So, doubts about 
a religious belief or group are ultimately doubts about God. Unamuno's and Jacinto's 
answer is not to despair in spiritual or physical suicide, but to continue till death, 
searching and fighting in religious freedom and personal loneliness. Unamuno would 
conclude, "jEste fiie el Hombre, este fue el padre, este fue el cristiano en agonia del 
cristianismo!" (1027) while remembering his own image of fighting all one's life with 
God, like Jacob, "como Jacob" ("Mi religion," Ensayos 1: 370): 
Sus liltimos afios, retirado ya de la vida activa, de 1893 a 1912, de 
sus sesenta y seis a sus ocHenta y cinco, flieron los mas tragicos de su 
vida, los de su mayor soledad. Fue una vejez robusta y davidica. Fue 
agonia de afios. "Sufro mucho. Asisto a una agonia dolorosa y 
deshonrada" (Sentimiento tragico 3:113). j Siempre el mundo! Haciale 
sufrir el aislamiento religioso. Estuvo, como Jacob, luchando solo con el 
angel del Sefior, desde la puesta del sol al rayar del alba, y clamando: "jDi 
tu nombre!" (Genesis, xxxi, 24-29). (Agonia 1024) 
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Unamuno concludes this book, reflecting again on His agony as an exile in Paris. 
Because he thought, wrote and acted independently from the powers-that-be in Spain and 
Christianity, he was now alone, in exile. The agony of his soul has received both the 
agony of Spain and that of Christianity. His written word is a witness to His agony, his 
doubts and His inner freedom in conscience. Following conscience is not only a fight till 
death with God, but a suffering alone inflicted by society. Unamuno's final words are a 
consolation that Christ too was alone, in agony, sweated blood, but still seems to leave us 
abandoned: "Y, aquellas como gotas de sangre eran simientes de agonia, eran las 
simientes de la agonia del cristianismo. Entre tanto gemia el Cristo: 'Hagase tu voluntad 
y no la mia' (Luc, xxii, 42). jCristo nuestro, Cristo nuestro!, ^por que nos Has 
abandonado?"(1034) 
The events surrounding Newman's Hfe from 1833 to 1841 can likewise be 
globally considered times of agony, doubt, dissent, loneliness and exile. While Unamuno 
wrote his La agonia del cristianismo considering more the social entity, with obvious 
parallels to his own life, our interest here with Newman is on how he himself understood 
and heroically lived liberty of conscience as His own religious convictions were 
unfolding. 
What is indeed remarkable in this time-frame are the apparent contradictions in 
Newman's decisions. First, He set out to defend the Anglican Church against Liberalism, 
yet eventually he ended up being considered "dead to the Church of England" (Apologia 
222). Then, he started writing the Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church 
Viewed Relatively to Romanism and Popular ProtestantismfVia Media). '^  as the middle 
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road of the Anglican Church, in order to prove He was not becoming a Roman Catholic. 
Again, this effort eventually drew him close to Rome (Apologia 61). Finally, he sought in 
the 39 Articles the theological basis for his anti-Roman bias (71). Their analysis in "Tract 
90" brought him nothing but trouble in Oxford and lead Him "into the hands of the 
PhiHstines [the Heads of Colleges at Oxford]" (78). Ultimately, he was to be exiled out of 
Oxford and banished out of the Church. 
The purpose of our reflection is not a theological analysis of the arguments used 
by Newman to justify His ideological position. Rather, we wish to analyze How He lived 
an understanding of liberty of conscience as free inquiry and personal assent. Above all, 
we wish to see in action in Newman's life his own theory on the "region of private 
judgment in religion; that is, of a private judgment, not formed arbitrarily and according 
to one's fancy or liking, but conscientiously, and under a sense of duty" (30). 
Hi this stage of Newman's life and writings, a paradox is seen in His contrasting 
opinions, as time evolved. How could he reconcile such contradictions? How did He 
envisage the clash of individual conscience and the ecclesiastical authority he was living 
under and only wishing to defend? As he wrote of the Tractarian Movement: "And so it 
proceeded, getting stronger and stronger every year, till it came into collision with the 
Nation, and that Church of the Nation, which it began by professing especially to serve" 
(70). 
First, let us briefly view the theological horizon of the events of the Tractarian 
Movement of 1833-1841.'^ Newman attributed its beginning to Keble's "Sermon on 
National Apostasy" in 1833, and its end to "Tract 90" in July, 1841. Its purpose was to 
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serve the Anglican Church against the dangers of Liberalism and Evangelicalism. 
Liberalism showed itself in the political sphere via intmsions by the State into religious 
affairs such as the appointment of an Anglican bishop in Jemsalem for foreign policy 
reasons. Newman considered this appointment inspired by religious indifferentism as the 
third blow which "finally shattered" his faith in the Anglican Church (Apologia 116-19). 
Liberal religious indifferentism also promoted the de-establishment of the Anglican 
Church. Case in point was the suppression of the ten Anglican bishoprics in freland, and 
the removal of religious tests in Oxford and Cambridge, especially subscription to the 39 
Articles. Evangelicalism, on the other hand, insisted on personal conversion and religious 
experience. Indirectly, it promoted Liberalism in Religion by making religion only "a 
subjective idea of our minds" (37; 68). 
Newman denounced both evils and wished to engage the battle on its tme terrain, 
which was not political but religious. John Henry wanted to bring the Anglican Church 
back to a sense of Her own dignity by Helping Her rediscover the sense of her mission 
from Apostolic times. Healing against Liberalism and Evangelicalism would come only 
from within by the renewal of faith and faithfiil obedience to the Church of the Fathers 
which the Anglican Church had forgotten. 
So, for Newman, the problem went beyond the question of privileges for religion 
in the State or Universities. The question was for the Anglican Church to get back to the 
faith of the Church of the Fathers. Indeed, Newman still Held the then-common assertion 
of state-support for religion. He rejected the separation of Church and State, Church and 
University, fostered by the religious indifferentism of Protestant Oxonian Liberalism. The 
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latter was in contrast to Roman Catholic Liberalism in France, where Montalembert and 
Lamennais advocated liberty of conscience in the context of Galilean control of 
Catholicism. Montalembert rejected State enforcement of religion. Religious assent 
should be personal and non-coercive. Newman's ideological evolution followed a 
different approach, as we shall see. Ultimately, However, it was his very life which bore 
out his understanding of liberty of conscience during these Tractarian years. 
The means Newman chose to bring the Anglican Church back to the Fathers was 
the wide diffusion of tracts destined to arouse or stir up from indifference all those, cleric 
or lay people, interested in the affairs of the Church. Pamphlets written in a striking style, 
incisive and dealing with unexpected subjects, were the weapons selected, rather than 
ideological petitions. Newman edited numerous tracts and wrote letter upon letter, 
fraveling throughout the countryside in order to bring tracts just off the presses to the 
vicarages. 
His opposition to Liberalism continued unabated. A painful example revealed the 
depth of his belief in the Anglican Church in 1834. Hi opposition to the current opinion of 
that time, Newman, Vicar of St. Mary's since 1826, refused to perform the wedding of an 
unbaptized woman who belonged to a dissident sect. The sacramental discipline in the 
Anglican Church was then very relaxed, brought under the influence of lax theologians 
and liberal pastors. Newman's refiisal to marry the couple was part of his effort to retum 
to the practice of the Primitive Church. This was the principle defended by the Tractarian 
Movement, to appeal to the Church of the Fathers. 
John Henry encountered hostility among his own family; even his mother did not 
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spare him her disapproval. Hi painful isolation. He only received letters of support from 
Keble and Pusey. Newman feU an obligation in conscience to obey His local Bishop. 
However, it would be an obedience under a certain compulsion. If he were to disobey, he 
knew disobedience ultimately meant disowning the authority of the Bishop and, finally, 
would involve resigning from his pastorate in the diocese (Letters and Diaries 4: 299­
301). 
In this incident, we see in a nutshell the inherent contradiction or, rather, power of 
development of Nevraian's thought both about the Anglican Church and liberty of 
conscience. He sought to defend the Anglican Church by appealing to the Church of the 
Fathers. Hence, He exercised His freedom of thought in a search for tmth in His religious 
beliefs. However, the tmth about the Primitive Church—in this case, about marriage-
would come back to judge the Anglican Church. His wish was to defend orthodoxy, but 
orthodoxy as he discovered it. Newman felt obliged to accept the bishop's authority, but 
also clearly saw the limits on such authority. Put another way, and as has already been 
seen with Newman's many previous teachers, those in authority may be God's 
representatives, but they are so only in so far as God decides. So, ultimately, Newman's 
understanding of the "region of private judgment in religion; that is, of a private 
judgment, not formed arbitrarily and according to one's fancy or liking, but 
conscientiously, and under a sense of duty," (Apologia 30) also subjects all religious 
authority to such a test of tmth. Are they really representing God? and within what 
limits? 
Newman's answer to LiberaHsm was to reach the vast public with signs of 
92 
doctrinal, liturgical, and ascetic renewal, based on a retum to the Church of the Fathers. 
The latter, however, caused Newman to be criticized as looking towards Rome. To 
answer that interpretation, during 1833-1836, Newman wrote the Lectures on the 
Prophetical Office of the Church Viewed Relatively to Romanism and Popular 
Protestantism (Via Media). Newman thought he had given the Anglican Church an 
original status, that of a Via Media, a moderate middle-of-the-road status between the 
Roman Catholic and Protestant interpretations of the Primitive Church. Thus, the Church 
of England claimed her right to Apostolic succession in a special way, which 
distinguished her from the innovations of Protestantism, bom of the Reformation, and at 
the same time from the cormption which had weakened Roman Catholicism. Newman 
did not consider the Via Media as being the political compromise of Elizabeth I, a sort of 
watered-down version of Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. Rather, he saw in the 
English theologians of the seventeenth century the tme face of Christianity as it had been 
defined by the Church of the Fathers. Newman's unique effort tended to show that the Via 
Media was the rich source towards which His Church of England ought to retum in order 
to express in her acts, as in her life, a fidelity to Her basic constitution (Apologia 61-63). 
In 1841, Newman published the celebrated "Tract 90," His last. Hi it, he first 
differentiated between the concepts of "Popery" and "Roman doctrine." Then he went on 
to ascertain what a man who subscribed to the 39 Articles might Hold rather than that 
what he must hold. Again, the method was "a first approximation to the required 
solution," with the acknowledgment that "in minor things, whether in question of fact or 
of judgment, there was room for difference or error of opinion," and Newman was 
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willing to own a mistake, if it were proved against him (72-73). 
Before analyzing Newman's response to the Church of England's reaction, let us 
examine some aspects of Newman's sense of duty in conscience on writing the Tracts. 
First, since his own lonesome agony in Sicily, Newman was no longer afraid: "Time was, 
I shrank from what was right / From fear of what was wrong; /1 would not brave the 
sacred fight, / Because the foe was strong."'^ Hi fact, the "position of his mind" was that 
it would Have been "intellectual cowardice" not to seek a "basis in reason" for His faith. 
Secondly, it would be "moral cowardice" not to put it in writing. Newman felt that if their 
opponents, those in favor of Liberalism did so, the Tractarians should do likewise. This, 
says Newman in the Apologia, was the main reason for "Tract 90" (63). 
As to the issue of authority versus private judgment, we note Newman's reaction 
to the public censure of "Tract 90" by the Heads of Houses at Oxford. Newman found 
himself not at all froubled. The latter was not some kind of Stoical resistance to pain. 
Rather, it was because His opinion remained unchanged as to the tmth and honesty of the 
principles of "Tract 90," and of the necessity of making it public. In regard to the reaction 
of ecclesiastical authority, the first step was His bishop's—Bagot of Oxford—request for 
silence and an end to discussion. One is reminded of other instances in political, religious 
and moral drama where the command to "keep silence" is the answer to awkward 
questions.'^ Newman found that artificial, akin to cowardice. Then, the bishop, at the 
urging of the Bishop of London, requested that "Tract 90" not be reprinted. Again, 
Newman tended first to obey, but Had second thoughts. Here, John Henry described 
several nuances in this power stmggle between his respect for religious authority and His 
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private judgment. To begin with. He saw the bishops becoming more authoritarian as he 
became more obedient. The more he submitted, the more they demanded: "They pressed 
on me whenever I gave way; they fell back when they saw me obstinate" (Apologia 79). 
The misfreatment became worse, as Newman suddenly saw himself being used 
against Himself He was to write a letter suppressing the Tract at the Bishop's request. 
Again, he saw that, if he obeyed, he would leave himself defenseless against those who 
attacked his ideas. Finally, he felt so strongly that, if pushed by the Bishop to resign His 
living, he "could not in conscience act otherwise" (79). This episode of the confroversy 
finally ended with a compromise. Newman did not defend the Tract, ceased to publish 
new Tracts, and wrote a letter of compliance, not recantation, recording the Bishop's 
view. John Henry keenly saw the meaning and limitation of the Bishop's disapproval. 
"Tract 90" had been found "objectionable," but no reason had been given nor the doctrine 
condemned by authority. His one aim was "to save the Tract" (Apologia 79; Ker, 220­
224). 
The damage, however, was done. Not only was Newman even more doubtful of 
the claims of the Anglican Church as it was de facto, but his religious submission to its 
authorities was severely shaken. The clear distinction between the divine message and the 
messenger was firmly established. Newman's naive obedience had come to an end. He 
understood the bishops' refusal to condemn "Tract 90." Their interest was not adherence 
to the value of the 39 Articles to serve the Anglican Church's cause, but rather to keep 
the peace and avoid scandal. 
Again, Newman reaffirmed the principle of submission to his bishop, but there 
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was a clear limit. Compromise was the solution, but He added that he had no intention 
whatever of yielding any one point which he held on conviction (Apologia 114). 
Authorities at Oxford University and in the Anglican Church Had lost confidence in him, 
he was no longer tmstworthy. 
I saw indeed clearly that my place in the Movement was lost; 
public confidence was at an end; my occupation was gone. It was simply 
an impossibility that I could say any thing henceforth to good effect, when 
I had been posted up by the marshal on the buttery-hatch of every College 
of my University, after the manner of discommoned pastry-cooks, and 
when in every part of the country and every class of society, through every 
organ and opportunity of opinion, in newspapers, in periodicals, at 
meetings, in pulpits, at dinner-tables, in coffee-rooms, in railway 
carriages, I was denounced as a traitor. (78-79) 
However, John Henry never lost confidence in himself His aim was to defend the 
Church of England and the "Catholic" (understood as "Church of the Fathers") 
interpretation of the 39 Articles. Henceforth He found himself "dead to the Anglican 
Church" (222). 
Newman's immediate conclusion to all this controversy over "Tract 90" was to 
stay with the important question of authority, or, rather, divine authority. Ultimately, who 
decides the interpretation of Scripture, the Church of the Fathers, and orthodoxy? 
Newman had begun "Tract 90" with distinctions of the meanings of "Rome"; next, he 
faced the question of who was to decide the interpretation of the 39 Articles; and now He 
found Himself confronted with the key issue of religious authority in all religious belief 
Ultimately, it was be his personal "conviction" which decided the issue. 
Beyond that, Newman wished to let the whole issue rest. As usual, he felt that 
tmth would work itself out, adding: "I feft that by this event a kind Providence had saved 
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me from an impossible position in the future" (79). "Tract 90" marked the end of 
Newman's belief in the cause of the Church of England. All his sincere efforts to bring to 
the Anglican Church the dogmatic stmctures justifying its claim to be the Church of the 
Fathers in the 19th century ended in a command to silence. Even though the Tracts had 
come to an end, the workings of His own mind and the accidents around Him were 
bringing about a change in his opinions (68). 
In July, 1841, the British Critic carried an article by Newman on "Private 
Judgment." Seemingly resisting His own changes of opinion, Newman Hsted a series of 
conditions for change of judgment in religion. First, change seems the characteristic of 
error, and men who change must show the sincerity of their willingness to change by 
their willingness to suffer. "We repeat it, if any men Have strong feelings, they should pay 
for them; if they think it a duty to unsettle things established, they should show their 
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earnestness by being willing to suffer." 
Newman remembered his own experience at "the Hands of the Philistines" 
(Apologia 78), when the Heads [of colleges at Oxford] did him a "violent act" (113). 
Second, since tmth in religion is a revelation from God himself, change of 
religion would be a sin, if it were not one's duty. ReHgion and a change thereof is a most 
serious matter, since it deals with God Himself 
Considering the emphatic words of the Apostle, laid down by Him 
as a general principle, and illusfrated in detail, "Let every man abide in the 
same calling wherein he was called:" considering, in a word, that change 
is really the characteristic of error, and unalterableness the attribute of 
tmth, of holiness, of Almighty God Himself, we consider that when 
Private Judgment moves in the direction of innovation, it may well be 
regarded at first with suspicion. (Essays 2: 337-38) 
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However, such may be one's duty in conscience. Newman's former definition of 
private judgment in religion based on the law of probability in life comes to mind. 
(Apologia 30). 
Third, and satirically, Newman distinguishes between "the right of private 
judgment" and "the private right of judgment." John Henry noted that the former, the 
right of all to have their personal judgment in religious matters respected, is totally 
distinct from the latter, where some think only they Have the right to judge. Hence, he 
concluded that "the doctrine of private judgment, all private judgment, and nothing but 
private judgment—is held by very few people indeed" (Essays 2: 340-41). 
Taking the case of an anti-Catholic Protestant whose daughter enters a Roman 
Catholic convent, Newonan remarked on the father's small delight in such an event. 
Hence, the real sense of the "right of private judgment," as understood by Newman, 
means respect for the individual conscience, whereas the "private right of judgment" 
reflects the tendency of some to demand freedom of religion for themselves, but not 
others (Apologia 30). Therefore, they demand freedom of religion when their religion is 
not respected, while coercing religious conformity when in power. 
Newman's final justification for a right of private judgment in reHgion is 
Scripture. In this way, the error of Liberalism is avoided, in so far as the human mind is 
not established as the judge of divine revelation. On the contrary, the Scriptures do teach 
us to inquire about the teacher of doctrine: "And this obvious fact does, as far at it goes, 
make it probable that, if we are providentially obliged to exercise our private judgment, 
the point towards which we have to direct it, is the teacher rather than the doctiine" 
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When, therefore, an appeal is made to private judgment-what we are calling 
freedom of conscience-this is done in order to settle who the teachers are and what are 
their authority, rather than to substantiate this or that religious opinion or practice. 
Newman added that later in the early Church, very grave outward differences seemed to 
exist even between Christian teachers, such as Paul, Cephas, and Apollos at Corinth, with 
partisan groups forming around them. John Henry concluded that we must distinguish 
between "party feelings and interests" and "the Holy Church Catholic" (361). Hence, 
there is obviously a freedom for the individual-a Scriptural privilege-to seek the tmth 
about religion, to judge the validity of the claims of teachers to preach the divine 
message: "Let it be observed How exactly this view of the province of private Judgment, 
where it is allowable, as being the discovery not of doctrine, but of the teacher of 
doctrine, harmonizes both with the nature of ReHgion and the state of human society as 
we find it" (353). 
Such a search aims, in free inquiry and through persuasion, towards tmth by 
private judgment. Scripture sanctions an inquiry, not about the content of divine teaching, 
but firstly about the teachers: whether or not they be tme or false. Here Newman seems to 
echo the views of John Locke on faith and reason: "The believing, or not believing that 
Proposition, or Book, to be of Divine Authority, can never be Matter of Faith, but Matter 
of Reason;^^ [...] But yet, it still belongs to reason, to judge of the tmth, and of the 
signification of the Words, wherein it is deHvered" (694). 
Another category mentioned by Newonan in this essay on private judgment are 
99 
those who "despise the notion of a teacher altogether." These assert that there is no such 
teaching authority anywhere. Consequently, Newman wished them to avoid the example 
of the dog in the fable "who would neither use the manger himself, nor relinquish it to 
others" (Essays 356). Such are those who neither seek the teacher of tmth nor allow 
others to do so. As for His own conscience, whether He should continue in the Church of 
England or take the road to Rome, he advocated leaving the issue to time, convinced that 
tioith can fight its own battle. Rather than attempting to foresee our future convictions, 
Nevmian insisted on doing simply what we think right day by day: 
Is not this a time of strange providences? Is it not our safest course, 
without looking to consequences, to do simply what we think right day by 
day? Shall we not be sure to go wrong, if we attempt to trace by 
anticipation the course of divine Providence? 
Has not all our misery, as a Church, arisen from people being 
afraid to look difficulties in the face? (Apologia 130) 
We may conclude this chapter with Unamuno's note to the word "scepsis" in La 
agonia del cristianismo: 
Scepsis significa rebusca, no duda, [. . .] El esceptico, en este 
sentido, se opone al dogmatico, como el hombre que busca se opone al 
Hombre que afirma antes de toda rebusca. El esceptico estudia para ver 
que solucion pueda encontrar, y puede ser que no encuentre ninguna. El 
dogmatico no busca mas que pmebas para apoyar un dogma al que se Ha 
adherido antes de encontrarlas. El uno quiere la caza; el otro, la presa. 
(Agonia 1068-69) 
Our writers were not dogmatic, but skeptical in that sense of the word. Both were 
seekers, and sometimes finders. They wrote and lived to further the search for tmth, with 
the freedom of conscience to reject doctrines, authorities and institutions, be that 
necessary and even painful. As for the future, neither bothered about foreseeing it. Rather 
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than attempting "to trace by anticipation the course of divine providence," Newman 
insists on doing "simply what we think right day by day" (Apologia 130). Unamuno tells 
the reader of Don Quixote to follow the star and straighten what is crooked before you, 
here and now: "Sigue a la estrella. Y haz como el Caballero: endereza el entuerto que se 
te ponga delante. Ahora lo de ahora y aqui lo de aqui" ("El sepulcro de Don Quijote," 
Ensayos 2: 77). 
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CHAPTER VI 

A CHRISTIAN IN CONSCIENCE 

Me repugnan los ortodoxos, sean catolicos o protestantes [...] 
que niegan cristianismo a quienes no interpretan el Evangelio como ellos.' 
When I was fully confident that the Church of Rome 
was the only tme Church, I joined Her.^  
Their relationship with the institutional Roman Catholic Church is no doubt a 
lightning-rod in our comparison of John Henry Newman and Miguel de Unamuno. On 
the one Hand, we have the most famous convert, later Cardinal, to Catholicism in the 
English-speaking world, while, on the other, we have the so-called "arch-heretic and 
master of heresies."^ Even though their conclusions about the Roman Catholic Church 
were totally opposite, the motor of their investigation of history was the principle of free 
intellectual examination, "libre examen,"" and the need for an argument for Christianity.^ 
Both set out to compare Catholicism with Protestantism within the Historical context of 
Christianity. 
In Unamuno's case, this is especially vivid in Chapter IV of his Sentimiento 
tragico, "La esencia del catolicismo." In His analysis of both Protestantism and 
Catholicism, Unamuno sees them both in the perspective of a possible answer to the 
human problem of immortality and salvation of the individual soul. Beginning with 
historical Christianity, as an affluence of both the Jewish and Hellenist spiritual currents, 
Unamuno adopts to great extent the reading of Hamack on the development of 
Christianity. Primitive Christianity really believed in the imminent second coming of 
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Jesus rather than the resurrection of Jesus or the immortality of the soul. From Hellenic 
philosophy came the idea of a personal soul; from Judaism the knowledge of a personal 
loving God: 
Asi, cada uno por su lado, judios y griegos llegaron al verdadero 
descubrimiento de la muerte, que es el que hace entrar a los pueblos, como 
a los hombres, en la pubertad espiritual, la del sentimiento tragico de la 
vida, que es cuando engendra la humanidad al Dios vivo. El 
descubrimiento de la muerte es el que nos revela a Dios, y la muerte del 
hombre perfecto, del Cristo, fue la suprema revelacion de la muerte, la del 
hombre que no debia morir y murio.^ 
Christology evolved around Paul of Tarsus, who never knew the historical Jesus 
but claimed to know the Risen Lord through a personal revelation. The center of his 
message was Christ Risen, without which the Christian faith would be empty. Linked to 
this cenfral dogma is the dogma of the resurrection of the body at the end of time. The 
prior belief in the second coming and the end of the world has been changed by Paul. In 
Unamuno's words: "^No ven que mas que de la vida inmortal de Cristo, reducida acaso a 
una vida en la conciencia colectiva cristiana, se trata de una garantia de nuestra propia 
resurreccion personal, en alma y tambien en cuerpo?" (Sentimiento tragico 127) 
The importance of this approach by Unamuno is that nothing is presupposed. The 
central doctrine of Christianity may have either a simple sociological conscience or a 
private so-called apostolic revelation, without a necessary connection to Jesus himself, or 
a divine revelation from above. However, Unamuno does not presuppose, as Newman 
did, a divine origin to Christianity either in its doctrine or authority, and. Hence, his 
questioning does not involve a reverential respect towards the tmth as divinely revealed. 
Moreover, the force of questioning a revealed doctrine or dissenting from an authority's 
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authenticity is greatly enhanced emotionally by the prize of etemal life to be won or lost. 
Hence, Unamuno's free examination has a better possibility than Newman's of picking 
and choosing what Unamuno considers correct. 
The great event analyzed by Unamuno is the Nicene or Athanasian Creed, in the 
year 325. Unamuno, following Hamack, characterizes Athanasius as "un Hombre de 
pocas letras, pero de mucha fe, y sobre todo, de la fe popular, Henchido de hambre de 
inmortaHdad." (120) But he also had the courage of faith to affirm the divinity of Christ, 
because if Christ were not God, how could he bestow divinity, etemal life, on us Humans? 
This was a cosmological, eschatological Christ, not the God of the philosophers. And so 
nature and revelation were separated and the "Catholic Christ" was bom. While the 
Historical Jesus of Protestantism suffers the chisel of biblical criticism, the Catholic 
Christ lives throughout the centuries, guaranteeing faith in personal immortality and 
salvation. 
If Arianism Had triumphed, Christ would only be the perfect man, an exemplary 
model, a moral teacher; Christianity, no more than an ethical code. Unamuno sees the 
contrast Protestantism versus Catholicism between religion linked to morality, as Kant 
would Have it, as in the former, or religion linked to etemity, as in the latter, as defined at 
the Council of Nicea. 
Y, en cambio, el protestantismo, absorto en eso de la justificacion, 
tomada en un sentido mas etico que otra cosa, aunque con aparencias 
religiosas, acaba por neutralizar y casi borrar lo escatologico, abandona la 
simbolica nicena, cae en la anarquia confesional, en puro individualismo 
reHgioso y en vaga religiosidad estetica, etica o cultural. (123) 
Athanasius also courageously affirms contradictory statements. Christ is both God 
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and human. Hamack considers this as the beginning of the end of rationality in 
CathoHcism. Dogma has said good-bye to clear thought and empirical proofs. Unamuno 
writes: "Y Atanasio tuvo el valor supremo de la fe, el de afirmar cosas contradictorias 
enfre si. 'La perfecta contradiccion que hay en el homousios trajo tras de si todo un 
ejercito de confradicciones, y mas cuanto mas avanzo el pensamiento', dice Hamack." 
Unamuno, however, adds that life is such, needing value judgments. The latter are not 
only confradictory, they are irrational: "Si, asi fiie, y asi tuvo que ser [...]. Las 
determinaciones de valor, no solo no son nunca racionalizables: son antirracionales" 
(121). 
The historical link between the Nicean Creed and later Vatican dogmas is 
established by Unamuno playing with the etymology of the word "idiot." An "idiot" is 
one who is naive, wild and sheepish. Touching this and his basic human problem, that of 
personal immortality, Unamuno states that the bishops at both places merely represent the 
genuine human spirit with our desire to never die. Hence, they search for the best reason 
to believe: 
En Nicea vencieron, pues, como mas adelante en el Vaticano, los 
idiotas-tomada esta palabra en su recto sentido primitive y etimologico—, 
los ingenues, los obispos cerriles y voluntariosos, representantes del 
genuine espiritu humane, del popular, del que no quiere morirse, diga le 
que qui era la razon; y busca garantia, lo mas material posible, a su deseo. 
(121-22) 
The sacrament of the Eucharist is immediately mentioned by Unamuno as "bread 
of etemal life." Faith in the divine presence in the Eucharist is obviously not susceptible 
of rational examination, but a question of feelings. Here reason gees one way; feelings. 
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another. Unamuno does net examine the issue of the controversies Protestantism later had 
with this dogma, when they substituted its reality for the idealist sacrament of the word. 
However, for him, this most religious belief was even beyond understanding even for the 
Fathers of the Church: 
Pero hasta Padres de la Iglesia Hay para los cuales la inmaterialidad 
de Dios mismo no era una cosa tan definida y clara como para nosotros. Y 
este Sacramento de la Eucaristia es el inmortalizador per excelencia y el 
eje, per tanto, de la piedad popular catolica. Y si cabe decirlo, el mas 
especificamente religioso. 
Porque lo especifico religiose catolico es la inmertalizacion y no la 
justificacion al mode protestante. Este es mas bien etico. (123) 
What we mentioned above about the effect on a believer of the dogma of immortality can 
be repeated here. Free examination of this dogma and the Church also involves the force 
of losing a consolation for the heart. Historically, Catholicism has not refiised to use her 
power to exclude dissenters from this sacrament, in accord with her OWTI mles. Hence, a 
lone Heretic like Unamuno might think twice before questioning Church doctrine, above 
all in public, be it that the Church refuses them admission to the Eucharist. 
Tradition and its importance is at the Heart of controversies between Catholicism 
and Protestantism as well as at the core of Newman's decision to become a Roman 
Catholic. Catholicism in its search for reasons for its doctrines appeals to the witness of 
centuries. Unamuno recognizes this power of the unity of what is handed down by many. 
From the early Fathers, Catholicism has invoked this argument to justify its teaching and 
authority. The problem for free examination is not only to judge if one might be wiser 
than the Pope, and the bishops, but understanding Christianity better than millions of 
believers did throughout the centuries. Nonetheless, Unamuno tums the argument around. 
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Quoting Lamennais, certainty is merely a social product, "la certeza, [. ..] es un producto 
social" (127) 
Even more so. Catholic apologists and mystics themselves demonstrate the origin 
of this traditionalist theory. Tradition merely shows us what is most useftil, as de Maistre 
states, and, what is more useful, asks Unamuno, than the immortality of our soul? Even 
the blessed Enrique Suso, Dominican mystic, rejected this democratic proof from 
fradition: 
Pero aquel formidable mistico y asceta que fiie el beato Enrique 
Suso, el dominicano, pidiole a la etema Sabiduria una sola palabra de que 
era el amor, y al contestarle: "Todas las criaturas invocan que lo soy", 
replico Suso, el servidor: "jAy Sefior, eso no basta para un alma 
anhelante!" La fe no se siente segura ni con el consentimiento de los 
demas, ni con la tradicion, ni bajo la autoridad. (127) 
As for sin, Unamuno notices How Catholicism does not Have the same anguish as 
Protestantism in regard either to original sin, due to the sacrament of baptism, or with 
concupiscence due to the doctrine of forgiveness by the sacrament of confession. 
However, Catholicism does have an interpretation of the sin against the Holy Spirit, 
absent from Lutheran rationalism, that is, the sin of Heresy, free examination: 
El verdadero pecado, acaso el pecado contra el Espiritu Santo, que 
no tiene remision, es el pecado de Herejia, el de pensar por cuenta propia. 
Ya se Ha oido aqui, en nuestra Espafia, que ser liberal, esto es, hereje, es 
peor que ser asesino, ladron o adiiltero. El pecado mas grave es no 
obedecer a la Iglesia, cuya infalibilidad nos defiende de la razon. (125) 
However, Unamuno also sees the contradiction of Protestant Europe being 

scandalized by the infallibility of one man, the Pope. What difference does it make if 

infallibility is attributed to one man, one bible, or one church? The same problem 
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presents itself in all three areas and exists in both Catholicism and Protestantism. Hence, 
bHnd obedience to either religion causes a problem for free examination and liberty of 
conscience to act accordingly. Nonetheless, Unamuno does consider that the Catholic 
Church affirms the vital dimension of the human being, both feeling and reason. Hence, it 
creates for itself rational dogmas that defend anthropocentrism against Galileo, and 
human uniqueness against Darwin. Therefore, Pio Nono rejected the so-called modem 
civilization. Hence, Unamuno concludes that Catholicism seeks to defend life against the 
rationalist, technical reason of the Protestant countries. 
Nonetheless, reason, free inquiry and human feelings constantly seek rational 
answers. Hence, faith in Catholicism is forced to make a pact with them, and therefore 
emerges a confradiction in conscience. Human beings need support for their faith as well 
as to defend it against the attack of reason. Hence, there came about in Catholicism an 
appeal to reason to support, if not prove, faith; to defend faith against irrational 
arguments: 
Necesitamos seguridad, certeza, sefiales, y se va a los motiva 
credibilitatis, a los motives de credibilidad, para fundar el rationale 
obsequium, y aunque la fe precede a la razon, fides praecedit rationem, 
segiin San Agustin, este mismo doctor y obispo queria ir por la fe a la 
inteligencia, perfidem ad intellectum, y cree para entender, credo ut 
intelligam. Cuan lejos de aquella soberbia expresion de Tertuliano: et 
sepultus resurrexit cerium est quia impossibile est\ "y sepultado resucito: 
es cierto porque es imposible' y su excelso: credo quia absurdum], 
escandalo de racionalistas. (127) 
Therefore, Unamuno concludes that scholastic theology, a magnificent edifice 
with all religious conflicts resolved by Saint Thomas Aquinas and the schoolmen, is an 
impotent Christianity. Faith is made to pact with reason and tries to justify, the rationalist 
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way, the fundamental dogmas of the Catholic Church. A typical example is the doctrine 
of transubstantiation, whereby faith, beyond reason, in the divine presence in the 
consecrated bread and wine, is rationalized with Aristotelian concepts: 
Y ya no se trata de Hacer aceptar el dogma, sino su interpretacion 
filosofica medieval y tomista. No basta creer que al tomar la Hostia 
consagrada se toma el cuerpo y sangre de nuestro Sefior Jesucristo; Hay 
que pasar por todo eso de la transustanciacion, la sustancia separada de los 
accidentes, rompiendo con toda la concepcion racional modema de la 
sustanciaHdad. (128) 
This approach leads, according to Unamuno, quoting Hamack's interpretation of 
the Council of Nicea, to both an unintelligible faith and a clerical-controlled church: 
"Que para eso, enfre ofras cosas, se instituyo el sacerdocio, para que la Iglesia docente 
fiiese la depositaria, deposito mas que rio, reservoir instead of river, como dijo Brooks, 
de los secretes teelogices" (128). 
The only option is the coal-worker's faith, "lafe del carbonero," which blindly 
accepts dogma and authority, without ever opening the door to any possibility of free 
examination and discussion. Such simplistic faithfiil never have their questions answered. 
Or rather receive only one, inviting them to be humble listeners of the transmitted word 
of God: Are you wiser that the doctors of Holy Mother Church? Again Unamuno quotes 
the thought-stopper of Saint Teresa of Avila in the Catholic catechism: "Eso no me lo 
pregunteis a mi, que soy ignorante; doctores tiene la Santa Madre Iglesia que os sabran 
responder" (128). 
Hence, Catholicism can never achieve a living, vital, free faith. Unamuno 
concludes that this rationalistic, scholastic theology Has led to a great setback for the 
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Catholic spirit. Giving the example of Duns Scotus, who wished to justify faith on the 
inscmtable free will of God, rather than on divine essence or goodness, Unamuno saw 
how ridiculous and even evil such a conception could be. So, even more was Catholicism 
separated from believers gifted with adult minds, and not coal-workers. And, in the 
perspective of free examination of the faith, became even more illogical. 
Ultimately, Unamuno sees Catholicism as a swinging between mysticism, which 
is an intimate experience of the living God (Saint John of the Cross, Saint Teresa of 
Avila, etc.) and scientific religion, a kind of diabolic pact between faith and reason: 
Y es que el Catolicismo oscila entre la mistica, que es experiencia 
intima de Dios vivo en Cristo, experiencia intransmisible, y cuyo peligro 
es, por ofra parte, absorber en Dios la propia personalidad, lo cual no salva 
nuestro anhelo vital, y entre el racionalismo a que combate; [. ..] oscila 
entre ciencia religionizada y religion cientificada. (129) 
Going through the history of Catholicism, Unamuno saw how a deep dialectic 
mns from the early Church's stmggle with apocalyptic enthusiasm for neo-platonic 
mysticism, Christological humanity and divinity, Trinitarian monotheism and polytheism, 
nature and grace, through the controversies on human freedom and divine will: "Y asi se 
hizo la dogmatica catolica un sistema de contradicciones, major o peor concordadas" 
(129). But, at what a price? 
The previous unintelligibility and now these contradictions all create for the 
educated believers an impossible dilemma. Their mental needs are totally oppressed. 
Freedom of inquiry, conscience and choice are all eliminated. One has to believe all or 
nothing. Be saved or condemned. Obey or be damned. If either one doctrinal declaration 
or act of authority is rejected, the force of all doctrines and all authority is then rejected. 
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Total rebellion is the only policy. As happened with Martin Luther in the Reformation, 
once he rejected the power of the Papacy in one area. He was required to denounce all 
postulates of the Pope. Unamuno, like Newman before him, saw that if people are pushed 
to accept all or nothing in religion, they can easily move into atheism: 
A costa, preciso es decirlo, de oprimir las necesidades mentales de 
los creyentes en uso de razon adulta. Exigeles que crean o todo o nada, 
que acepten la entera totalidad de la dogmatica, o que se pierda todo 
merito si se rechaza la minima parte de ella. Y asi resulta lo que el gran 
predicador unitariano Charming decia, y es que tenemos en Francia y 
Espafia multitudes que Han pasado de rechazar el papismo al absoluto 
ateismo. (129) 
A totally different vision of Catholicism comes from the pen of the convert 
NewTnan, but the conclusion is the same: atheism seems the altemative to Catholicism: 
And in these latter days, days, in like manner, outside the Catholic 
Church things are tending,—with far greater rapidity than in that old time 
from the circumstance of the age,—to atheism in one shape or other. What 
a scene, what a prospect, does the whole of Europe present at this day! 
And not only Europe, but every government and every civilization through 
the world, which is under the influence of the European mind! Especially, 
for it most concems, us. How sorrowfiil, in the view of religion, [...] is the 
spectacle presented to us by the educated intellect of England, France, and 
Germany! (Apologia 188) 
Hence, Unamuno reflects at the end of this chapter, Catholicism offers a solution 
to the problem of human immortality and the soul's etemal salvation. This answer 
satisfies the will and. Hence, life. But, by rationalizing faith with dogmatic theology, 
reason is left wanting. Reason has her reasons. But Unamuno makes an important 
distinction, ft is one thing for a tmth to be above reason; quite another to be confrary to 
reason. The first case would be the divine presence in the Eucharist; the second would be 
fransubstantiation. Unamuno feels that forcing reason to accept as above reason what is 
113 

really against reason is irrational, and, hence, rejected by believers gifted with adult 
reason, "dotados de razon adulta" (Unamuno, Sentimiento tragico 128). Likewise, forcing 
one who is not a coal-worker to be so, is a waste of time: "No sirve querer forzarse a 
reconocer sobrerracional lo que claramente se nos aparece contrarracional, ni sirve querer 
hacerse carbonero el que no lo es" (130). 
Freedom of conscience implies a search for tmth, the option of receiving or 
rejecting doctrines or authorities. Catholicism, as portrayed by Unamuno, implies no such 
compromise for the thinking believer. If one questions, there is no answer. If one rejects 
any doctrine, all are rejected and one can no longer be identified with the Church. Hence, 
to be a Catholic in freedom of conscience would seem impossible for an educated 
believer. 
Newman's decision in conscience to join the Roman Catholic Church is intimately 
linked with his writing of An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine 
(Development). This book was written before the author became a Catholic.^ In fact, the 
outcome of the book was to remove the last obstacle on His road towards Rome. Once 
again, we note the amazing link between Newman's life and books. In fact. He had leamt 
the lesson from His illness in Sicily and friendship with Froude that certitude in religious 
questions demands action. In considering the question of joining the R.C. Church in 
1843, Newman's own simple answer to his great difficulty had been: "Do what your 
present state of opinion requires in the light of duty, and let that doing tell: speak by acts" 
(Apologia 168). 
In accord with the aim of this dissertation, we wish to analyze Newman's concept 
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of conscience as he wrote this book and acted accordingly. We shall endeavor to note the 
following characteristics of conscience as brought out in this episode of Newman's life. 
First, its individual, personal, character as each person finding alone their own path 
towards duty in tmth. Secondly, we shall emphasize the Historical dimension of decisions 
in conscience as written and lived by Newman at the time of his conversion to the RC 
Church. Finally, we wish to note the element of tmth in any decision in conscience as 
understood by Newman. Our Hope is that this elucidation of conscience as lived by 
Nevraian in his decision of 9 October 1845 will prepare the road towards our later 
conclusions on His understanding of liberty of conscience. 
On March 20, 1841, Newman had written: "No one can enter into my situation 
but myself (Apologia 137). Newman's purpose in writing the Essay on Development 
was not to write an apology for his conversion to Catholicism. Less still was He writing 
an apology for Roman Catholicism itself (Preface to the Edition of 1878, Development 
vii). His purpose was totally personal; How to answer His own difficulty in becoming a 
Catholic or not at a precise time in his life (Development ix). His need was not for logical 
reasons to join the Church of Rome. He felt a great dislike for "paper logic." 
All the logic in the world would not have made me move faster 
towards Rome than I did; as well might you say that 1 have arrived at the 
end of my joumey, because I see the village church before me, as venture 
to assert that the miles, over which my soul had to pass before it got to 
Rome, could be annihilated, even though I Had been in possession of some 
far clearer view than I then Had, that Rome was my ultimate destination. 
(Apologia 36) 
Newman insisted Here on the personal, historical dimension of decisions in 
conscience. Comparing logical arguments to seeing the village church at a distance, he 
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distinguished between seeing intellectual reasons for going to Roman Catholicism and 
actually going over to Rome. At the root of this distinction is His philosophical dislike for 
"unfeeling logical inferences" (36). As developed later in the Grammar of Assent 
Newman considered certitude as being in the concrete by a living Human being, whereas 
logical inference only reaches conclusions in the abstract. Here, with the Essay on 
Development, Newman distinguished between seeing and walking. One thing is to see 
intellectual arguments for Roman Catholicism. Quite another to actually go over to that 
Church. The Human mind may foresee intellectual consequences in Logic from certain 
premises. But, it is the "whole man who moves" (36). Newman's philosophical 
anthropology involves the whole person with his life situation, a clear rejection of an 
intellectual abstraction. 
Therefore, in the Essay on Development, Newman's method of certitude for his 
own conscience is the law of probability. On the question of development of doctrine, 
there is the High antecedent probability that Providence would watch over his own work, 
directing and ratifying those developments of doctrine which were inevitable 
(Development 100). On the other hand, the existing developments of doctrine are the 
probable fiilfillment of that expectation (92). This system of writing and arguing by 
Newman in this work follows the distinction quoted above from the Apologia between 
the certitude in logic due to rigid demonstration, and certitude in religious inquiry, where 
we arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities (Apologia 157). For that reason, it is 
the whole man that reasons and moves; whereas "paper logic is but the record of it" (136) 
Therefore, for Newman objective reasons or apologetics Have a clear limit; the individual 
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person needs certitude from an accumulation of probabilities brought home to Him alone. 
The personal and Historical character of conscience is also seen in his 
"Advertisement to the First Edition" of the Essay on Development. The work is intended 
to "avow his present belief with His desire to "suggest thoughts" and "carry forward" 
other inquirers (x). So, if, on the one Hand, Newman found his own certitude in Roman 
Catholicism on writing this book, on the other Hand, He clearly knew that his reasons for 
beHef are mere suggestions for other seekers. Not only did He see His own decision in 
conscience to be entirely individual, but also considered that the same held for other 
people. Just because He saw reasons for conversion to Roman Catholicism with the 
decision to walk that road did not mean he felt others should in conscience follow his 
path. On the confrary, precisely because his own certitude was entirely personal and 
historic, likewise the conscience of others had to see and walk for themselves. Newman 
was convinced by his teacher Hawkins "to see with my own eyes and to walk with my 
owm feef (Apologia 41). 
Besides, this characteristic of conscience can be seen in both the Essay on 
Development and the Apologia. He began the Essay on Development as an non-Catholic 
as he says in the "Advertisement," and decided to become a Catholic when "He Had got 
some way in the printing" (vii) But, this. His own personal certitude, did not entice him 
on a cmsade of proselytizing for Roman Catholicism. On the contrary, in the Apologia he 
remarked that He was eager for converts while he was "fighting in Oxford for the 
Anglican Church." Nevertheless, as soon as he tumed towards Rome, he kept to the 
principle of "finding disciples, rather than seeking them," because His concem became 
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entirely His own duty in conscience: "This went on till 1843; but, at that date, as soon as I 
tumed my face Romeward, I gave up, as far as ever was possible, the thought of in any 
respect and in any shape acting upon others. Then I myself was simply my own concem" 
(169). 
The divine character of decisions in conscience is brought out in the Essay on 
Development. Newman's conversion is concomitant with the discovery of the Historical 
character of divine revelation and Providence in the development of doctrine. Newman's 
argument was history, against which there were no arguments. His problem was likewise 
history in so far as certain apparent inconsistencies appeared in historical Christianity. 
And his solution was history in so far as probability demanded a divine Providence over 
developments of doctrine in history. Chapter IV of Part I of the book precisely reviews 
instances to illustrate his point. All of Part II is a historical view of doctrinal 
developments vis-a-vis doctrinal cormptions. In the final analysis, this historical 
Christianity tums out to be Roman Catholicism. So, he could conclude His introduction to 
the Essay on Development: "The following Essay is directed towards a solution of the 
difficuHy which has been stated,-tHe difficuHy, as far as it exists, which lies in the way 
of our using in controversy the testimony of our most natural informant conceming the 
doctrine and worship of Christianity, viz., the History of eighteen hundred years" (29). 
The historical and divine character of Christianity determinant in Newman's 
certitude in embracing Roman Catholicism is also paralleled in the historical and dutifiil 
character of His decision towards conversion in conscience. There is a precise "here and 
now" when Newman decided to embrace the Church of Rome as tme Christianity. His 
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theory of the development of doctrine was not only a hypothesis to account for a 
difficulty (30), but also the historical moment for his certitude on what his conscience 
freely wanted him to do. There was a precise here and now in his decision to write the 
Essay on Development, (Apologia 177) but also a precise historical "circumstance" 
which allowed him to freely act on His certitude in conscience, and be received into 
Roman Catholicism as the Church of Christ (xi). 
Therefore, the argument of history which determined his conviction on the divine 
nature of Roman CathoHcism in Essay on Development is also the argument to determine 
his own historical conversion, understood as his decision in conscience at that time and 
place. Hence, His theory of conscience was historical, changing and constantly seeking 
tmth in life and life in tmth, exactly like Unamuno ("Mi religion," Ensayos 2: 370). His 
certitude in conscience was not the same at the beginning of the Essay on Development 
as at the end. So, later he would apply to others what He himself had lived. His theory of 
conscience, then, could likewise be considered a Hypothesis to account for the difficulty 
of His change in certitude, and, consequently, other people's changes in certitude. 
The second edition of the Apologia is precisely titled History of my Religious 
Opinions since he says it is "historically relating my state of mind" (Apologia 157). The 
Essay on Development is in itself a testimony of history on How Newman gradually 
changed from a non-certitude in the Church of Rome to intellectual conviction (157). 
Hence, he could conclude a theory of conscience where each person, day by day, must 
seek their certitudes: 
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Is not this a time of strange providences? is it not our safest course, 
without looking to consequences, to do simply what we think right day by 
day? shall we not be sure to go wrong, if we attempt to trace by 
anticipation the course of divine Providence? 
Has not all our misery, as a Church, arisen from people being 
afraid to look difficulties in the face? (130) 
This gradual change of certitudes in religious matters finally raises the question of 
a tmth in conscience which seems concomitant with error. How can the same religion or 
tmth be present in contradictory conscientious certitudes? How can Historical Christianity 
be interpreted in good faith in such diverse modes? Consequently, is it enough for a 
personal, historical conscience, such as Newman's, to seek tmth, though he find error? 
How can real objective tmth be allied with subjective change? What respect merits a 
conscience we know to be in error? 
Again, Newman's life is Newman's answer. Beginning the Essay on Development 
we cannot doubt His sincerity as a non-Catholic (Development xi), while, at the end, we 
cannot fail to admire his courage to "go on the open sea" (Apologia 110). God, He 
beHeves, who lives as a Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in his conscience (156), 
is also the same Lord who provides the antecedent probability of divine protection and 
the subsequent probability of his action in the development of doctrine. 
Newman applied this theory to the individual conscience when He faced the 
question of His change of certitude possibly leading people to be skeptical as to all 
objective tmth. If Newman was mistaken as an Anglican, might he not be mistaken again 
as a Catholic? Quite the contrary: John Henry argued in the Apologia The very fact of 
objective tmth demands that a person recognize that He Has been deceived, as Newman 
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was by the Anglican divines. Tmth demands change in accord with the knowledge the 
individual achieves in his historical life. The confrary-to remain in a known error-
indeed would be militating against objective tmth (161).^ So, Newman's decision to enter 
the Church of Rome as soon as he saw the emptiness of His doubt was not an apology for 
relativism, but rather for objective tmth (Development 10). 
The next step in Newman's theory of conscience was to ask whether a person 
should always follow an erring conscience. The whole focus of the Essay on 
Development is that Newman was in error in regard to His doubts about Roman 
Catholicism. Hence, his change. Nevertheless, at no point did Newman consider his 
subjective error to be an objective culpable fault. On the contrary, he stated that He Has 
"always contended" that 
Obedience even to an erring conscience was the way to gain light, 
and that it mattered not where a man began, so that he began on what 
came to hand, and in faith; and that any thing might become a divine 
method of Tmth; that to the pure all things are pure, and Have a self-
correcting virtue and a power of germinating. 
And though I Have no right at all to assume that this mercy is 
granted to me, yet the fact, that a person in my situation may have it 
granted to him, seems to me to remove the perplexity which my change of 
opinion may occasion. (Apologia 162) 
Hence, obedience to an erring conscience not only is not considered "evil," but 
rather is considered the road to tmth. Besides, Newman added the historical reference to 
those conscientious Jews being precisely those who converted to Christianity, whereas 
the lukewarm did not (162). This reference implies that obedience to an erring conscience 
is precisely that; obedience to conscience as to a Living Person dwelling within, and not 
to some fancy or liking. In Newman's case, it was His desire to defend the Church of 
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England against Liberalism which eventually brought Him to the tmth of the Church of 
Rome. 
A final question then arises as to Newman's view of the "authority" of conscience 
vis-a-vis Church authority as brought out in the Essay on Development. We note that in 
the postscript he states: "His first step on his conversion was to offer his work for 
revision to the proper authorities." This obedience to the authorities of Roman 
Catholicism was a consequence of his recognizing the presence of God in that Church 
(Development x-xi). 
Again, the whole point of Essay on Development was a final farewell to the 
Church of England and her authorities. Newman did finish the work obeying the 
authority of the Church of Rome, but the book itself in its writing is a clear dissent in 
conscience from both the Anglican Church and the Church of Rome. The final authority 
for conscience is tmth itself In the case of Church authorities, Newman discovered 
writing the Essay on Development that that same tmth dwelt in the Church of Rome, 
rather than in the Church of England. The primacy of conscience is the primacy of tmth 
itself over both the individual in error or religious authorities which teach error in tmth's 
name. 
So, we see in the Essay on Development, though linked to Newman's conversion, 
a moderate approach to dissent. Obedience is granted to the religious authorities accepted 
in conscience by Newman. In no way would John Henry agree with a systematic 
rejection of religious authorities known to be tme. Nor would He enhance himself as an 
authentic teaching authority of the Church. If he considered that Christ endowed the 
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Church with a living authority throughout the ages (Development 2: 2), he consequently 
included in the postscript the offer of His work to the accepted in conscience authorities 
(xi). 
Thus, primacy of conscience as seen in Newman's conversion to Roman 
Catholicism is the primacy of tmth in freedom over the individual and religious 
authorities. This primacy implies the liberty of conscience to seek God in tmth, follow 
tmth when knowm, and obey authority in so far as it is tme. The very fact of the Essay on 
Development and Newman's consequent conversion implies that Newman believed in 
freedom of inquiry in so far as he sought out tmth; freedom of expression in so far as he 
thought it fit to print what he wrote; and freedom of religion, in so far as he felt free to 
change his religious beliefs and practice. 
Newman was also willing to be a lone Heretic. On March 15*, 1845, he wrote to 
his sister Jemima: 
I have a bad name with more—I am fiilfilling all their worst wishes 
and giving them their most coveted triumph-I am distressing all I love, 
unsettling all I Have instmcted or aided—I am going to those whom I do 
not know and of whom I expect very little-I am making myself an 
outcast, and that at my age. Oh, what can it be but a stem necessity which 
causes this? 
Unamuno and Newman, dissenters among strangers, banished from their loved 
places and people, writers and witnesses, followers of both conscience and Christ in 
freedom and agony. 
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CHAPTER VII 

DEATH AND CONSCIENCE 

Ya esta donde se respeta la libertad de conciencia 
y se oye y se escucha todo parecer.' 
Time was, [. . .] I would not brave the sacred fight 
because the foe was strong.^ 
Both Unamuno and Newman constantly question the meaning of death for a 
person of conscience. If at the end nothing remains, nothing is achieved, our existence 
has little meaning. Neither writer feared thinking about death, but rather sought meaning 
to life, so that at death, something of their life would remain. Hence, it was more the 
sense of either nothingness or fiitility at the hour of death that concemed them. However, 
ultimately, the thought of death was what eventually gives meaning to their lives. In this 
chapter, we wish to deepen our perception of Unamuno's and Newman's philosophy of 
life from a perspective of death, analyzing the experience of death in Newman and 
Unamuno which gave their lives meaning. 
In Unamuno's philosophy is a faith in oneself in which the human being lives 
continually in constant debate between the wanting to continue to live and the knowledge 
that one Has to die: 
Crear lo que no vemos, si, crearlo, y vivirlo, y consumirlo, y 
volverlo a crear y consumirlo de nuevo viviendolo otra vez, para otra vez 
crearlo [...] y asi; en incesante tormento vital. Esto es fe viva, porque la 
vida es continua creacion y consuncion continua y, por tanto, muerte 
incesante. ^Crees acaso que viviras si a cada momento no murieses? 
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Therefore, Unamuno aims at a philosophy of death whereby the desire for 
immortality has its origin in the experience of death. Here, arises a hope that all does not 
end with death, that we in some way outlive death: 
j Vivir, vivir lo mas posible en extension e intensidad; vivir, ya que 
hemos de morir todos; vivir, porque la vida es un fin en si! Y, sobre todo, 
meter mucho mido, que no se oigan las aguas profundas de las entrafias 
insondables del espiritu, la voz de la Etemidad! Reventar de cultura, como 
dice un progresista amigo mio." 
Hence, to philosophize, for Unamuno, is to do so with all one's being. 
Paraphrasing Unamuno's statement that one philosophizes with more than reason, with 
will, feeling, flesh and blood, body and soul, we may also add that we philosophize with 
death. Since it is the Human being in all our existential reality that makes philosophy, 
death is a key experience in giving Hfe meaning: "Y haga lo que quiera, filosofa, no con 
la razon solo, sino con la voluntad, con el sentimiento, con la came y con los Huesos, con 
el aHna toda y con todo el cuerpo. Filosofa el Hombre" (Sentimiento tragico 2: 97). 
So the thought of death is the tme origin of the philosophic experience. A Human 
being cannot Hve without being aware of its existence and the corresponding anguish of 
its certainty. In fact, we cannot even consider ourselves as non-existent: 
Imposible nos es, en efecto, concebimos como no existentes, sin 
que haya esfiierzo alguno que baste a que la conciencia se de cuenta de la 
absoluta inconsciencia, de su propio anonadamiento. Intenta, lector, 
imaginarte en plena vela cual sea el estado de tu alma en el profimdo 
suefio; trata de llenar tu conciencia con la representacion de la conciencia, 
y lo veras. Causa congojisimo vertigo el empefiarse en comprenderlo. No 
podemos concebimos como no existiendo. (3: 103) 
Unamuno sees all of the visible universe, as being created by the human desire for 
immortality. In this perspective, one wishes to be part of all and, especially, part of every 
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other human being. Therefore, love for others is really a desire to become etemal in the 
other. A good deed lives forever. 
jO todo o nada! jY que otro sentido puede tener el "ser o no ser"! 
To be or not to be shakespeariano, el de aquel mismo poeta que Hizo decir 
de Marcio, en Coroliano (V,4),que solo necesitaba la etemidad para ser 
dios: He wants nothing of a god but eternity? jEtemidad!, jetemidad! Este 
es el anhelo; la sed de etemidad es lo que se llama amor entre los 
Hombres; y quien a otro ama es que quiere etemizarse en el. Lo que no es 
etemo tampoco es real. (103-04) 
So, for Unamuno, the possibility of annihilation is rejected by a thirst for 
immortality, a need to love others, a desire to be like God. Even poetry is based on the 
confrast between the vanity of what is fleeting and the etemity of love. Unamuno, as 
earlier Newman, will grow in love against a cmel destiny as they see it. A new freedom is 
bom when one overcomes obstacles in life, achieving a sense of service: "Y el amor, 
sobre todo cuando la lucha contra el destino, siimenos en el sentimiento de la vanidad de 
este mundo de apariencias, y nos abre la vislumbre de otro en que, vencido el destino, sea 
ley la libertad" (104). 
Our hunger and thirst for immortal life beyond the grave is a desire to be, to be 
more, and, ultimately, to be divine. Both in Unamuno and Newman, the sense of purpose 
in this life is linked to a desire for immortality and a longing for God. In Newman, the 
emphasis is more on a sense of mission and fulfillment of the divine will. With 
Unamuno, the tone is metaphysical: "jSer, ser siempre, ser sin termino, sed de ser, sed de 
ser mas!, j hambre de Dios!, jsed de amor etemizante y etemo!, jser siempre! jser Dios!" 
(103-4). 
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Therefore, while the essence of conscience for Newman is like a voice of God,^ 
Unamuno considers conscience having its essence in the thought of our death and the 
question of what comes later. This is understandable seeing that, for Unamuno, the desire 
to live, to love and be immortal are all linked to a divine imperative. Hence, living and 
loving, in this Hfe and the next, are at the heart of philosophical awareness and moral 
obligation. At the same time, we are conscious of ourselves as both living and mortal 
beings. Both Newmian and Unamuno are living life, believing in their fiiture as they see 
it. However, the possibility of death opens their lives' horizons: 
Ese pensamiento de que me tengo que morir y el enigma de lo que 
Habra despues es el latir mismo de mi conciencia. Contemplando el sereno 
campo verde o contemplando unos ojos claros, a que se asome un alma 
hermana de la mia, se me hinche la conciencia, siento la diastole del alma 
y me empapo en vida ambiente, y creo en mi porvenir; pero al punto la 
voz del misterio me susurra "jDejara de ser!" Me roza con el ala el Angel 
de la muerte, y la sistole del alma me inunda las entrafias. (Sentimiento 
tragico 104) 
The role of religion is thus explained as a pluralistic attempt to satisfy the Human 
need for personal immortality. From an anthropological point of view, Unamuno notes 
that humans are the only animals that take care of their dead, refusing to hand over 
corpses to the ravages of indifferent nature. Respect for the dead is both the 
distinguishing factor for humans and the origin of all religious belief While the living 
had barely a hut to live in, the dead received tumuli and cement buildings long before the 
living. Thus, the Homes of the dead have survived in more cultures than the homes of the 
living. The point is that so many religions reflect so many searches for human 
immortality. Hence, the mystery of life after death implies the possibility of various 
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answers to the enigma of its contents. And these various answers suppose the free search 
for a plausible religious solution. 
The uniqueness of each person seeking meaning to life after death is dramatized 
by Unamuno addressing the reader: 
Recogete, lector, en ti mismo, y figiirate un lento deshacerte de ti 
mismo, en que la luz se te apague, se te enmudezcan las cosas y no te den 
sonido, envolviendote en silencio, se te derritan de entre las manos los 
objetos asideros, se te escurra debajo los pies el piso, se te desvanezcan 
como en desmayo los recuerdos, se te vaya disipando todo en nada y 
disipandote tambien tii, y ni aun la conciencia de la nada te quede siquiera 
como fantastico agarradero de una sombra. (105-06) 
The remedy to this problem is not to be found in indifference, as the verse reads: 
"Cada vez que considero que me tengo que morir tiendo la capa en el suelo y no me Harto 
de dormir"(106). Rather, the only solution is meeting the problem head-on, since it is 
better to live in constant pain than to be nothing. The tme Hell consists in nothingness. As 
Schopenhauer says, the uncontrolled love of life leads to suicide. A suicide does not seek 
death, that is, nothingness, but, on the contrary, would like a better life. It is the supreme 
anguish of living better and prolonging his life that pushes the suicidal to destroy 
themselves. Death, then, is a tragic problem, from which there is no escape. According to 
Unamuno, such should lead a philosopher to a free and thoughtful examination of the 
quest for personal immortality. 
This quest for personal immortality, the philosophical thought thereupon and the 
possible religious solution are totally personal. No other person can take place in either 
the quest, the thought or the belief "No quiero morirme, no, no quiero ni quiero quererio; 
quiero vivir siempre, siempre, siempre, y vivir yo, este pobre yo que me soy y me siento 
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ser ahora y aqui, y por esto me tortura el problema de la duracion de mi alma, de la mia 
propia. Yo soy el centro de mi universe, el centro del universo" (108). 
At this point, Unamuno cleariy distinguishes between self-love and selfishness. 
Selfishness implies a love for oneself, even if it damages others. On the contrary, one Has 
self-love, or, better said, self-respect implies seeking the good of others as one's own-
loving thy neighbor as thyself 
^Egoismo decis? Nada hay mas universal que lo individual, pues lo 
que es de cada uno lo es de todos. Cada Hombre vale mas que la 
humanidad entera, ni sirve sacrificar cada uno a todos, sino en cuanto 
todos se sacrifiquen a cada uno. Eso que llamais egoismo es el principle 
de la gravedad psiquica, el postulade necesario. "jAma a tu projimo como 
a ti mismo!", se nos dijo, presuponiendo que cada cual se ame a si mismo. 
(108) 
The hunger for personal immortality is not foreign to any human being, since it is 
a presupposition to exist, as to continue existing. So, for Unamuno, life after death is no 
longer a right for a few, but a need without which life would Have no meaning. There is 
no point in asking why someone wants to be immortal, since personal immortality is the 
only factor that gives meaning to life and the universe: 
Nos preguntan que quienes somos, viles gusanos de la tierra, para 
pretender inmortalidad; ^en gracia a que? ^Para que? ^Con que derecHo? 
^En gracia a que—pregunteis—, y en gracia a que vivimos? Tan gratuito es 
existir como seguir existiendo siempre [...]. No reclame derecho ni 
merecimiento alguno; es solo una necesidad, lo necesito para vivir. (109) 
Unamuno is aware of the difficulties involved in a reflection on the problem of 
personal immortality. As such, he considers himself a new Paul of Tarsus, preaching to 
the ignorant the tme doctrine. So, Paul, persecuted by the Jews of his own religion, 
stoned and shipwrecked, arrived in Athens, intellectual center of the philosophic universe 
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of the time. To the stoic and epicurean Heirs of Plato and Aristotie, Paul prepared to 
identify their unknown god. For our perspective, what is most important is that Unamuno 
considers this a city where freedom of conscience is practiced: "Ya esta, pues, Pablo ante 
los refinados atenienses, ante los graeculos, los Hombres cultos y tolerantes que admiten 
toda doctrina, toda la estudian y a nadie apedrean ni azotan ni encarcelan por profesar 
estas o las otras; ya esta donde se respeta la libertad de conciencia y se oye y se escucha 
todo parecer" (110) 
Nonetheless, as soon as Paul tried to preach about the resurrection of the dead, the 
Athenians lost their patience and began jeering him. Unamuno, as a contemporary Paul, 
attempts to explain the only and tme problem of the Human being and, likewise, is not 
heard nor understood by those who should understand His philosophy. Just like what 
happened at the beginning of the propagation of the Christian faith, so-called intellectuals 
today still need sufficient patience and tolerance in order to understand another's point of 
view: 
Pero asi que les hablais de resurreccion y de vida allende la 
muerte, se les acaba la paciencia y os atajan la palabra diciendo: "jDejalo, 
otro dia Hablaras de esto!" Y es de eso, mis pobres atenienses, mis 
intolerantes intelectuales, es de esto de lo que voy a Hablaros aqui. 
Y aun si esa creencia fiiese absurda, ^por que se tolera menos el 
que se les exponga que otras muchas mas absurdas aiin? Por que esa 
evidente Hostilidad a tal creencia? ^Es miedo? ^Es acaso pesar de no poder 
compartirla? (110) 
If, in Unamuno's case, the crisis of conscience comes with his preaching a 
philosophy about life after death, in Newman's case, his philosophy of life changed 
radically with His own personal bmsh with death. The strength of conscience over 
personal whims becomes a drama in his death agony during a trip alone to Sicily. 
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Following our theory of understanding Newman's teaching on liberty of conscience by 
seeing how he lived, we can analyze this key vital event to bring out even more the 
difference between judgments in conscience and those in fancy. Later, in the Letter to the 
Duke of Norfolk Newman will deny the rights of conscience considered as "the right of 
self-will." Such a concept of conscience as self-will prevalent, according to the Letter to 
the Duke of Norfolk, in the eighteenth century, Newman will call a "counterfeit."^ What 
Newmian meant by this counterfeit of conscience, and what he meant by self-will were 
clearly illustrated during this death agony in Sicily. His reflections thereupon taught Him 
to purify His view of conscience and duty. 
Having set off from England with the Froudes in December 1832, Newman 
decided to go back by himself to Sicily all alone. His desire was to know more about the 
enchanting places which He had only started to discover in the course of this 
Mediterranean voyage. Dr. Copleston's words came to mind: "Nunquam minus solus, 
quam cum solus, 'never less lonely than when alone.'"^ Reaching Naples, the sole 
voyager wrote to sister Jemima: "I have lost my companions, and I was going among 
sfrangers into a wild country to live a wild life, to travel in solitude, and to sleep in dens 
of the earth-and all for what? for the gratification of an imagination, for the idea of a 
warm fancy which might be a deceit, drawn by a strange love of Sicily." The irony of 
these lines is that they reflect the stmggle of conscience which was to follow. On the one 
hand, Newman felt that he was just following his own personal desire to enjoy the 
pleasures of the voyage. On the other, scmples of conscience were to magnify in his 
mind, as if he were committing some kind of a deceit, a falsehood, a doing something 
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which was not his duty and maybe not even the will of God. John Henry was living the 
stimggle of those who wish to follow their conscience but doubt about their selfishness. 
The idea of conscience, duty and the will of God, were intimately connected in His 
scmples. In a letter to Froude, Newman explains His anxiety: 
When I went down to Sicily by myself, I had a strong idea that He 
was going to effect some purpose by me. And from Rome 1 wrote to some 
one, I think Christie, saying I thought I was to be made something of in 
His Hands, "though if not, the Happier for me. 
And when I was in Sicily by myself, it seemed as if someone were 
battling against me, and the idea has long been in my mind, though 1 
cannot say when it came on, that my enemy was then attempting to 
destroy me. A number of sins were committed in the very act of my going 
down by myself- to say nothing else, I was willful, and neglected 
wamings-from that time everything went wrong.^ 
Deep down we see that, on the one Hand, Newman wished to assure himself that 
he remained in the hands of God. On the other. He associated the deadly illness he would 
suffer with a divine punishment for having been too capricious and self-willed. Hi another 
letter, he wrote: "I felt it was a punishment for my willfiilness in going to Sicily by 
myself (Mozley 1:363). 
As to the trip itself, on arrival in Sicily, Newman was ecstatic at the spectacle of 
Taormini. However, assailed by illness, he decided to go inland towards the city of 
Catania. Accompanied by Gennaro, his faithful servant and guide, John Henry in pain 
reached the town of Leonforte, a hundred miles from Palermo. After a sleepless night, he 
was overwhelmed by fever without finding a suitable remedy to fight it. Two or three 
days later, realizing that his state was getting progressively worse without Hope of rapid 
improvement, he decided to take to the road again in the hope of reaching, at any cost, a 
place where he would be in a better position to receive care. A few miles later. He was 
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forced to stop anew. A doctor, met by chance, took him to the village of Castro-Giovanni, 
where he was to remain for nearly three weeks in a precarious state between life and 
death (Apologia 40). 
By throwing Newman into a state bordering on death, this agony was a terrible 
encounter with His deeper self ft became a dramatic confrontation between the forces of 
self-will and his whole philosophy of life. John Henry Himself, a year eariier, had 
consoled His bed-ridden friend Thomas Mozley, also ill in bed: 
Had it pleased God to have visited you with an illness [...] it 
would almost have seemed a rebuke for past waste of time. I believe that 
God cuts off those He loves and who really are His, not interfering with 
their ultimate safety, but as passing them by as if unworthy of being made 
instmments of His purpose. [...] It is one especial use of times of ilHiess 
to reflect about ourselves. (Mozley 1: 228) 
These austere reflections on human weakness made earlier to Mozley were probably now 
present in the mind of our depressed voyager, languishing in a poor Sicilian inn. His 
physical weakness stirred up a sorrowful examination of conscience, while the mounting 
fever made former scmples reappear. His plunging into the Hidden recesses of the tmth of 
His life bears the mark of a personal punishment. God appeared to abandon his servant to 
the worst of temptations, that of the desert, that of loneliness before death, with the threat 
of spiritual failure beyond repair. Unamuno's final words at the end of La agonia del 
cristianismo, "jCristo nuestro, Cristo nuestro!, ^por que nos has abandonado?" sound 
strikingly famiHar.'^ 
This feeling of rebellious self-will-later to be called a "counterfeit of conscience" 
by Newman in the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk"-and the empty intellectualism of the 
Liberals at Oxford reached a peak in Newman's mind at Leonforte during the most 
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eighteen months after the event: 
Next day the self-reproaching feeling increased. I seemed to see 
more and more my utter Hollowness. I began to think of all my professed 
principles, and felt they were mere intellectual deductions from one or two 
admitted tmths [...]. I have a vivid perception of the consequences of 
certain admitted principles. Have considerable intellectual capacity of 
drawing them out, have the refinement to admire them, and a rhetorical or 
histrionic power to represent them; and having no great (i.e. no vivid) love 
of this world, whether riches. Honors, or anything else, and some firmness 
and natural dignity of character, take the profession of them upon me, as I 
might sing a tune which I like—loving the Tmth, but not possessing it, for I 
believe myself at heart to be nearly hollow, i.e., with little love, little self-
denial. I believe 1 have some faith, that is all. (Mozley 1: 366) 
The above letter merits a detailed analysis to appreciate Newman's understanding 
of selfishness as a counterfeit of conscience and His critique of mere academic success, 
which would be empty of all virtue. First, we notice the rejection, just like Unamuno, of 
an empty rationalism which has nothing to say at Newman's Hour of agony. John Henry 
realized that he had thoughts about this or that, that He drew logical deductions, and even 
had the capacity to deduce their consequences and admire their beauty. All of which gave 
little strength to a dying man alone in a strange land. Second, we perceive the reference to 
Keble. Again, Newman felt he lacked the inner peace and sincerity of conscience, which 
was the charm and source of his friend's influence. Newman saw that He was unable to 
realize, with regard to himself, this marvelous accord, this sort of natural symbiosis 
between tmth and sentiment, grace and life, of his fiiend, pastor and scholar. Again, the 
echo of Unamuno, "y haga lo que quiera, filosofa, no con la razon solo, sino con la 
voluntad, con el sentimiento, con la came, y la con los Huesos, con el ama toda y con todo 
el cuerpo. Filosofa el hombre" (Sentimiento fragico 2: 97). Thirdly, we note that Newman 
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felt that the Lord was battling against him, but not because of earthly pleasures. These, he 
admitted, never attracted him: "1 do not love the worid, its riches, nor its Honors." The 
problem was His self-will, his desire to mle his own life, taking him away from his 
destiny in conscience. This self-will was made up of an pride of judgment and an 
impatience of heart which sometimes were able to master his conscience. 
The spiritual trial of His deadly illness tore Newman's conscience apart in two 
different directions. On the one hand, Newman was attracted by moral beauty such as that 
represented by Keble and, on the other. He felt He was not living up to the requirements of 
what He knew to be his duty. Newman felt that "he Had not sinned against the light" 
(Apologia 40), but also that "God was fighting against me, [.. .]-at last I knew why-it 
was for self-will" (Mozley 1: 365). In this Sicilian drama, the anxieties and scmples of 
past years came to his conscience. A kind of spiritual fire threw light on His most intimate 
sentiments, as He lay in his death-agony. A new light was shed on His conscience to know 
even better the imperfections of his acts and thoughts. The resulting remorse made him 
condemn any remaining trace of selfishness. 
With death close, a deep questioning spirit threw a tme light on his "private 
judgment in religion, not formed arbitrarily and according to one's fancy or liking, but 
conscientiously, and under a sense of duty" (Apologia 30). In spite of conversions and 
self-denials, in spite of the security of a divine presence which gave him Hght, His joumey 
in conscience in Sicily seemed more the work of His will than a duty in conscience. It was 
less a divine revelation than a self-seeking by Newman. Up to now, John Henry had 
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chosen his path in life, not that of conscience. The poem "Sensitiveness," written during 
this Mediterranean trip, states: 
Time was, I shrank from what was right 
From fear of what was wrong; 
I would not brave the sacred fight 
Because the foe was strong [...]. 
Such dread of sin was indolence. 
Such aim at heaven was pride. (Verses LX: 113) 
Having discovered how He Had lived arbitrarily and not really in conscience as a 
sense of duty towards a loving Person, Newman entered the next step. A sense of desert 
and hollowness made him feel How much His soul was empty. To cut short such painfiil 
reflections, he counted the number of stars and flowers "in the pattem on the walls" to 
keep himself busy in his sick room.'^ Such a trial accomplished the necessary purification 
of his will towards a more complete abandonment to whatever mission the Lord destined 
for Him in England. Newman had indeed chosen His own way, but His search for the light 
was sincere. The Lord would eventually make his will known. Though erroneous, his 
conscience had led him on the road to tmth: "I had a strange feeling on my mind that God 
meets those who go on in His way, who remember Him in His way, in the paths of the 
Lord; that I must put myself in His path. His way, that I must do my part, and that He met 
those who rejoice and worked righteousness, and remembered Him in His way" Mozley 
1:368). 
Newman notes in the Apologia that "especially when I was left by myself, [.. .] I 
began to think that I had a mission" (40). And going to Sicily, he noted that "the 
presentiment grew stronger." At several stages during this drama, such a conviction 
surfaces. First, there was the spontaneous farewell to Msgr. Wiseman at the English 
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College in Rome, when Newman said he had a work to do in England. Then, in 
Leonforte, when the fever stmck, he assured Gennaro He would not die for "he had not 
sinned against light." Finally, on becoming well again. He could only explain his violent 
sobbing by exclaiming: "I have a work to do in England" (40). Hence, Newman's 
understanding of divine, and not self, will involved freeing His judgment from whim and 
fancy in order to discover tmth in following conscience as one understood it, which 
Newman would consider tme liberty of conscience. And such a liberty involves a 
decision to follow tmth and value wherever they might lead. 
On His retum to Oxford, Newman would now brave the sacred fight, even if "the 
foes were sfrong" ("Sensitiveness," Verses LX: 113). If, up to now, Newman had chosen 
His ovm easy way. He would now have to banish all vanity and attachment to his owoi 
self-will. The desire for total sincerity in conscience to what he thought His mission for 
life became the "kindly Light" to lead Him on. Though later He will lose his friends, 
church, employment, Oxford, and even Rome, He endeavored never "to sin against light" 
(Apologia 40). Newman's ultimate answer was to repeat the words dear to him from 
youth, "Exoriare aliquis, 'Arise, some avenger'" (40).'^ Together with the sense of divine 
mission in the verse from Virgil, Newman applied to himself Southey's poem of Thalaba, 
a young Arab, whose appointed task was to destroy a race of sorcerers. Thalaba 
succeeded, despite great difficulties, due to his faith in the Lord (40). 
With his conscience at peace again, Newman renewed His resolution to be a 
faithfiil instmment in the Hands of the Lord. Once his self-will was ftilly submitted in 
conscience, understood as a moral sense and sense of duty to a living and loving Creator, 
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his mission was able to assert itself God was presenting it to him a mission in England. 
Newman would now undertake it, not as a task chosen by him, but as a mandate received 
in conscience from God. The certitude that he was obeying tmth, and not his own whim 
or fancy, was to fortify his conscience in all his trials. On His retum to Oxford, Newman 
would surprise himself with His own courage and audacity. Froude Had taught him 
previously How to dominate his personal repugnance and timidity towards controversies 
and possible enemies. Now in Sicily, the Lord himself showed Newman the meaning of 
his illness and the strength of Achilles retuming to battie (40).'" 
All this episode had a key message in Newman's understanding of liberty of 
conscience. We have seen that Newman's "private judgment in religion" was not based 
on a "fancy or Hking." He undertook the trip to Sicily as an act of self-will. Here, we see 
Newonan reject an understanding of liberty of conscience as self-will, as what I want to 
do, without any consideration of tmth beyond my liking. Of course, the opposite 
implication is also tme. A decision in conscience is likewise not doing whatever the 
other's "will to power" might be. Newman felt strong now to "brave the sacred fight [. ..] 
even if the foe were strong" (Verses LX: 113). Liberty of conscience involves freedom 
from slavery to one's self-will in the same breath as it is freedom from the will of other 
Human beings, however divine they consider themselves. In other words, neither total 
autonomy or servility of conscience is the same as primacy of conscience. Firstly, 
autonomy or servility would mean making oneself or another the absolute law, following 
one's or another's will. On the contrary, primacy of conscience means doing what one 
considers one's duty in conscience (Apologia 30). Likewise, primacy of conscience 
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means seeking tmth and life understood as absolute values, above self-will or any 
supposedly divine institution, such as the Anglican Church, which may become dead 
("Note on Liberalism," Apologia 222). 
We have also seen How Newman, on the one hand, says He "never sinned against 
the light," while, on the other. He was a slave of "self-will." How can these views be 
reconciled? It remains obvious that Newman was erroneously following what He thought 
right, though indeed it was more personal fancy than conscientious duty. Ultimately his 
desire to always follow the light, led him out of the darkness of self-will to the fuller light 
of tmth. The lesson Here may be that even if a private judgment in religion be guided by 
self-will, if the ultimate desire is to seek tmth, there is the probability of error recognition 
and, even, ulterior strength. As happened to Newman in Sicily. 
The light of conscience may grow dim amid the darkest night. The traveler, like 
Newman and Unamuno, may choose to follow in pride his own path, but while he 
searches with the light of a sincere conscience, the road to tmth becomes clear. Therein is 
reflected a serene humility, a peaceful confidence, and tmst in tmth, which gives spiritual 
strength and a hopefiil end. 
Newman's strange love for Sicily ended on the sea-voyage Home with His poem, 
"The Pillar of the Clooud": 
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Lead, Kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom 
Lead Thou me on! 
The night is dark, and I am far from home-
Lead Thou me on! 
Keep Thou my feet; I do not ask to see 
The distant scene—one step enough for me. 
I was not ever thus, nor prayed that Thou 
Shouldst lead me on. 
I loved to choose and see my path; but now. 
Lead Thou me on! 
I loved the garish day, and, spite of fears. 
Pride mled my will, remember not past years! 
So long Thy power hath blessed me, sure it still 
Will lead me on. 
O'er moor and fen, o'er crag and torrent, till 
The night is gone. 
And with the mom those angel faces smile 
Which I have loved long since, and lost awhile. (Verses XC: 156)'^ 
John Henry arrived back at his mother's House in England on July 9, 1833. The 
following Sunday, John Keble preached the sermon "National Apostasy" from the 
Oxford University pulpit. For Newman, that date was always considered the start of the 
Tractarian Movement and the beginning of His exile from the Church of England. 
(Apologia 41). 
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CHAPTER Vni 

CHURCH AND CONSCIENCE 

De la realidad de este san Manuel Bueno, martir,. . . 
no se me ocurre dudar.' 
I give an absolute obedience 
to neither the Pope nor the Queen.^ 
Unamuno's San Manuel Bueno. martir and Newman's Letter to the Duke of 
Norfolk may be dually considered as the ultimate respective justifications of supremacy 
of conscience over religious authority in both authors. These works were published near 
the end of the authors' lives and both proved to be among their most remembered 
writings. Though the context and conclusion might seem totally alien to each other, I 
wish to suggest that both philosophers ultimately defend the right of personal conscience 
to dissent from their institutional Church within a context of free examination and search 
for tmth. This is the "Kindly Light" Newman wishes to follow, while Unamuno searches 
for a religious "tmth in life and life in tmth."" 
Unamuno's San Manuel Bueno, martir may be read as placing the unbelieving 
curate, Don Manuel, as the central character, as indeed the title implies (Boerigter 457).^ 
Despite His care for others and works of charity, which gain him the possibility of 
canonization and being role-model for the next curate, an existential anguish grips don 
Manuel as he cannot believe in the immortality of the Human soul after death. The fact 
that Unamuno portrays this reality presumably indicates his experience of a similar 
anguish. Besides seeing faith as a gift, not a given, Unamuno is clearly affirming the 
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freedom of conscience both of the curate to disbelieve and of the people to believe. 
Hence, we note a contrast between His affirmation in the epilogue to the Sentimiento 
fragico and the curate's attitude in San Manuel Bueno. martir. In the Sentimiento tragico. 
Unamuno sees his mission as: 
Pero es que mi obra—iba a decir mi mision—es quebrantar la fe de 
unos, y de otros, y de los terceros, la fe en la afirmacion, la fe en la 
negaci6n, y la fe en la abstencion, y esto por fe en la fe misma; es 
combatir a todos los que se resignan, sea al catoHcismo, sea al 
racionalismo, sea al agnosticismo; es Hacer que vivan todos inquietos y 
anhelantes.^ 
In San Manuel Bueno, martir. however, the curate does not wish to disturb the 
faith of his flock. Not even in the case of "superstitions," so-called by Unamuno, does he 
wish to perturb their faith. To the skeptic Lazaro who wishes to preach against such 
superstitions, Don Manuel warned: 
Y como supiese que este andaba predicando contra ciertas 
supersticiones populares, Hubo de decirle: 
—jDejalos! jEs tan dificil hacerles comprender donde acaba la 
creencia ortodoxa y donde empieza la supersticion! Y mas para nosotros. 
Dejalos, pues, mientras se consuelen. Vale mas que lo crean todo, aun 
cosas contradictorias entre si, a no que no crean nada. [. . .] No 
protestemos. La protesta mata el contento. (San Manuel Bueno, martir 
131) 
And the reason why Don Manuel continues his pious deceit, if it can be called 
such, is that He realizes that the people Have a right to their religious beliefs. The role of 
religion is to give people hope and spirit. So, for each group, the tme religion is their 
own, the religion that they made. Therefore, he has no right to disturb people in their 
beliefs if they are happy with themselves and with others. On the confrary, he sees his 
duty as giving life to their souls and make them dream they are immortal: 
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Yo estoy para Hacer vivir a las almas de mis feligreses, para 
hacerios felices, para Hacerles que se suefien inmortales y no para 
matarlos. Lo que aqui hace falta es que vivan sanamente, que vivan en 
unanimidad de sentido, y con la verdad, con mi verdad, no vivirian. jQue 
vivan! Y esto Hace la Iglesia, hacerios vivir. (123) 
This "pious lie" of the curate seems to receive ecclesiastical approval, emphasized 
both at the beginning and the end of the novel. Official Church approval is lavishly 
granted to Don Manuel. At the opening of the story, Angela tells how the pending 
beatification of don Manuel is the reason why she decides to write the novel: 
Ahora que el obispo de la diocesis de Renada, [...] anda, a lo que 
se dice, promoviendo el proceso para la beatificacion de nuestro don 
Manuel, o, mejor, san Manuel Bueno, que fiie en esta parroco, quiero dejar 
aqui consignado, a modo de confesion y solo Dios sabe, que no yo, con 
que destino, todo lo que se y recuerdo de aquel varon matriarcal que lleno 
toda la mas entrafiable vida de mi alma [...]. (95-96) 
Likewise, in the final paragraph of Angela's recount, a likewise ecclesiastical 
approval for the life of don Manuel seems in place, due to its possibly serving as a guide 
for the perfect parish priest. The bishop seems unaware of the mystery of don Manuel's 
faith or lack thereof Angela Has no intention of telling him due to Her fear of all 
temporal, including Church, authorities. 
Parece que el ilustrisimo sefior obispo, el Ha promovido el proceso 
de beatificacion de nuestro santo de Valverde de Lucema, se propone 
escribir su vida, una especie de manual del perfecto parroco, y recoge toda 
clase de noticias. A mi me las ha pedido con insistencia, ha tenido 
entrevistas conmigo, el he dado toda clase de datos, pero me he callado 
siempre el secreto tragico de don Manuel y de mi hermano. Y es curioso 
que el no lo haya sospechado. (147-48) 
Several feasible interpretations of these passages seem possible. According to 
Martin Nozick: 
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Saint Manuel Bueno, Martyr is Unamuno's supreme act of 
contrition, a public statement of regret for having tried to involve so many 
in his personal turmoil, and an expression of the nostalgia the iconoclast 
feels for simpler times. In design it is a subtle mosaic of autobiographical 
Hints, of metaphysical and political symbols.' 
Or was Unamuno simply appealing for liberty of conscience to contemporary 
Church authorities, in the context of the new political situation in Spain that year, 1930? 
Was he insisting on faith as a gift, not granted to all, as it was not bestowed on him, but 
because He, Miguel de Unamuno, respects people's faith and liberty of conscience for all? 
Another reflection is that he focuses on the real possibility of ministers of religion 
actually losing either part or all of their faith, but wishing to continue in the ministry for 
the sake of the flock. Hence, a double respect for conscience is warranted: both towards 
that of the minister, as for that of the people. 
Don Miguel's attitude towards Lazaro behooves a special consideration in that 
regard. Angela herself asks just before the end of Her story her repeated question on why 
Don Manuel did not try to deceive Her brother with false faith, if it were a simple matter 
of reiterating with him what he did with His flock. A first response is that Lazaro arrived 
as a skeptic from America with all the "viejos lugares comunes anticlericales y Hasta 
antirreligiosos y progresistas que habia traido renovados de America" (San Manuel 
Bueno, martir 116-17). Also noteworthy is the fact that the novel notices how nobody 
listened to Lazaro's skepticism, but rather continued in their religious beliefs. 
Nonetheless, at the end of the story, Angela explains that don Manuel did not try to 
deceive Him with his comedy or-"tragedia mas bien" (146)-because it simply would not 
work. Only with don Manuel's tmth, the tmth of keeping his comedy and tragedy to 
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himself the people would stay in their faith. This final conclusion revokes Unamuno's 
definition of religion in "Mi religion": "Mi religion es buscar la verdad en la vida y la 
vida en la verdad, aun a sabiendas de que no he de encontrarla mientras viva ("Mi 
Religion" 369). Here, don Manuel wins Lazaro over to the cause of Hfe with the tmth of 
death: 
Pero ^por que—me He preguntado muchas veces—no trato don 
Manuel de convertir a mi Hermano tambien con un engaiio, con una 
mentira, fingiendose creyente sin serlo? Y He comprendido que fiie porque 
comprendio que no le engafiaria, que para con el no le serviria el engafio, 
que solo con la verdad, con su verdad, le convertiria; [...] Y asi le gano 
con la verdad de muerte a la razon de vida. (San Manuel Bueno, martir 
146) 
Besides don Manuel and Lazaro, Angela, as narrator, Herself may well be 
considered the central character of this novel. If don Manuel seems to represent Miguel 
de Unamuno at the end of his life, Angela may well suggest Unamuno's life-stmggle 
from faith to disbelief This novel may portray the Catholicism Unamuno enjoyed in his 
early life, which nonetheless gave way to crisis and dissent. Besides, from our 
perspective of freedom of conscience, Angela's account may even better illustrate liberty 
of conscience: the free examination and constant search at the heart of a religious "fight 
with God" from morning till night, like Jacob in the Bible ("Mi religion" 370). 
The novel begins with the small girl Angela admiring Her home-town curate. At 
boarding school, she hears from all her companions and the nuns how great a man he is 
(San Manuel Bueno, martir 98). Beginning with her first visit Home, there is a marked 
crescendo in her relationship with the priest, moving from admiration to compassion, 
from blind faith to intellectual curiosity, from complete assent to doubtfiil religiosity. Her 
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doubts come to the surface with don Manuel's public exclamation in church: "jDios mio, 
Dios mio!, ^por que me has abandonado?" His mother's cry that broke the silence of the 
church, "jHijo mio!" gave Angela both the courage to question and the need to console. 
Faced with her religious questions, don Manuel only quotes Saint Teresa of Avila from 
the catechism, on not asking him but doctors of the Church. On Her resolve that he is the 
doctor of the Church in their village, don Manuel suggests the devil is behind Her 
questions. On her further insistence on the hypothesis were Satan to question him, don 
Manuel suggests the devil is behind her questions. Perhaps, we notice a satire on those 
who consider questioning belief to be a sign of Satan. On her further insistence on the 
Hypothesis were Satan to question, don Manuel gives an ambiguous answer, making 
Angela doubt even more and cry in loneliness. Later, conceming the question of Hell, don 
Manuel again sidesteps the inquiry, saying it is enough to believe all that our Holy 
Mother Church believes and teaches. Angela concludes that Her pastor has a deep sadness 
in His eyes, blue as the waters of the lake (112-13). And the lake, significantly is a symbol 
of doubt: The snow (a sign of divine grace, accumulates on the mountain (faith), but 
melts upon falling into the waters of the lake (also associated with death, as the villagers 
believe their dead sleep beneath the waters). 
Unamuno sets up a growing search for tmth in life and life in tmth in the 
dialogues of Angela and don Manuel. Her "coal-worker's faith" is challenged by the 
discreet unbelief of Her spiritual guide. What is important to emphasize is that don 
Manuel is not deliberately encouraging her to doubt her faith, but his difficulties spur Her 
search beyond the simplistic and dogmatic religion of her childhood. Instead of receiving 
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divine support in her faith from Her spiritual director, he becomes the source of her 
anxiety. Gradually, such a situation forces her to abandon the submissive and tmstfiil 
acceptance of the religion he represents in favor of the quest for tmth in life and life in 
tmth he pursues. 
The retum of her brother, Lazaro, provides the occasion for the tmth to come into 
the open. Lazaro finds the priest too smart to believe all he Has to teach. The death of 
their mother and her plea for prayer from her skeptical son is the action personifying the 
next step in the drama. Now, the curate tums the tables asking Lazaro to show belief, 
even if he disbelieves, for the peace, happiness and dreams of the people. Lazaro then 
asks don Manuel if such were his case, the secret comes out. Angela, upon hearing this, 
sees don Manuel as a "martir" and understands How Her mother died in peace, thanks to 
being deceived. Nonetheless, Her faith seems intact. Like Saint Monica, she prays with 
tears: " Nos separamos para imos cada uno a su cuarto, yo a llorar toda la noche, a pedir 
por la conversion de mi hermano y de don Manuel, y el, Lazaro, no se bien a que" (124). 
At the marrow of these conversations is Unamuno's respect for individual conscience. 
Brother and sister, dying mother and doubting priest, all wish to follow their sense of 
right and wrong, tmth and life, as they freely see fit. Angela's ongoing joumey is part and 
parcel of a consequent need to search beyond our preconceived notions, but with respect 
for both the faith and conscience, peace and joy, of others. 
Later, she questions don Manuel openly about His faith in etemal life. This 
touches the essence of Christianity, as cleariy quoted at the beginning of book: "Si solo 
en esta vida esperamos en Cristo, somos los mas miserables de los hombres todos" (95). 
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A Christian who only believes in this life is the most miserable. So, is Don Manuel one of 
those most wretched beings? Don Manuel's answer is evasive: he suggests Angela get 
married. This could be understood as a double evasion: either a simplistic way of 
avoiding the question altogether, or the response itself promotes living life out to the 
fullest. Both answers seem plausible in the text. Don Manuel suggests marriage "para que 
se te curen esas preocupaciones" and later "si, si. Hay que vivir, hay que vivir" (126). 
However, the epilogue to this passage offers another possible interpretation, as 
don Manuel requests and receives absolution from Angela in the name of the people. The 
priest considers himself a sinner seeking forgiveness from the community. The reader 
may interpret these lines into don Manuel's own doubts and understanding of Christian 
faith. Either he Has to distract himself with other concems or simply live life to the 
ftillest. Possibly the latter could be read as an existentialist solution to the problem of 
faith in immortality: to live as if etemal life did in fact exist even though one may be 
unable to grasp it intellectually. Or, within the whole philosophy of Unamuno on faith, 
such is not an intellectual adherence to ideas, but a sinner's tmst in the Father of Christ, 
living life to the fiillest: 
El intelectualismo es quien nos Ha traido eso de que la fe sea creer 
lo que no vimos, prestar adhesion del intelecto a un principle abstracte y 
logico, y no confianza y abandono a la vida, a la vida que irradia de les 
espiritus, de las personas, y no de las ideas, a tu propia vida. 
[. . .] ved [. . .] que fe es confianza del pecador arrepentide en el 
Padre de Cristo. ("La fe" 262)^ 
The next dialogue in the novel regards the sacrament of the Eucharist and the 
notion of sin. The context is Passion Week, don Manuel recites the words of Jesus on the 
cross, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?", insists te Lazaro that there is no 
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life but this one, while te Angela, He asks her te pray for Jesus. Later, Angela would 
probe the soul of den Manuel conceming the meaning of sin and. Hence, salvation (San 
Manuel Bueno. martir 134-36). 
These topics seem te hark back to Unamuno's treatment of etemal life, the 
Eucharist, and sin the Sentimiento tragico de la vida. chapter IV, en the essence of 
Catholicism. Hi this chapter, Unamuno first links the question of personal immortality, 
Christ's resurrection, the resurrection of the dead, and the sacrament of the Eucharist as 
bread of etemal life: 
Y a este dogma central de la resurreccion de Cristo y per Cristo 
corresponde un sacramente central tambien, el eje de la piedad popular 
catolica, y es el sacramente de la Eucaristia. En el se administra el cuerpo 
de Cristo, que es pan de la inmortalidad. 
[...] Y este sacramente de la Eucaristia es el inmortalizador por 
excelencia y el eje, por tanto, de la piedad popular catolica. (Del 
sentimiento fragico 122-23) 
Hence, reading San Manuel Bueno, martir in the shadow of Sentimiento tragico 
de la vida, den Manuel's desperate cry of Christ en the cross may be read as the common 
human feeling of agony before death. His admonition te Lazaro, upon receiving the 
Eucharist, that etemal life is here below, may reflect Unamuno's thought on living life te 
the fiill, even though one does net see an answer te the question of immortality. 
Furthermore, his request to Angela to pray for all, including Christ, is not a blasphemy of 
praying for God, but rather an acknowledgement of the agony of the Human Christ, 
similar te our own at the Hour of death. This is an agony that is ongoing, a Christ that is 
always dying to give us life: 
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Y podemos decir, en cambio, que la mas alta expresion artistica 
catolica, por le menos espafiek, es en el arte mas material, tangible y 
permanente-pues a les senides se los lleva el aire-de la escultura y la 
pintura, en el Cristo de Velazquez, jen ese Cristo que esta siempre 
muriendose, sin acabar nunca de morirse, para dames vida! (125) 
The later reference te sin is also a logical parallel te the Sentimiento tragico de la 
vjda. Angela step by step moves from a prayer for Christ te ask, then, what sin is, since 
Christ is classically portrayed as the Savior from sin. Unamuno repeats his notion that our 
sin is precisely having been bom with the consequent agony of wishing te live after death 
but not reaching a rational solution. Hi this sense, according to Unamuno, the Sentimiento 
fragico de la vida also sees sin in the Catholic tradition as something material and 
hereditary from Adam: 
No Ha sido la preecupacion del pecado nunca tan angustiosa entre 
les catolicos, e por le menos con tanta aparencialidad de angustia. El 
sacramente de la confesion ayuda a ello. Y tal vez es que persiste aqui mas 
que entre ellos el fondo de la concepcion primitiva judaica y pagana del 
pecado como de algo material e infecciose y hereditarie, que se cura con 
el bautismo y la abselucion. En Adan peco toda su descendencia, casi 
materialmente, y se transmitio su pecado come una enfermedad material 
se transmite. (123) 
Unamuno's identification of sin with birth is reinforced later when He asked 
Angela to pray for all sinners, for all who Have been bom, "per todos les pecadores, per 
todos los nacidos" (137). Quoting Calderon as a great doctor of the Spanish Catholic 
Apostolic Church, Unamuno concludes that the greatest sin of man is te have been bom, 
"el delito mayor del Hombre es haber nacido" (136). Though reaching a conclusion at 
odds with the traditional Catholic interpretation of sin, nonetheless this thought leaves the 
door open to a consideration en the agony of religious belief as a natural search all 
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humans must accomplish. And, in San Manuel Bueno, martir, the climate is one of 
freedom of conscience. 
Tom Boeringer considers Angela's conclusions on faith: 
These are statements which create tremendous problems for an 
understanding of Christianity, and human psychology. For if individuals 
have faith without knowing it, then faith is subconscious, and primarily 
symbolic, something that leaves no trace of itself in the individual's 
consciousness. A faith thus defined would be taking en characteristics 
exfremely unlike those attributed te faith in the Christian tradition. (459) 
Angela does believe that den Manuel and Lazaro, although they thought or feared 
they did net believe, were, in fact, believers. And she finally believes that God, for seme 
inscmtable reason, made don Manuel and Lazaro believe they were unbelievers. 
Boerigter is right if we were te understand "faith" in the traditional institutional sense. 
Hence, Angela would be stmggling with faith in a rational fashion, "as if it were a math 
problem" (Boerigter 459). However, if we read this conclusion in the light of Unamuno's 
previous definition of faith as sincerity, tolerance and mercy, and net beliefs, the path is 
clear for a definition of faith with freedom of conscience at its heart. Faith is net, for 
Unamuno, an intellectual concurrence with dogmas. Rather it is a search for tmth and life 
in sincerity, tolerance and mercy. Gnosis, mere knowledge, is rejected, while faith is 
xtaWy pistis, more a tmst in a Person than an intellectual allegiance to a dogma: 
Y sobre todo fe mas que creencias, pistis mas que gnosis; porque 
de \a pistis, en se identifican la fe, la esperanza y la caridad; de la pistis, 
que da libertad, igualdad y fratemidad a los hombres: de lapistis bretan la 
sinceridad, para descubrir el ideal siempre y oponerle a la realidad; la 
tolerancia hacia las diversas creencias que dentro de la comiin esperanza 
caben; la misericordia hacia las victimas del pasado y del presente 
incoercibles y fatales. 
jSinceridad, tolerancia y misericordia! 
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Hence, we may conclude that San Manuel Bueno. martir essentially defends faith 
as Unamuno understands it, and the novel implies personal freedom of conscience in its 
search. 
If San Manuel Bueno. martir was indeed one of Unamuno's last works bringing 
together key elements of Unamuno's life and thought, Newman, towards the end of His 
Hfe, faced another critical scenario in regard te religious freedom and institutional 
authority. In 1875 Newman wrote his Letter to the Duke of Norfolk as a response to 
British Prime Minister Gladstone's critique of the First Vatican's Council definition of 
papal infallibility as an article of faith five years previously. 
Gladstone's basic argument is directed towards two elements in papal authority. 
First, that Catholics ewe the Pope absolute obedience in their religious submission. 
Second, that the Pope had jurisdiction in all aspects of a Catholic's life. Seeing that no 
aspect of life escapes papal jurisdiction, and a Catholic has no right to disobey the Pope 
ever, Gladstone draws the conclusion that the Vatican decrees had put the conscience of 
every Catholic at the disposal of the Pope. "Therefore Catholics are moral and mental 
slaves" (Difficulties 224). 
Newman will address both issues raised by Gladstone, coming, of course, te an 
opposite conclusion. In passing, he will develop a philosophy en the supremacy of 
conscience te justify His claims. Se, we shall see that once Newman allows the possibility 
of conscience overmling either the State or the Church in one instance, that is, in either 
the political or the reHgious realm, the need is felt to philosophically justify His position. 
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In this chapter, we shall endeavor first to address the issues as raised by 
Gladstone, and then describe Newman's answer, followed by his philosophy of the 
supremacy of conscience. Hi this, we shall fellow the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk 
(Difficulties), with references to his previous philosophical work in Grammar of Assent 
(Assent). 
A key te the reading of Newman on the question of conscience and the Church is 
tiie method of interpretation he followed. Hi the dedication itself, Newman addressed this 
issue, excluding all interpretations of papal documents except that of both theologians 
and time (Difficulties 176). 
This hermeneutics is carried out throughout. In the final chapter en the Vatican 
Definition, Newman again insists that: 
But Hardly Has she [the Church] spoken out magisterially seme 
great general principle, when she sets her theologians to work te explain 
Her meaning in the concrete, by strict interpretation of its wording, by the 
illusfratien of its circumstances, and by the recognition of exceptions, in 
order te make it as tolerable as possible, and the least of a temptation, te 
self-willed, independent, or wrongly educated minds. (321) 
Newman, no doubt, considered himself one of the Schola Theologorum of the 
Church, for his readings of church documents in the Letter te the Duke of Norfolk are 
carried out in that vein. The importance of this hermeneutics is that Newman is excluding 
Church authority itself as its own exclusive interpreter. This is especially brought out 
when Newman gives the example of the Catholic dilemma with two conflicting Popes: 
"Hew else could private Catholics save their souls when there was a Pope and anti-popes, 
each severally claiming their allegiance?" (245). 
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Coming back te the original question posed by Gladstone, Newman addressed 
both issues; whether obedience is absolute and whether obedience is due by a CathoHc in 
all aspects of his life. The quotation from the Council, used by both Newman and 
Gladstone, is that clergy and laity are "bound by the duty of hierarchical subjection and 
of sincere obedience; and this not only in matters that pertain to faith and morals, but also 
in matters that pertain te the discipline and government of the Church."'" 
First, Newman analyses "hierarchical subjection and sincere obedience." Later, 
we shall investigate Newman's hermeneutics of the "matters" involved. Hi the context of 
Gladstone's question on how Catholics may obey both Queen and Pope, Newman rejects 
"absolute obedience" te either. Newman treated the expression "absolute obedience" with 
irony—Gladstone "speaks of 'absolute obedience' so often, that any reader [.. .] would 
think that the word 'absolute' was the Pope's word, not his" (Difficulties 233). However, 
what is important is hew Newman Himself understands the word. It is obedience which is 
unlimited in extent, obedience te whatever might be commanded. No person en earth, 
neither Pope nor Queen, has such authority ever a person's conscience. 
When [. . .] Mr. Gladstone asks Catholics how they can obey the 
Queen and yet obey the Pope, since it may Happen that the commands of 
the two authorities may clash, 1 answer, that it is my mle, both te obey the 
one and to obey the other, but that there is no mle in this world without 
exceptions, and if either the Pope or the Queen demanded of me an 
"Absolute Obedience," he or she would be transgressing the laws of 
human nature and human society. I give an absolute obedience to neither. 
Further, if ever this double allegiance pulled me in contrary ways, which 
in this age of the world I think it never will, then I should decide according 
te the particular case, which is beyond all mle, and must be decided en its 
own merits. (Difficulties 243) 
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In this answer Newman developed a personalist ethical theory based on, in this 
writer's opinion, an empiricist philosophy, whereby the real is the concrete. Universal 
statements are, ipsofacto, belonging to the realm of the unreal." Ultimately, the 
individual must decide in each case, because such is the nature of the world. And the laws 
of Human nature and Human society, according te Newman's philosophy, are universal. 
There is no mle without exceptions. Se, seeing that there is no mle without exceptions, 
such universal, that is, in all cases, obedience to either Church or State always has its 
limits. 
In the Essay en the Grammar of Assent (Assent), Newman's defines conscience as 
both a moral sense and a sense of duty. In the Letter te the Duke of Norfolk Newman 
again rejects a definition of conscience as the "right of self-will" and a definition of 
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conscience that would empty it of its content (Difficulties 249-250). A ftirther reflection 
shows that Newonan thought that, in fact, such a conflict between Pope and Queen, 
Church and State, could never happen. However, he did go on te consider possible 
examples of How that might occur. There are possible cases where a Catholic should obey 
the Pope ever the command of the Queen and, likewise, situations when a Catholic 
should obey the Queen over a command of the Pope (239-42). Hi another part of the 
Letter, he clearly implied that the Pope did, in fact, overstep His authority (217).'^ 
What is important for our study is the fact that Newman does teach that a Catholic 
may disobey the Pope, in certain "suppesable cases," under certain conditions (242): "Its 
[conscience's] dictate, in order te prevail against the voice of the Pope, must follow upon 
serious thought, prayer, and all available means of arriving at a right judgment of the 
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matter in question (257-58). Newman concluded in principle that a Catholic's obedience 
to the Pope; "though not 'absolute' even in religious matters, [. . .] he [the Pope] has a 
supreme call on our obedience" (240). This distinction between our net owing an 
absolute obedience to the Pope and His having a supreme call on our obedience will be 
deah with by Newman later on in the Letter te the Duke of Norfolk (256-57). Newman 
maintains there that obedience te the injunctions of a Pope must be withheld at the dictate 
of conscience. However, the main thesis comes in dramatic form at the end of the section 
en conscience: "I add one remark. Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-
dinner toasts, (which indeed does net seem quite the thing) I shall drink—te the Pope, if 
you please,-still, te Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards" (261). 
The second aspect of Gladstone's critique centered en the Pope's power over all 
aspects of a Catholic's life. "Absolute" means unlimited in its authority in any aspect of a 
CathoHc's Hfe. "Matters of faith and morals," as defined by Vatican I, would seem to 
cover all one's life (Vatican I 246). Newman begins his comments by stating that "Mr. 
Gladstone says that 'the Pontiff declares te belong te him the supreme direction of 
Catholics in respect te all duty.' Supreme direction; tme, but 'supreme' is net 'minute,' 
nor does 'direction' mean 'supervision' or 'managemenf (Difficulties 227). Te make his 
point, Newman drew two parallels; that of Human law, and that of medical supervision. 
Human law directs our conduct and must be obeyed, but Has net total direction of every 
aspect of our lives. Likewise, Church law and authority has power over us; "yet no one 
would say that the Law, after all, with all its power in the abstract and its executive 
vigour in fact, interferes with our comfort or our conscience" (227). Again, the bottom 
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line seems that law, perse, whether State or Church, is in the realm of the abstract. 
Therefore, conscience is needed to apply that law to the individual situation. Again, in the 
example of the businessman with a medical adviser, Newman tried te answer Gladstone's 
objection to the seemingly limitless authority, and. Hence, possible tyranny of the Pope 
ever tiie whole domain of a Catholic's conduct. Newman's thesis is that the Pope may 
have authority over any act of a Catholic, but not over every act of a Catholic. A medical 
adviser may indirectly control the business life of his patient, as to his meals, schedule, 
tiips or, in fact, any act. This control is not slavery understood as total authority over all 
areas of Human conduct, but rather indirect authority in all life's matters. Hence, the 
distinction is between authority in every act of the patient and authority in any act of the 
patient. An example would be that the doctor may tell the patient net te travel to an 
attorney te write His will, but would net be competent to tell the patient not to make a 
will. 
Likewise a Catholic is net a slave of the Pope, who has a general authority over 
any act of his life. Again, however, Newman insisted that papal power may cover all 
one's life, and must be applied by the individual conscience to concrete situations (231­
32). An example would be that the Pope, or the Church, may determine the laws of 
marriage according to the Church, but, obviously, would not tell the Catholic who or 
when te marry. So, coming from the question of disobeying the Pope in favor of the 
State, Newman has advanced te the consideration of who uHimately decides when to 
obey one or the other. Having accepted the individual's conscience as the supreme guide 
in these hypothetical conflicts of Church and State authority, Newman was brought te the 
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conclusion that the individual Catholic conscience may mle against the Pope in ether 
suppesable cases. Having, therefore, accepted the principle of a supremacy of conscience 
over the Pope in certain circumstances, Newman felt obliged to give reasons for his 
thesis. Newman substantiated his claim that the dictate of conscience may overmle 
saying: "I must begin with the Creator and His creature, when I would draw out the 
prerogatives and the supreme authority of Conscience" (246). 
Newman based His claim on three principles: 
Conscience has the antecedence of natural religion te revealed religion. 
Conscience is foundational te the mission of any Church. 
Conscience is coeval with creation. 
This threefold priority of conscience over the Pope touches the very essence of 
Newman's toast te conscience first, and then te the Pope. The after-dinner hypothetical 
toast is the conclusion of the section of the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk on conscience 
where Newman begins by linking conscience to creation. Just before the toast, there is a 
citation of theological opinion to the effect that conscience is always te be obeyed. The 
toast, therefore, reflects the entitlement of conscience to obedience in all circumstances, 
based en its link te creation, and supported by traditional Catholic theological opinion 
(261). 
A first reason given for the authority of conscience is its being the principle of 
natural religion. Newman's argument maybe described as follows: Revelation, including, 
of course, the authority of the Pope, depends on Natural Religion; and Natural Religion 
depends on conscience as a sense of right and wrong. Firstly, Revelation, according to 
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Newman, depends on Natural Religion. Hence, His lapidary phrase in the Letter to the 
Duke of Norfolk: "The Pope, who comes of Revelation, has no jurisdiction ever Nature" 
(254). The philosophy of reHgion espoused is that revelation is net independent of but 
rather complements, natural religion. In the Grammar of Assent Newman Had asserted 
that "beHef in revealed tmths depends en belief in natural" (Assent 321). Hi An Essay en 
the Development of Christian Doctrine Newman had affirmed the role of revelation as 
being parallel, but posterior, te the role of conscience in natural religion. In fact, he 
considered the mle of conscience as being prior te the mle of revelation, the former 
having a subjective authority, the latter an objective one. 
Secondly, conscience, as a sense of right and wrong, is "the first element in 
religion" (Difficulties 253). In the Grammar of Assent Newman had written of 
conscience as "our great intemal teacher of religion," giving us "a mle of right and 
wrong, as being His mle, and a code of moral duties" (304) and concluding "that no 
religion is from God which contradicts our sense of right and wrong" (325). Based en this 
philosophy of religion and conscience, Newman rejected a notion of the Papacy using 
"revealed prerogatives" to neglect "his mission of preaching tmth, justice, mercy, and 
peace, much more if He trampled on the consciences of his subjects" (254). Here at work 
is a clear rejection of Antinomianism as if papal authority were ever and above the 
natural law and human conscience. Two objections may immediately be made te this 
supremacy of conscience based on its role in natural religion and nattiral religion's role in 
revelation. First, that in the text, Newman insisted en conscience as "the least luminous 
of teachers." Second, that natural religion "needs" te be "sustained and completed by 
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Revelation" (Difficulties 254). However, we note that in the same sentence that Newman 
considered conscience the "least luminous" of teachers, he also considered it "the highest 
of all teachers." This paradoxical philosophy recalls Unamuno. Grasping its difficuHy 
brings us closer te Newman's teaching en conscience. Hi the same vein that Newman saw 
the enormous limitations of conscience, he also states its supremacy as teacher. Hence, 
conscience should always be followed even if easily mistaken. But, precisely because it is 
so weak and erroneous, as part of its sense of right and wrong, conscience is precisely 
bound to seek right and wrong beyond its own defective perspective. But one affirmation 
cannot eliminate the other in Newman. 
As for the second objection on the need for revealed religion, the above weakness 
of conscience explains why religion is at all necessary. Being human and individual, 
conscience tends to err and, therefore, needs help to find right and wrong. Hence, a 
human need for religion, and the Church. But such a necessity in no way eliminates the 
primordial essence of the seeker. To state the need for conscience te know right and 
wrong presupposes that conscience in fact does seek right and wrong. Hence, conscience 
demands respect at all stages of its search. Religion, as something required by 
conscience, would lose its raison d'etre were it te suffocate conscience. The doctor is 
only needed where the sick exists. 
The second basis for Newman's claim for supremacy of conscience is its role as 
being foundational te the mission of the Church. Newman wrote: "On the law of 
conscience and its sacredness are founded both his [the Pope's] authority in theory and 
his power in fact" (252). Newman explains this foundational role of conscience vis-a-vis 
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the Papacy in that it is the Pope's "very mission to proclaim the moral law." In this moral 
theology, the moral law, knowable by "the light of nature," that is, by conscience, is 
definitively made known by revelation, from which also the Pope derives his teaching 
office. Hence, part and parcel of the Papacy is to proclaim the natural moral law of which 
conscience is an essential part. Hi that sense, conscience is foundational to the Pope's 
mission. Hence, Newman concluded that "the championship of the Moral Law and of 
conscience is His [Pope's] raison d'etre" (253). However, Newman immediately clarifies 
the concept of papal proclamation of moral law by not limiting the role of the Papacy, 
and of the Church, to "a mere republication of the Natural Law" (254). Religion is 
"distinct" and "beyond" the teaching of nature. So, even though the Pope should preach 
respect for conscience, such a teaching in no way takes away from the originality of 
religion. Again, we have the paradox in Newman. On the one Hand, respect for 
conscience must be preached by religious authorities. On the other hand, conscience 
needs religion. 
Newman is at the same time affirming the need for the Pope te respect conscience 
and proclaiming all parts of the moral law are part of the Pope's mission. Therefore, a 
wTong conclusion would be to make Newman teach that conscience is inherently opposed 
to or en a different track te Christianity. On the contrary, precisely because the Pope 
teaches respect for conscience as part of his mission, in the same manner other elements 
of the moral law are within his teaching authority. Whether conscience accepts His 
teaching authority is another matter. But Newman is writing the Letter te the Duke of 
Norfolk in the context of Catholic coherence in His teaching on conscience and the 
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Catholic Church. So, seeing that the Papacy teaches the moral law, and 
conscience is 
essential to that law, it follows that if "He [the Pope] neglected His mission of preaching 
tmth, justice, mercy, and peace, much more if he trampled en the consciences of his 
subjects,... then he could not have lasted all these many centuries till new" (254). But 
Newman also applies the teaching of the Pope vis-a-vis conscience to the authority of the 
Pope vis-a-vis conscience. If the Pope "could net speak against conscience," it follows 
that the Church itself is "built" on "the right and duty of following that Divine Authority, 
the voice of conscience" (252). The Church is built on conscience, according to Newman, 
because what inspires papal authority is a sense of right and wrong. Likewise, what 
inspires a person in conscience te follow the Pope is precisely the same sense of right and 
wrong. Going back te Newman's experience in His "great change" to Reman Catholicism 
(349), we saw hew he became a Catholic because he thought it was the right thing te do. 
His conversion had no value if it were not a conversion in conscience. Therefore, his 
conscience was what brought him te Rome. On the other Hand, He became a Catholic 
precisely because He saw that the Church of Rome was right, and that its doctrines and 
teaching authority were from God, the same creator of his conscience seeking tmth. 
In a curious twist to the historical arguments found in An Essay on the 
Development of Christian Doctrine, in the Letter te the Duke of Norfolk the very 
historical fact of the survival of the Papacy throughout the ages becomes proof of His 
claim te defend conscience and the moral law. Net only did Newman argue that if the 
Pope had trampled en the consciences of his subjects. He would net have survived (254); 
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but he also affirms the very fact of conscience as the only foundation for the survival of 
the Papacy. 
It is by the universal sense of right and wrong, [...] as first 
principles deeply lodged in the hearts of men, it thus and only thus, that he 
[the Pope] Has gained his footing in the world and achieved his success. It 
is His claim to come from the Divine Lawgiver, in order to elicit, protect, 
and enforce those tmths which the Lawgiver has sewn in our very nature, 
it is this and this only, that is the explanation of his [the Papacy] length of 
Hfe. (253) 
Se, according te Newman, if the Pope mles by divine authority, conscience, with 
the sense of right and wrong, will require that he be obeyed as part of that same sense of 
right and wrong. 
A third reason for conscience's supremacy is that it is coeval with creation. 
Newman Had begun his chapter on conscience in the Letter te the Duke of Norfolk : "I 
must begin with the Creator and His creature, when I would draw out the prerogatives 
and the supreme authority of Conscience" (246). Here we find the same contrast noted 
above between natural and revealed religion, between moral law and papal respect for 
conscience, also present between divine creation and the divine authority of conscience. 
Conscience has its force because it is the etemal law of God as apprehended in the minds 
of individual men. Again, it may "suffer refraction," but still remains the Divine Law. 
The conclusion is that even though it be mistaken, it still is divine and ought te be 
obeyed. Newman, therefore, gees beyond the mere paradox of conscience being the 
Highest and the least luminous of teachers. Its force comes because it is always "divine." 
Consequently, seeing that conscience is always divine, whereas the voice of the Pope 
may sometimes be seen as not divine, it follows that the voice of conscience prevails. The 
166 

basic argument of the Letter te the Duke of Norfolk is that divine law is supreme as 
coming from God. But there is an inherent subjectivity in the individual's knowledge of 
that law. Nonetheless, the subject is bound to fellow God as he knows Him and His law 
over and above any human, including papal, authority. So, Newman espouses not some 
moralistic cede of conduct according to conscience, but rather sees God as always present 
in the very definition of conscience. Consequently, conscience is always te be obeyed 
since God is always to be obeyed. Whereas, the Pope, by his very human nattire is never 
God and, hence, is net always te be obeyed. Hence, the precedence of conscience over 
die Pope is not only a matter of what comes later in time. Rather it is the precedence of 
what is created over what is perfected. All of the above, in this third reason, in no way 
takes away from the erring character of conscience and its possible need for religion and 
church. 
The next step is to determine the consequences of Newman's teaching en the 
supremacy of conscience, especially in the case of a believing CathoHc. If conscience is 
always to be obeyed, when is the Church te be obeyed by a believing Catholic? In a 
parallel fashion we may ask the same question for someone who accepts the divine 
authority of seme other religion. Is obedience either blind and supreme, or never at all? 
Newman applied te his original question in the Letter te the Duke of Norfolk a personal 
philosophy of conscience. Before entering into Newman's theory of a CathoHc 
conscience questioning the Pope, we see the same pattem of conscience questioning 
religious authority throughout Newman's life as described in this essay. Newman was 
bom into one Church and, following his conscience, decided te follow different religious 
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authonties. Hiherent in His philosophy is the optimism that conscience sincerely followed 
perse leads to tmth: "ft [conscience] is se constituted that, if obeyed, it becomes clearer 
in its injunctions, and wider in their range, and corrects and completes the accidental 
feebleness of its initial teachings" (Assent 304). 
In Unamuno's case, in the novel San Manuel Bueno, martir, Angela, no doubt, is 
the inquiring mind progressing throughout the work by questions, reflections and 
examples to a new faith in conscience, seeking tmth and life. 
This is similar te Newman's conviction, present in all His life, that tmth and, in His 
case, tme religion only needs a love for tmth: "Thus it is that the Catholic religion is 
reached, as we, by inquirers from all points of the compass, as if it mattered net where a 
man began, so that he had an eye and a heart for the tmth" (295). Therefore, we note that 
Newman was net in favor of a "cafeteria Christianity," according to which supremacy of 
conscience means a believer can select at random what teachings of Church authority 
convince Him: "We are net left at liberty te pick and choose out of its contents according 
te our judgment, but must receive it all, as we find it, if we accept it at all (302). 
Retuming to the text and context of the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, Newman is 
answering a specific question as to the freedom of a believer in the political and religious 
realm when the two came into conflict. However, he answered Gladstone by stating that 
if conscience and the Pope, operating in the same domain as they do when the Pope 
legislates, or gives particular orders, and the like, were te clash, conscience would Have 
the final say (256-57). Ultimately, in conflicts of Church, State and conscience; reHgion 
politics and personal decision; conscience is supreme. And being supreme, conscience 
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must be free to seek tmth ever the dictates of political and religious authority. Were it 
coerced, controlled or censored, it would not be free, nor tme conscience. 
Hence, we may conclude that even though Newman and Unamuno approach the 
issue of religious authority from totally different perspectives in these publications of 
their final days—one is the believer defending his Church, while the other is the doubter 
who causes his spiritual daughter to disbelieve, ultimately both authors are defending the 
right of free examination and choice against dogmatic and unquestioning obedience to 
constituted authority, whether it claims te be human or divine. 
Conscience, understood as a moral and dutifiil sense in each human being, is the 
"kindly Light" (Verses XC: 156) te lead each one freely to "tmth in life and life in tmth" 
("Mi ReHgion" 370). 
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CHAPTER \X 

CONCLUSION 

Y reclame mi libertad, mi santa libertad, 
Hasta la de contradecirme, si llega el case.' 
Obedience even te an erring conscience 
was the way to gain light.^ 
The main purpose of this work has been te seek in Miguel de Unamuno a 
coherent theory on freedom of conscience. By comparing his life, literature and 
philosophy, with that of John Henry Newman, a champion of conscience in Catholic 
circles, our hope is that this mirroring will ftirther enhance the statiire of Unamuno as a 
heroic defender of the principle of academic, political and religious freedom. This 
writer's opinion is that extant literature on Unamuno, up te new. Has insisted on "what" 
Unamuno believed or disbelieved rather than his defense of freedom of conscience as a 
human right. 
The emphasis here is based en Unamuno's quest for tmth in life and life in tmth 
("Mi religion" 370), as one such odyssey, presupposing principles of free examination, 
ongoing search and personal choice in one's convictions. At the same time, the role of 
authority, be it academic, political or religious, is consistently open te questioning and, 
ultimately, rejection by Unamuno. In censtrast, this free-thinker, Miguel de Unamuno y 
Jugo, is likewise subject to intents of censorship, control or coercion by demotion, exile 
and arrest. So, our focus is net en Unamuno's views as such, but rather en His opinions as 
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being his, and net constrained by these of others, no matter how much power they may 
claim to have over him. 
There are undoubtedly points of difference as well as similarities between 
Unamuno and John Henry, in later life Cardinal, Newman. Beginning with childhood 
reminiscences, Unamuno in his Recuerdos de nifiez y mocedad and Newman in An Essay 
in Aid of a Grammar of Assent see a natural sense of right and wrong, prior and 
independent of all fiiture authority. Unamuno explains how He was educated in 
institutional Catholicism as practiced in Spain at the time, whereas Newman was te know 
the Via Media of the Anglican Church. Both were religious youths, with Unamuno 
fervently practicing the Catholicism of His Heme even te the degree of considering the 
ministry, whereas Newman came to relish the Bible religion of His family. Their 
patriotism was a love of country and culture, but Unamuno had the pain of witnessing a 
civil war in his town with fanatical religious overtones while Newman relished the 
tmthfiilness of an Englishman within a State Church. 
Their adolescence involved both changes in conscience and challenges te 
traditional religiosity. Newman and Unamuno began te be avid readers of philosophy: 
deists like Paine and Hume are mentioned in Newman's Apologia Pro Vita Sua, while 
Unamuno in His Recuerdos and Ensayos speaks of Kant, Descartes and Hegel. Newman 
accepted, then questioned, the evangelical Protestantism of his mentor. Rev. Mayers, 
whereas Unamuno rejected the interpretations of Donoso and Balmes. Philosophical 
searching and emotional mysticism are characteristics of their love ofti-uth and life. 
Though thefr convictions and authorities were different, both preferred te question 
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formeriy-held doctrines in order te follow their own opinions rather than preconceived 
dogmas. 
Beth had eariy experience with death: Newman that of his sister and His own 
weak health, Unamuno that of His father and a bloody civil war on His doorstep. The 
question of all questions for both was that of life beyond the grave, and both found reason 
lacking. In Newman's case, he came across rationalist liberalism, understood as a 
rejection of religion, on arrival at Oxford. This dream was mdely shattered by the 
awareness of his infirm body while his letters, diaries and poems shew how his sister's 
demise shattered his acceptance of an ideology reduced to this world. Unamuno followed 
a more philosophical path in Del sentimiento tragico de la vida en les hombres y en les 
pueblos te refute the rationalist preefs-by reason alene-ef the existence of God and 
personal immortality. Their analysis of the limitations of human reason brings both 
writers to see the realities of illness and death, teaching them that there are mysteries our 
human minds simply cannot reach. And precisely because our minds are limited in their 
knowledge of essential tmths, both Unamuno and Newman will deduce in their lives and 
writings that no Human knowledge may claim to be totally complete. Though their 
conclusion will go towards different definitions - "private judgment" in Newman; 
"sentimiento tragico" in Unamuno, nonetheless their perspective holds. No human mind 
may insist that their personal view on tmth is whole and complete, to the exclusion of all 
others. 
Freedom of conscience for both Newman and Unamuno meant agony in exile. 
Both were banished from their respective universities and churches. Unamuno was also 
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exiled from His beloved Spain, whereas Newman was considered suspect in his adopted 
Church. In both cases, the authors were motivated by love for these Institutions, but were 
willing te pay the price of dissenting followers of conscience. Neither accepted so-called 
blind obedience nor happy ignorance. This courage either to leave or be exiled 
presupposes the supremacy of conscience over institutions, however fearfiil. 
The relationship of both with the institutional Reman Catholic Church is 
obviously their most notable difference. While Newman became a famous convert, 
Unamuno was branded the "hereje mdximo" While one is its foremost intellectual 
proponent in the English-speaking worid, the another is blamed as leading many Spanish 
speakers to heresy, if not apostasy. Nonetheless, both changes, for and against 
Catholicism, took place because both felt that was their duty, there and then. Their 
decisions were based en an intellectual analysis of historical Catholicism, Newman in An 
Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine and Unamuno in La agonia del 
cristianismo. And, as writers, both decided to go public, in the presupposition that readers 
could decide for themselves. And, seeing that they did alter their institutional allegiance, 
such a tumareund implies the freedom of conscience of Newman and Unamuno to do se, 
while their persuasive writings entail they believed their followers Had a similar right te 
search and question, doubt and decide. 
Unamuno and Newman both deepen their philosophy of life from a perspective of 
death. By analyzing the experience of death, Newman and Unamuno gave their lives 
meaning. While Newman lived the reality of an agony close te death in Sicily, related in 
the Apologia and his poems as later giving him courage te follow his conscience, 
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Unamuno in the Sentimiento trapir.o philosophically sees the problem of personal 
immortality at the heart of our conscience. The role of religion is thus explained as a 
pluralistic attempt te satisfy the human need for personal immortality. Hence, the mystery 
of Hfe after death implies the possibility of various answers to the enigma of its contents. 
And these various answers suppose the free search in conscience for a plausible religious 
solution. 
The two most famous works of both authors, dealing with issues of conscience, 
came towards the end of their lives: "A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk" and San Manuel 
Bueno, martir. Again, apparently, the differences could not be greater. While the former 
seeks to defend Catholicism, the latter presents its protagonist curate as a non-believer. 
However, a carefiil reading of the context and finality of both works lead us te affirm that 
both defend the right of conscience te dissent from authority, while obedience to 
authority can never be either total nor absolute. Se, while Newman affirms the supremacy 
of a Catholic's conscience over Church and State, Unamuno skillfiilly combines the 
disbelief of the priest with his respect for the conscience of his fleck. 
So, ultimately, despite following diverse paths and arriving at divergent 
destinations, both Newman and Unamuno believe in following conscience wherever it 
may lead while freely searching for truth in life and life in tmth, respecting freedom of 
conscience for all. This is their faith: "sinceridad, tolerancia y misericordia."^ 
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CHAPTER X 

EPILOGUE 

Y no estaras de veras cempleta y abselutamente solo 

hasta que te despejes de ti mismo, 

al horde del sepulcro.' 

Death is the final line.^ 
To understand Newman's toast te and Unamuno's defense of conscience, we have 
chosen a chronological development in order te have as an ultimate guiding interpretative 
principle their lives themselves. Newman claims that "a man's life lies in His letters. 
Biographers varnish; they assign motives; they conjecture feeling [...] they palHate or 
defend." Unamuno insists that "lo que en un filosofo nos debe mas importar es el 
hombre." Se, possibly the best epilogue to our essay are the conclusions to Newman's 
and Unamuno's fives played out in defense of freedom of conscience. 
In Nevraian's case, as late as September 1876, he had made a note in his private 
journal, for the benefit of friends after His death, referring to the unjust treatment he Had 
received from religious authorities in retum for His labors en behalf of the Church. Again, 
He insists that he is not disappointed nor ambitious, but feels a "seem and wonder at the 
injustice shewn me."^ He knows some will read this as disappointment at net receiving 
promotion in the Church, but is convinced that precisely His lack of interest in 
ecclesiastical career advancement makes him follow His conscience and speak His mind 
freely: 
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But I had no wish te get it [promotion], and it was my very 
consciousness that I never Had had such aspiration, nor felt any such 
disappointment, and was simply careless whether they thought I Had or no, 
that made me thus speak. And at other times of my life also I have used 
words which, when I used them, 1 saw could be used against me, but did 
net care whether they were se used or net, from a clear conscience that it 
would be a mistaken use of them, if they were. (Autobiographical 
Writings 273-74) 
However, the University and Church that either exiled or doubted him were now to 
invite Newman back into their domains as a glorious sen. 
So, en 15 December 1877, Newman received an invitation from the President of 
Trinity College, Oxford, te become the college's first Honorary fellow. Newman was 
overjoyed: 
I Have just received a very great compliment, perhaps the greatest I 
ever received. Trinity Has been the one and only seat of my affections at 
Oxford, and te see once mere, before I am taken away, what I never 
thought I should see again, the place where I began the battle of life [...] 
is a prospect almost toe much for me te bear. (Letters and Diaries 23: 283­
84) 
As a way of showing gratitude te Trinity College, He took the "bold step" of 
dedicating the new edition of the Development of Doctrine te its President. In the 
dedication He noted the "happy coincidence, that whereas its first publication was 
contemporaneous with my leaving Oxford, its second becomes, by virtue of your act, 
contemporaneous with a recovery of my position there." 
After writing this entry, only one ftirther line was added: "Since writing the above 
I have been made a Cardinal!" (Autobiographical Writings 275). John H. Newman, once 
considered by some Catholics as the "most dangerous man in England," new became 
Cardinal Newman in one of the first acts of Lee XIII. Pope Lee is said te have his doubts. 
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Years later, he told an English visitor: "My Cardinal! ft was not easy, it was not easy. 
They said he was toe liberal, but I had determined to Honour the Church in honoring 
Newman. I always Had a cult for him. I am proud that 1 was able te honour such a man" 
(Letters and Diaries 29: 426). 
Hi this essay we Have net refen-ed to Cardinal Newman with such a title, precisely 
because Newman only became a cardinal at age 78. All of His writings and witness were 
accomplished eariier in life. So, here, we agree with Frank Turner that our protagonist is 
not "John Henry Cardinal Newman" but simply John Henry Newman.* Nonetheless, the 
two loves of his life, university and church. Had joyously come back together in an 
astonishing way at the very end. 
Unamuno's conscience led Him te a totally different end with His beloved university 
of Salamanca, country of Spain and religion of his childhood. On October 12,1936, as a 
witness te His country bleeding te death on the battlefield and his own Salamanca heme 
te foreign froeps of "liberation," the lonely old man could net take it any longer. Though 
not scheduled to speak. He stood up to denounce the hatred, violence and sectarianism of 
General Millan Astray, whose battle cry had been "j Viva la muertel" His conscience 
inspired courage to face the armed guards and cowed civilians in the Great Hall of the 
University of Salamanca. In answer to the General's intermptien "\Muera la 
r , ,9 
inteligencia^'' Unamuno declared: "Vencereis, pero no convencereis. 
The consequences for Unamuno were tragic: again he was demoted as Rector of 
the University, his friends insulted him at His aftemeen cafe and the State confined him te 
house arrest. Upon his death, the Church took ever His religious fimeral and the miHtary 
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gave his open tomb the Fascist salute. University, Church and State seemed te Have 
vanquished the final words of Unamuno. 
However, as this essay Hoped to shew, the free voices of conscience in both 
Newman and Unamuno are clear and courageous in our world today. Force, fear and 
falsehood have net convinced! 
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